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Blockchain, Crypto Infrastructure and the Trans...

Blockchain, Crypto Infrastructure and the Transaction Cost View of Economic History

These materials will review the Transaction Cost View of Economic History starting with Hunter Gatherer Societies to the end of the Pre-Analog Era. Students are encouraged consider whether Blockchain / Crypto Infrastructure is the next logical continuation of this arc of history ? v1.02

Daniel Martin Katz

February 04, 2019
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  1. @ computational professor daniel martin katz danielmartinkatz.com BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOCURRENCY AND

    LAW professor nelson rosario CRYPTO AND THE TRANSACTION COST VIEW OF ECONOMIC HISTORY nelsonmrosario.com @ nelsonmrosario BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  2. DANIEL MARTIN KATZ E D U | I L L

    I N O I S T E C H + S TA N F O R D C O D E X B LO G | C O M P U TAT I O N A L L E GA L S T U D I E S . C O M PAG E | DA N I E L M A R T I N K AT Z . C O M C O R P | L E X P R E D I C T. C O M NELSON ROSARIO B LO G | L AWO F C RY P TO C U R R E N C Y. C O M PAG E | N E L S O N M RO S A R I O . C O M F I R M | S M O L I N S K I RO S A R I O L AW P. C . BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM L A B | T H E L AW L A B . C O M E D U | I L L I N O I S T E C H - C H I C AG O K E N T L AW
  3. OVER THE PAST 5000+ YEARS WE HAVE ENGAGED IN A

    MASSIVE TRUST SCALING EXERCISE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  4. NOT BITCOIN PER SE BUT RATHER CRYPTO INFRASTRUCTURE PURPORTS TO

    BE THE NEXT CHAPTER … BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  5. IN THE TRANSACTION COST VIEW OF (ECONOMIC) HISTORY BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM (NOTE:

    THIS IS A HIGH LEVEL OVERVIEW OMITTING MANY KEY DETAILS)
  6. IS THAT WE CAN HELP PUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN A

    PROPER HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE … BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  7. SO TODAY WE WILL HARKEN BACK THOUSANDS OF YEARS AND

    WALK FORWARD … BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  8. HUNTER GATHERER SOCIETIES HUNTING OR FORAGING WAS REQUIRED FOR SUBSISTENCE

    (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  9. HOW WERE WE ABLE TO SLOWLY DEVELOP THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC

    ARRANGEMENTS THAT HELP DEFINE THE MODERN ECONOMY? BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  10. ECONOMIC HISTORY TO DATE CAN BE SEEN AS A QUEST

    TO SCALE TRUST AND LOWER TRANSACTION COSTS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  11. THE ORIGIN AND MAINTENANCE OF TRUST INSTITUTIONS HAS LONG BEEN

    AN INTEREST OF ECONOMISTS, ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENTISTS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  12. HUNTER GATHERER SOCIETIES HUNTING OR FORAGING WAS REQUIRED FOR SUBSISTENCE

    (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  13. BOB HAS RECENTLY KILLED A DEER WITHOUT SALT, BOB CAN

    ONLY PERSONALLY CONSUME A LIMITED AMOUNT OF DEER MEAT BEFORE IT ROTS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  14. BOB HAS RECENTLY KILLED A DEER BOB WOULD LIKE TO

    BOTH TIME SHIFT AND PERHAPS DIVERSIFY HIS CONSUMPTION BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM WITHOUT SALT, BOB CAN ONLY PERSONALLY CONSUME A LIMITED AMOUNT OF DEER MEAT BEFORE IT ROTS
  15. ALICE IS GOOD AT FORAGING BERRIES BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM BERRIES ALSO HAVE

    A LIMITED LIFE WHICH IS LONGER THAN RAW MEAT (BUT NOT UNLIMITED)
  16. ALICE IS GOOD AT FORAGING BERRIES BERRIES ALSO HAVE A

    LIMITED LIFE WHICH IS LONGER THAN RAW MEAT (BUT NOT UNLIMITED) ALICE WOULD LIKE TO DIVERSIFY HER CONSUMPTION BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  17. NO DEBT NO CURRENCY JUST A SPOT BARTER WITH REAL

