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Crypto 101 by Laurens Van Houtven
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PyCon 2013
March 16, 2013
Programming
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1.6k
Crypto 101 by Laurens Van Houtven
PyCon 2013
March 16, 2013
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Transcript
Crypto 101 @lvh
@lvh
[email protected]
None
None
None
POST /quantum HTTP/1.1
None
Lightning Talk Version
In motion: TLS
At rest: GPG
(Py)NaCl KeyCzar cryptlib
If you are typing the letters A-E-S into your code,
you’re doing it wrong.
DES: extra wrong MD5, SHA: maybe wrong
Why stay?
Recognizing wrong stuff still matters
Understanding stuff still matters
None
None
xor
1 ^ 0 == 1 0 ^ 1 == 1
1 ^ 1 == 0 0 ^ 0 == 0
Invert? Input Output
Invert: yes (1) Input: 1 Output: 0
Invert: no (0) Input: 1 Output: 1
One-time Pad
1110010101010110 1010100000111101 0100101010101010 ...
OTP crypto XWCVPR
Perfect secrecy
0? 1? 1
1? 0? 1
None
None
None
Victory!
len(one_time_pad)
== len(all_data_ever)
== very_big_number
Exchange?
Ciphers
Block Ciphers
Block Cipher Key abc XYZ Ciphertext Same fixed size Plaintext
Fixed size
P C
Random permutation
000: 001 001: 010 010: 111 011: 000 100: 110
101: 011 110: 100 111: 101
x, C(k, x) vs y, C(k, y)
P C
AES
Blowfish/Twofish
DES/3DES
Victory!
“Hello”
with open(“x.jpg”) as f: send(f, you)
Block Cipher
len(message) > block_size
aes.block_size == 128 (16 bytes)
Stream Ciphers
Native stream ciphers
RC4
Salsa20 ChaCha20
Implemented as construction with block ciphers
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw C k C k C k C k C
k C k C k { { { { { { { { C k padding KEGASVTPCFDRUWBOJNMHXQIL { { { { { { { {
ECB
plaintext chunk ciphertext chunk
None
None
None
None
Replay Attacks
None
None
Block Cipher Modes of Operation
ECB, (P)CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR
ECB, (P)CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR
CBC
Most common in the wild
BEAST
CTR
{nonce}{count:08d}
D501320200000000 D501320200000001 D501320200000002 Nonce Count . . .
C k C k D501320200000000, D501320200000001, ... D1DC4D1FE3679212, 0FD25C7B1CF46485, ...
D1DC4D1FE3679212 0FD25C7B1CF46485 ...
Keystream
Pseudo-OTP
GCM, EAX, OCB, IAPM, CCM, CWC
GCM, EAX, OCB, IAPM, CCM, CWC
PATENT PENDING
Victory!
None
Key exchange?
In person?
None
O(n2)
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
None
= +
= + +
- =
Internet Me You
None
+ = + =
None
None
+ = + =
= + + + +
Victory!
None
Cease fire! ZSTAMUTJMEFFILH Cease fire!
Attack at dawn! HUWKEMMQTXMR Attack at dawn!
Authenticity
sender == expected_sender
message == expected_message
Encryption without authentication
Almost certainly wrong
Attackers don’t need to decrypt to modify
Cryptographic hash functions
lorem ipsum 358d846c39 digest (state) fixed size message arbitrary size
Hash Function
lorem ipsum 358d846c39 Hash Function
lorem ipsum 358d846c39 Hash Function
lorem python 358d846c39 lorem ipsum 358d846c39 Hash Function Hash Function
lorem python 358d846c39 lorem ipsum 358d846c39 Hash Function Hash Function
That’s it.
H(x) can be used to compute H(f(x))
Extension attacks
hf = HF(“hello pycon\n”) hf.update(“how are you”) hf.hexdigest()
hf = HF(state=your_hash) hf.update(my_string) hf.hexdigest()
my_string = “\nI am not attending, because I have switched
to PHP”
Payment processor
MD5(secret + amount)
$12.00: “1200”
hf = HF(state=your_hash) hf.update(“0” * 12) hf.hexdigest()
bwall/HashPump
SHA-3 era: fixed (SHA-3, BLAKE2)
SHA-256, SHA-3 (both are fine)
BLAKE2
MAC
H(x) can be used to compute H(f(x))
MAC(k, x) says nothing about MAC(k, f(x))
MAC(k, x) says nothing about MAC(k, y)
HMAC
hmac(k, hf, msg)
import hmac
Password storage
CHFs are WRONG
password 45ed8f8c31 Hash Function
Brute force?
None
ATI HD 5970, 2GB 5.6e9 MD5/s 2.3e9 SHA2/s
None
SHA-3?
lorem ipsum 358d846c39 Hash Function
SHA-2-256: 14 cpb SHA-3-256: 11 cpb (Intel Ivy Bridge/Sandy Bridge)
Salts?
Dictionary attacks
KDFs should be hard to compute
bcrypt (tunably) time-hard
scrypt time- and space-hard
Sender authentication?
None
Public key Cryptography
None
None
None
Key generation
me me you you
me you
Encryption
PK Enc you hello world BXUWD VWQEF
Decryption
PK Dec you hello world BXUWD VWQEF you
Signing
Anyone can use my public key
How do I know you’re you?
PK Dec you Signature HF(m) you
PK Enc you Signature HF(m)
RSA
Victory!
“me” == actually me?
Chains of signatures
I don’t trust you.
But X trusts you.
And I trust X.
So I trust you.
GPG key signing
SSL
TLS
None
version, ciphersuites, ...
Key exchange method (RSA, DH, ...)
Signing algorithm (RSA, DSA, ECDSA)
Bulk encryption algorithm (AES-CBC, RC4...)
MAC algorithm (HMAC-{MD5, SHA2})
version, ciphersuites, ...
✓
RSA Enc srvr random secret OUTDX BHXUS
OUTDXBHXUS
RSA Dec srvr random secret OUTDX BHXUS srvr
random secret AES MAC random secret AES MAC
MAC
None
Encrypted + Authenticated
✓
None
CAs
...
None
valid vs trustworthy?
valid vs trustworthy?
What if I plant a root cert?
sslbump
ICAP/eCAP
lvh/minitrue
Questions?
Timing attacks
Side-channel
Implementation, not theory
None
None
None
None
None
provided == password
compare length
compare byte by byte
“abc” == “xyz”
“abc” == “ayz”
“abc” == “abz”
len(alpha) ** len(pw)
X * X * X * .... len(alpha) possibilities len(pwd)
times
k * len(alpha) * len(pw) possibilities measurements characters
More TLS
Client certificates
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curves ECDH/ECDSA