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Applied Kubernetes Security Pitfalls
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Michael Schubert
October 25, 2018
Technology
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Applied Kubernetes Security Pitfalls
Michael Schubert
October 25, 2018
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Transcript
Applied Kubernetes Security Pitfalls
Kubernetes today ❏ Many means available to make clusters more
secure ❏ Continued efforts towards secure-by-default ❏ Fairly good security track record
None
apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod … volumeMounts: - mountPath: /test name:
test subPath: malicious-symlink volumes: - name: test hostPath: path: /tmp/test type: Directory
“Complexity is insecurity” Complexity correlated with the presence of security
vulnerabilities
Capture the flag http://tiny.cc/k8sminictf PS: No DoS and wrongdoing please
:)
kube-apiserver: auth delegation ❏ Needed for e.g. API extensions --requestheader-client-ca-file
--requestheader-group-headers --requestheader-username-headers --requestheader-allowed-names (~optional) --requestheader-extra-headers-prefix (optional)
kube-apiserver: auth delegation [Service] ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/kube-apiserver \ --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC \ --client-ca-file=/etc/k8s/ca.pem \
--bind-address=0.0.0.0 \ […] --requestheader-client-ca-file=/etc/k8s/ca.pem \ --requestheader-group-headers=X-Remote-Group \ --requestheader-username-headers=X-Remote-User CTF: Demo #1 http://tiny.cc/k8sminictf
PodSecurityPolicy (PSP) ❏ Added with v1.10 ❏ Administrators decide what
contexts pods can run in ❏ Would have been a way to mitigate CVE-2017-1002101 ... with the right policy
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy … privileged: false volumes: - 'hostPath'
allowedHostPaths: - pathPrefix: /tmp runAsUser: rule: 'MustRunAs' ranges: - min: 1 max: 65535 CTF: Demo #2 http://tiny.cc/k8sminictf
Server-side request forgery (SSRF) ❏ “... is a type of
exploit where an attacker abuses the functionality of a server causing it to access or manipulate information in the realm of that server ...”
Server-side request forgery (SSRF) <script> window.location="http://metadata.google.internal/…; </script> https://hackerone.com/reports/341876 Kudos Shopify!
Thank you
[email protected]
@schux00 @
[email protected]
[email protected]
Resources ❏ https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/60813 ❏ https://www.daemonology.net/blog/2009-09-04-complexity-is-insecurity.html ❏ https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/06/thomas_dullien_.html ❏ https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy/#volumes-and-file-syst ems
❏ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server-side_request_forgery ❏ https://hackerone.com/reports/341876