    TIME DELIVERY IT IS PRACTICALLY THE SIMPLEST FORM OF TRANSACTION BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  18. BUT NOTE EVEN THIS SIMPLE TRANSACTION REQUIRES COORDINATION (I.E. IT

    HAS TRANSACTION COSTS) SEARCH: BARGAINING: NEED TO LEARN THAT THE OTHER PARTY HAS A SURPLUS ENFORCEMENT: BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM NEED TO AGREE UPON AN ACCEPTABLE RATE OF EXCHANGE NEED TO MAKE SURE THE OTHER PARTY DELIVERS ON THE DEAL
  19. PURE ARMS LENGTH BARTER APPEARS TO BE PERHAPS LESS COMMON

    THAN SOME ECONOMIC SCHOLARS ACKNOWLEDGE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  20. BECAUSE MANY LIVED IN SMALL SCALE GROUPS — THUS WERE

    INVOLVED IN REPEATED INTERACTIONS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  21. BARTER INDIVIDUALS IN REPEATED INTERACTION STRANGERS ON THE SPOT MARKET

    CUSTOMS, REPUTATION + INFORMAL CREDITS = = BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  22. FOR EXAMPLE, GIFT ECONOMIES CAN BE SEEN AS RUNNING SOME

    SORT OF AN INFORMAL LEDGER ENFORCED THROUGH SOCIAL NORMS, ETC. BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  23. NOW WE CAN INCREASE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TRANSACTION 3

    FISTS OF BERRIES 2 FISTS OF DEER MEAT <LATER> <TODAY> <TODAY> + 3 FISTS OF BERRIES BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  24. THE BENEFIT OF DEBT IS THAT CREDITOR COULD THEREBY SHIFT

    THEIR CURRENT SURPLUS AND TRANSFER IT TO THE FUTURE (OTHERWISE IT MIGHT BE WASTED) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  25. NOW IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DEBT COULD BE SETTLED

    BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES DEBTOR CREDITOR BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  26. THERE IS A HISTORIC DEBATE REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH

    FORMAL VS INFORMAL MECHANISMS WERE USED TO SATISFY DEBTS DEBTOR CREDITOR BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  27. BUT OFTEN IT IS LESS COSTLY TO ALLOW AN INSTITUTION

    (SUCH AS THE STATE OR 3RD PARTY) TO HELP ENFORCE AGREEMENTS DEBTOR CREDITOR BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  28. IT IS MORE EFFICIENT TO ALLOW EACH PERSON TO SPECIALIZE

    RATHER THAN HAVE TO BE A JACK OF ALL TRADES … HUNTER FORAGER (NOT A PROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTOR) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  29. SOME SYSTEM OF DEBT RECORDING BECOMES IMPORTANT SUCH AS A

    LEDGER … ACCOUNTING LEDGER. TABLET WITH AN ACCOUNT IN SUMERIAN CUNEIFORM DESCRIBING AMOUNTS OF BARLEY BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  30. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO HAVE LEGAL RULES SUCH AS

    CONTRACT LAW TO SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  31. LEDGERS, LEGAL RULES AND CURRENCY ALLOW FOR A RANGE OF

    TRANSACTIONS TO OCCUR WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  32. THE FIELD HAS MANY OFFSHOOTS BUT IT SEEKS TO CHARACTERIZE

    THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS (BROADLY CONSTRUED) IN FACILITATING TRANSACTING BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  33. WHAT ARE ‘TRANSACTION COSTS’ ? “In order to carry out

    a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.“ Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  34. DENNIS P.KEHOE, DAVID RATZAN, AND URI YIFTACH (EDS.), LAW AND

    TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE ANCIENT ECONOMY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS (2015) “Transaction costs (TC) are the ‘friction’ in an economic system, and their analysis is vital to understanding institutional design and economic performance” TOWARD FRICTION FREE TRANSACTING? BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  35. WHAT ARE ‘TRANSACTION COSTS’ ? (1) SEARCH AND INFORMATION COST

