Rails and security

be secure

Transcript

1. Rails & Security People should know it Insecure-by-default means insecure http://homakov.blogspot.com
2. Agenda • GET Accessible Actions(method “match”, CSRF) • Mass Assignment(attr_accessible, “SQL Inject”) • JS(ON) and DOM Injects, Responders and XSS • Regular Expressions and Validators • Common Tips • Headers • [bonus?] OAuth
3. • CSRF Protection by default (authenticity_token) • XSS Protection(HtmlSafe, sanitize by default) • SQL Injects are impossible(active record) • Hundreds of commits with security improvements, etc Rails ARE Secure
4. • if I see PHP site with (proper)CSRF protection than .. it's facebook.com • SQL Injects, XSS, includes, zomg etc • "secure by default" just impossible thus rails is more secure than most php sites are... PHP(and others) is not
5. BUT
7. #routes.rb #match usage is a common mistake match “/follow”, to: “followings#create” match “/followers, to: “followings#index” case 1
8. Hey, “match” means GET too. GET means no csrf protection! case 1
9. >This commit disallows calling +match+ without an HTTP verb constraint by default. To explicitly match all verbs, this commit also adds a :via => :all option to +match+. (@wycats) #update code: post “/follow”, to: “followings#create” get “/followers, to: “followings#index” match “/getpost_endpoint”, via: :all, to: “etc#etc” case 1
10. Make sure to set “post” for state-changing requests. Avoid using of “match” Use “get” for all data retrieval requests. Scope your routes, be RESTful, please. case 1 tips
11. #comments/index.haml :javascript var comments = #{@comments.to_json} OR :javascript var value = "#{current_user.name}" case 2
12. @comments = {k:"</script><script>alert(1) </script>"} JSON Encoder and ':javascript' (:css too!) both don't escape anything - output is RAW. case 2
13. XSS?! case 2
14. Update rails to 4(now html entities are escaped by default) or set manually ActiveSupport.escape_html_entities_in_html = true in initializers or don't use .to_json in templates. case 2 tips
15. #comments/index.haml :javascript var data = #{@data.to_json} #or getJSON $('.datacontainer').html(data.body); case 3
16. Pitfall. That is a pure DOM XSS - you didn't sanitize it! Escaping \u only helps JSON parser but you should sanitize it before you insert into DOM Don't trust/use any input param until you sanitized it. case 3
17. case 3
18. Use $.text()/innerText instead of $.html() /innerHTML when possible, always sanitize any user input even in JS(Rails just escapes). I strongly recommend this patch: ActiveSupport::JSON::Encoding:: ESCAPED_CHARS.merge! '<' => '&lt;' case 3 tips
19. params[:user][:url]="http://#{params[:user][: url]}" unless params[:user][:url] =~ /^https?/ #update attributes case 4
20. case 4
21. Keep in mind - in ruby $^ always match new lines. Your manuals and books lie. Use \A\z This passes: javascript:alert(1)/* http://hi.com */ added warning/exception in RoR case 4 tips
22. #in application_controller.rb skip_before_filter :verify_authenticity_token case 5
23. protect_from_forgery is a MUST. It is a hassle to deal with tokens but don't be stupid. No, presence of authenticity_token input doesn't scare a hacker. case 5 tips
24. found an XSS for auto_link, remember, always *whitelist* everything - protocols too javascript://%0Aalert(1) Update your bundle, if you use auto_link or rails_autolink gem case 6
26. class PublicKey < ActiveRecord::Base #attr_accessible, where are you... end case 7
27. case 7
28. Github and Assembla shared the same vulnerability. It was easy to steal or push code into anybody’s repo 'dropping' your public key. Also you could(still can) set “created/updated_at” to 3012 in *really* a lot of applications to have fun and get the 1st place in 'order by *_at' case 7
29. If use update_attributes/new/create+hash - you should set attr_accessible(If you don’t use mass assignment - don’t care.) gem 'strong_parameters' whitelist_attributes = true by default. it takes slightly more time to write an app but it’s worth it. IT IS NOT attr_accessor :± case 7 tips
30. #hand-made jsonp json = Order.all.to_json render text: "#{params[:callback]}(#{json})" https://api.github.com/user/repos? callback=leak case 8
31. don't give out private data via JSONP avoid - render text: contains_user_input XSS - ?callback=<script>..</script> use - render json: data, callback: params[: cb] case 8 tips
32. Mass assignment[extended edition]. You can send nested arrays/hashes in any param. params[:token] can be a huge array(brute): ?token[]=1&token[]=2&token[]=3... it also may contain nils! ?token[] <- nil case 9 - CVE-2012-2660
33. Change User.find_by_token(params[:token]) and User.where(token: params[:token]) use explicit casting params[:token].to_s case 9 - CVE-2012-2660
34. • use system('ls', '.') instead of `ls .` • before_filter{headers['X-Frame-Options'] ='SAMEORIGIN'}#application_controller. rb • hide config/initializers/secret_token.rb • obvious: check permissions • WHITELIST • RTFM common tips
35. Security is not developers' business. Web is poorly designed: Clickjacking, CSRF #DISCUSS
36. bonus
37. CSRF + GET. code/token getting into master-account with no fingerprints. omniauth fb strategy vulnerability depends on server side logic bonus OAuth
38. http://soundcloud. com/connect/facebook/create? code=AQBXeR_dORPlx4RRUt_YzJ6Rdg0 eb9CWHek8J2fB4vqfdNPvznmx-d- J36gGQlXJICRdfqFb9a_VWqke4ZamE2H ytlXtK5c6sMaOQUQLPPhSWNv3v8z- ze6hdT6x4LNSXC_- jxGRecjw1WTmifzO_rBFaDI86xPo2YH3k_ ehEtw5wM9rVduymjZumXkoistF7I9g2MQ bonus OAuth
39. Mitigation: CSRF token in 'state' param. Checking $_SESSION['state']==$_REQUEST ['session'] IS NOT WORKING Check existence and equality both. OR use client side JS based authentication. bonus OAuth
40. [old] http://www.rorsecurity.info/ http://guides.rubyonrails.org/security.html http://developers.facebook. com/docs/authentication/server-side/ get new stuff 1st!: homakov.blogspot.com references
41. Teh Edn. Y U NO PAY ME FOR SECURITY AUDIT?