    (2) BARGAINING AND DECISION COST (3) POLICING AND ENFORCEMENT COST BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  36. SOME COSTS FOR THE SIMPLE SPOT MARKET BARTER SEARCH: BARGAINING:

    NEED TO LEARN THAT THE OTHER PARTY HAS A SURPLUS ENFORCEMENT: BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM NEED TO AGREE UPON AN ACCEPTABLE RATE OF EXCHANGE NEED TO MAKE SURE THE OTHER PARTY DELIVERS ON THE DEAL
  37. SOME COSTS FOR THE BARTER WITH A DEBT OBLIGATION SEARCH:

    BARGAINING: LARGELY THE SAME ENFORCEMENT: BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM LARGELY THE SAME NEED TO MAKE SURE THE OTHER PARTY DELIVERS ON THE DEAL INCLUDING SECURING PAYMENT AT A LATER POINT IN TIME (I.E., THE DEBT OBLIGATION)
  38. MESOPOTAMIA GREECE ROME MEDIEVAL ERA MERCHANT LAW RENAISSANCE PRE ANALOG

    ERA THE CORPORATION MARITIME LAW + INSURANCE HUNTER GATHERERS CODE OF HAMMURABI SOME EARLY TRANSACTION ENHANCING INNOVATIONS AND SOCIETIES
  39. WE WILL *NOT* DO COMPLETE JUSTICE HERE TO ALL NUANCES

    OF THESE SOCIETIES BUT WE WANT YOU TO SEE THE OVERARCHING THEMES
  40. HUNTER GATHERER SOCIETIES HUNTING OR FORAGING WAS REQUIRED FOR SUBSISTENCE

    (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  41. HUNTER GATHERER SOCIETIES HUMANS BEGAN TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PART

    TO SPECIALIZE IN TOOL MAKING (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  42. HUNTER GATHERER SOCIETIES DEVELOPED COOPERATIVE CULTURAL PRACTICES IN AN EFFORT

    EXTEND TRUST WITHIN SMALL GROUPS (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  43. AGRARIAN SOCIETIES FARMING COMPLETELY (OR PARTIALLY) REPLACES HUNTER/ GATHERING FOR

    SUBSISTENCE (SOME STILL EXIST TODAY) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  44. DEVELOPED A VARIETY OF TRANSACTION COST REDUCING INNOVATIONS CODE OF

    HAMMURABI (BABYLONIAN CODE OF LAW) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM ACCOUNTING LEDGER. TABLET WITH AN ACCOUNT IN SUMERIAN CUNEIFORM DESCRIBING AMOUNTS OF BARLEY ACCOUNTING LAW
  45. A MAJOR CHALLENGE WAS TO ENSURE A CONSISTENT FOOD SUPPLY

    AS MANY URBAN LOCATIONS HAD GROWN BEYOND LOCAL AGRICULTURE CAPACITY BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  46. TO FACILITATE THESE AND OTHER RELATED GOALS IT WAS NECESSARY

    TO DEVELOP AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  47. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE HELPED SUPPORT INCREASING LEVELS OF

    TRANSACTIONS OVER LONGER AND LONGER DISTANCES BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  48. IN ADDITION, ROME DID FEATURE MANY FAIRLY SOPHISTICATED FINANCIAL TOOLS

    WHICH LOOK QUITE FAMILIAR TO US IN THE MODERN ECONOMY … “ C O I N A G E , C O N T R A C T S , C O L L A T E R A L I Z A T I O N , M O R T G A G E S , A P U B L I C T R E A S U R Y A N D C E N T R A L BANKING” WILLIAM GOETZMANN, MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING: HOW FINANCE MADE CIVILIZATION POSSIBLE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2017) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  49. THERE ARE ARGUABLY MANY REASONS FOR THE EVENTUAL FAILURE OF

    ROME … WE NEED *NOT* CONSIDER THOSE AS MANY BOOKS HAVE BEEN WRITTEN ON THIS SUBJECT BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  50. OUR PURPOSE IS TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN PART ROME’S SUCCESS

    WAS LINKED TO THE ABILITY TO FACILITATE TRADE THROUGH INSTITUTIONS WHICH WERE TRUST ENHANCING AND TRANSACTION COST REDUCING …. BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  51. ROMAN TERRITORY CHANGED HANDS MANY TIMES IN THE CENTURIES THAT

    FOLLOWED THEREBY FRAGMENTING UNDERLYING INSTITUTIONS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  52. EUROPE BECAME A ‘COMPETITIVE PATCHWORK OF CITIES AND STATES THAT

    ONLY RARELY ORGANIZED THEMSELVES INTO A UNIFIED POLITY’ WILLIAM GOETZMANN, MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING: HOW FINANCE MADE CIVILIZATION POSSIBLE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2017) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  53. THIS COMPETITION AMONG CITIES A N D S T A

    T E S W A S G O O D A N D HELPFUL FOR WHAT WOULD COME … THE PATCHWORK WAS BAD AS IT UNDERMINED THE FACILITATION OF TRADE FOR EXAMPLE, EACH CITY AND STATE HAD ITS OWN LAWS AND CUSTOMS W H A T W A S N E E D E D W A S A N I N S T I T U T I O N W H I C H C O U L D C O O R D I N A T E A C R O S S T H E S E VARIOUS POLITICAL UNITS … BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  54. A N I N ST I T U T I

    O N ( S ) W H I C H CO U L D COORDINATE ACROSS THESE VARIOUS POLITICAL UNITS WOULD NEED TO BE ABLE TO SUPPRESS THE DESIRE OF LOCAL RULERS TO CONFISCATE THE PROPERTY OF TRAVELING MERCHANTS (OR THEIR AGENTS) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  55. AVNER GREIF, PAUL MILGROM & BARRY R. WEINGAST, COORDINATION, COMMITMENT,

    AND ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, 102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 745 (1994) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  56. “EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GROWTH BETWEEN THE TENTH AND THE FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

    WAS FACILITATED BY THE ‘COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES” — THE REEMERGENCE OF MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN LONG-DISTANCE TRADE AFTER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF DECLINE.” AVNER GREIF, PAUL MILGROM & BARRY R. WEINGAST, COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, 102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 745 (1994) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  57. “ F O R T H I S C O

    M M E R C I A L EXPANSION TO BE POSSIBLE, I N S T I T U T I O N S H A D T O B E CREATED TO MITIGATE THE MANY K I N D S O F C O N T R A C T U A L PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LONG-DISTANCE TRADE” AVNER GREIF, PAUL MILGROM & BARRY R. WEINGAST, COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, 102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 745 (1994) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  58. “IN THE LATER MEDIEVAL PERIOD, THE MERCHANTS OF EUROPE D

    E V E L O P E D A N E L A B O R AT E INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM THAT A L L O W E D F O R T R A D E O V E R L O N G E R A N D L O N G E R DISTANCES.“ AVNER GREIF, PAUL MILGROM & BARRY R. WEINGAST, COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, 102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 745 (1994) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  59. “LONG DISTANCE PREMODERN TRADE TOOK PLACE IN A HIGHLY C

    O M P L E X A N D U N C E R T A I N ENVIRONMENT. MANY UNANTICIPATED EVENTS COULD OCCUR ALONG THE WAY AND IT WAS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO D E T E R M I N E R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y. INSTITUTIONS WHICH CAN OBTAIN AND INTERPRET INFORMATION PROVED NECESSARY.” AVNER GREIF, PAUL MILGROM & BARRY R. WEINGAST, COORDINATION, COMMITMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF THE MERCHANT GUILD, 102 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 745 (1994) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  60. MERCHANT GUILDS WERE ABLE TO BAND TOGETHER IN PART TO

    LOWER NEGOTIATION COSTS AND HELP SUPPORT LONG DISTANCE TRADE. THERE WAS REAL POWER IN NUMBERS WHICH WAS NEEDED TO HELP ENCOURAGE RULERS FAR AWAY TO RESPECT THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE GUILD’S MEMBERSHIP. BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  61. AS GUILDS GREW IN THEIR POWER, THEY COULD CONDITION FUTURE

    TRADE IN A JURISDICTION ON PRESENCE OF PAST GOOD BEHAVIOR. OTHERWISE, THEY COULD BOYCOTT. THE BENEFIT OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE CONTEXT WERE CLEAR BUT THE ORGANIZATION NEEDED TO PREVENT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS FROM DEFECTING. BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  62. AGAIN WE SEE THAT MANY KEY HISTORICAL MOMENTS ARE FUELED

    BY INNOVATIONS WHICH CAN SCALE TRUST AND ALLOW TRADE AND/OR SOME CLASS OF FINANCIALIZATION TO OCCUR BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  63. THE INCREDIBLE INTELLECTUAL GAINS OF THE RENAISSANCE (IN ART, SCIENCE,

    ETC.) DERIVE FROM THE ECONOMIC SURPLUS GENERATED BY INCREASING COMPLEX TRADE NETWORKS RICHARD A. GOLDTHWAITE, THE ECONOMY OF RENAISSANCE FLORENCE. JHU PRESS, 2009. NOTE: THE PRECISE CONTOURS ARE A SUBJECT OF ONGOING ACADEMIC DEBATE SEE E.G. FOR MORE INFORMATION — BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  64. ITS ORIGINS CAN BE TRACED BACK MANY CENTURIES TO ROME

    AND LATER SWEDEN AND EVEN LATER TO 14TH CENTURY ITALY … BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  65. A CLEARER MANIFESTATION OF THE MODERN FORM CAN BE SEEN

    IN CHARTER COMPANIES SUCH AS DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  66. SUCH COMPANIES WERE TRAVELING THE WORLD AND OPERATED IN A

    RISKY GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  67. WHEN PAIRED WITH LIMITED LIABILITY - THE CORPORATE FORM ALLOWS

    FOR THE SEGMENTATION AND SHIFTING OF RISK BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  68. FIRMS HELP SOLVE FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF TRANSACTION COSTS Ronald

    Coase The Nature of the Firm 4 Economica 386 (1937) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  69. THE CORPORATE FORM ITSELF AND THE SIZE OF CORPORATIONS CAN

    ALSO IMPOSE COSTS OF THEIR OWN (IT IS A TRICKY BALANCE) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  70. A SHORT ARTICLE WRITTEN FOR COASE’S 100 BIRTHDAY IN THE

    ECONOMIST “HIS CENTRAL INSIGHT WAS THAT FIRMS EXIST BECAUSE GOING TO THE MARKET ALL THE TIME CAN IMPOSE HEAVY TRANSACTION COSTS. YOU NEED TO HIRE WORKERS, NEGOTIATE PRICES AND ENFORCE CONTRACTS, TO NAME BUT THREE TIME-CONSUMING ACTIVITIES. A FIRM IS ESSENTIALLY A DEVICE FOR CREATING LONG-TERM CONTRACTS WHEN SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS ARE TOO BOTHERSOME.” BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  71. A SHORT ARTICLE WRITTEN FOR COASE’S 100 BIRTHDAY IN THE

    ECONOMIST BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM “THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN HIERARCHIES AND MARKETS IS CONSTANTLY RECALIBRATED BY THE FORCES OF COMPETITION: ENTREPRENEURS MAY CHOOSE TO LOWER TRANSACTION COSTS BY FORMING FIRMS BUT GIANT FIRMS EVENTUALLY BECOME SLUGGISH AND UNCOMPETITIVE.”
  72. THE DESIRE TO MANAGE RISK AND RETURN HAS FUELED OTHER

    IMPORTANT INNOVATIONS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  73. EVEN TODAY SHIPPING AND WORK ON THE HIGH SEAS IS

    AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  74. THE SIZE OF LOSSES COULD BE LARGE AND THUS IT

    WAS CHALLENGING FOR AN INDIVIDUAL TO BEAR THE GIVEN LOSS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  75. THE ORIGINS OF MARINE INSURANCE CAN BE TRACED BACK TO

    GREECE AND ROME (EVEN EARLIER) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  76. MODERN FORMS COULD BE SEEN IN AS AN IMPORTANT INGREDIENT

    IN THE EXPANSION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  77. UNDERWRITING BEGAN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO SIGNED UNDERNEATH THE LINE ON

    THE BOTTOM OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  78. HMS LUTINE (1799) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM “Lutine sank during a storm at

    Vlieland in the West Frisian Islands on 9 October 1799, whilst carrying a large shipment of gold. The gold was insured by Lloyd's of London, which paid the claim in full. The underwriters therefore owned the gold under rights of abandonment and later authorised attempts to salvage it. However, because of the state of war, the Dutch also laid claim to it as a prize of war.”
  79. KEY IDEA IS THAT MARINE INSURANCE SOLVED A REAL NEED

    IN THE RELEVANT MARKET BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  80. AN ENTIRE RANGE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WOULD LIKELY *NOT* OCCUR

    WITHOUT SOME CONTINGENCY FOR DOWNSIDE RISK BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  81. UNDERWRITING BEGAN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO SIGNED UNDERNEATH THE LINE ON

    THE BOTTOM OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  82. TWO CORE QUESTIONS HOW TO EX ANTE VALUE THE RISK

    ? HOW TO ENSURE PAYMENT IN THE EVENT OF LIABILITY ? BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  83. GREATER COORDINATION OF EXCHANGE GREATER ABILITY TO TIME SHIFT CONSUMPTION

    ABILITY TO SCALE TRUST LOWER TRANSACTIONAL FRICTION BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  84. OVER THE PAST 5000+ YEARS WE HAVE ENGAGED IN A

    MASSIVE SCALING EXERCISE BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  85. IN THE TRANSACTION COST VIEW OF (ECONOMIC) HISTORY (NOTE: THIS

    IS HIGH LEVEL OVERVIEW OMITTING SOME KEY DETAILS) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  86. MESOPOTAMIA GREECE ROME MEDIEVAL ERA MERCHANT LAW RENAISSANCE PRE ANALOG

    ERA THE CORPORATION MARITIME LAW + INSURANCE HUNTER GATHERERS CODE OF HAMMURABI SOME EARLY TRANSACTION ENHANCING INNOVATIONS AND SOCIETIES BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  87. TELEGRAPH TELEPHONES INTERNET LONG TAIL COMMERCE (MERCHANT LAW TAKE 2)

    CRYPTO INFRASTRUCTURE ANALOG ERA DIGITAL ERA COMPUTATIONAL ERA INTERNET OF THINGS FIAT CURRENCY EARLY COMPUTERS GLOBALIZATION PERSONAL COMPUTERS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AUTOMOBILE CREDIT CARDS CHARGE CARDS BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  88. SOME OPTIONAL READING OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF

    CAPITALISM, SIMON AND SCHUSTER (1985) DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (1990) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  89. SOME OPTIONAL READING AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO

    THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (2006) DENNIS P.KEHOE, DAVID RATZAN, AND URI YIFTACH (EDS.), LAW AND TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE ANCIENT ECONOMY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS (2015) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  90. SOME OPTIONAL READING DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS,

    MELVILLE HOUSE (2014) WILLIAM GOETZMANN, MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING: HOW FINANCE MADE CIVILIZATION POSSIBLE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (2017) BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  91. SOME OPTIONAL READING GILLIAN HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD:

    WHY HUMANS INVENTED LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM
  92. DANIEL MARTIN KATZ E D U | I L L

    I N O I S T E C H + S TA N F O R D C O D E X B LO G | C O M P U TAT I O N A L L E GA L S T U D I E S . C O M PAG E | DA N I E L M A R T I N K AT Z . C O M C O R P | L E X P R E D I C T. C O M NELSON ROSARIO B LO G | L AWO F C RY P TO C U R R E N C Y. C O M PAG E | N E L S O N M RO S A R I O . C O M F I R M | S M O L I N S K I RO S A R I O L AW P. C . BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM L A B | T H E L AW L A B . C O M E D U | I L L I N O I S T E C H - C H I C AG O K E N T L AW
  93. @ computational professor daniel martin katz danielmartinkatz.com BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOCURRENCY AND

    LAW professor nelson rosario CRYPTO AND THE TRANSACTION COST VIEW OF ECONOMIC HISTORY nelsonmrosario.com @ nelsonmrosario BLOCKCHAINLAWCLASS.COM