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SecTor 2015 - Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Applicat...

SecTor 2015 - Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow

This speech will demonstrate attacking .NET applications at runtime. I will show how to modify running applications with advanced .NET and assembly level attacks that alter the control flow of any .NET application. New attack techniques and tools will be released to allow penetration testers and attackers to carry out advanced post exploitation attacks.

This presentation gives an overview of how to use these tools in a real attack sequence and gives a view into the .NET hacker space.

Topher Timzen

October 21, 2015
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  1. CLR Attacks Controlling the Common Language Runtime Accessing raw objects

    on Managed Heap Manipulate AppDomains • Controlling all Loaded Code • Controlling Just-In-Time Compilation
  2. Runtime .NET Process CLR (2.0/4.0) & AppDomains Assemblies (.EXE and

    .DLL(s)) Objects Properties Fields Instance Methods Classes Methods Logic
  3. Gray Frost Payload delivery system Memory-resident Attack C++ .NET CLR

    Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload
  4. Gray Frost Payload delivery system Memory-resident Attack C++ .NET CLR

    Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload 2 Rounds GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp • C# Payload
  5. Gray Frost Payload delivery system Memory-resident Attack C++ .NET CLR

    Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload 2 Rounds GrayFrostCpp GrayFrostCSharp • C# Payload
  6. Gray Storm Reconnaissance and In-memory attack payload Features Attacking the

    .NET JIT Attacking .NET at the ASM level ASM and Metasploit payloads Utilize objects on the Managed Heap
  7. Controlling the JIT Method Tables contain address of JIT stub

    for a class’s methods. During JIT the Method Table is referenced We can control the address Lives after Garbage Collection
  8. Control Flow Attacks .NET uses far and relative calls 0xE8;

    Call [imm] (x86)  0xFF 0x15; Call dword segmentRegister[imm] (x86) relCall = dstAddress - (currentLocation+ lenOfCall)
  9. ASM Payloads Address of a method known through Reflection Overwrite

    method logic with new ASM Steal stack parameters Change events
  10. ASM Payloads Change return TRUE to return FALSE Password validation

    Key & Licensing validation SQL Sanitization Destroy security Mechanisms Overwrite logic Update Mechanisms
  11. Managed Heap Storage point for .NET Objects New reference objects

    added to heap Garbage Collector removes dead objects
  12. Managed Heap Storage point for .NET Objects New reference objects

    added to heap Garbage Collector removes dead objects Let’s manipulate it!
  13. Object Hunting in Memory Objects are IntPtrs Point to Object

    Instance on Managed Heap All instantiated objects of the same class share the same Method Table Reflection Object Hunting Win
  14. Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find

    location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
  15. Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find

    location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
  16. Construct an Object Use Reflection to invoke a constructor Can

    instantiate any object • Being mindful that some constructors can invoke a lot of code If a constructor takes other objects, nullify them https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/010b19fdbde77f251414
  17. IntPtr = 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 (Object) 00000005 00000001 00000000 IntPtr =

    5 STACK 024e9fe8 (Object) L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/812aa20dbe23cb42756d Find Location of Managed Heap
  18. IntPtr = 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 (Object) 00000005 00000001 00000000 IntPtr =

    5 STACK Managed Heap 024e9fe8 (Object) L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/812aa20dbe23cb42756d Find Location of Managed Heap
  19. IntPtr = 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 (Object) 00000005 00000001 00000000 IntPtr =

    5 STACK 024e9fe8 (Object) L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/812aa20dbe23cb42756d Find Location of Managed Heap
  20. IntPtr = 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 (Object) 00000005 00000001 00000000 STACK L

    H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/812aa20dbe23cb42756d Find Location of Managed Heap
  21. Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find

    location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
  22. Signature Instantiated Type Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer

    to their corresponding type. (x86) Bytes 0-3 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 4-7 in MT is Instance Size 0:009> dd 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 00774828 0000038c 00000001 00000000
  23. Signature Instantiated Type Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer

    to their corresponding type. (x64) Bytes 0-7 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 8-11 in MT is Instance Size 0:008> dd 00000000024e9fe8 00000000`0286b8e0 ea774828 000007fe
  24. Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find

    location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
  25. Scan Managed Heap Scan down incrementing by size of object

    Scan linearly up to top of heap Compare object’s Method Table to the reference If they match, get IntPtr address of object
  26. Scan Managed Heap Scan down incrementing by size of object

    Scan linearly up to top of heap Compare object’s Method Table to the reference If they match, get IntPtr address of object Use ASM!
  27. Finding Objects at Runtime i. Construct an object and find

    location of Managed Heap ii. Signature instantiated type iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
  28. Convert Object ptr -> raw obj STACK Refer (System.IntPtr) pointer(024ea00c

    ) pointer(024ea00c ) L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/1da2b0aab6245ed1c27b
  29. Convert Object ptr -> raw obj STACK Refer (System.IntPtr) pointer(024ea00c

    ) pointer(024ea00c ) L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/1da2b0aab6245ed1c27b
  30. Convert Object ptr -> raw obj Refer (GrayStorm.testClass) pointer(024ea00c )

    STACK L H https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/1da2b0aab6245ed1c27b
  31. How to construct attack chains Gray Wolf / IL Decompiler

     Find Methods, Fields & Properties of interest  Locate meaningful objects  Discover high level control flow Gray Storm “Debugging” functionality  Breakpoint at constructors or methods from Method Pointers  Use with WinDbg Utilize DLL Hijacking!
  32. Hybrid .NET/ASM Attacks Hybrid C#/ASM code in .NET Encrypting .NET

    payloads and unwinding Encrypting ASM Payloads
  33. Payload System C# is easy Can use Gray Frost in

    any application Low and High level gap is easy
  34. .NET Hacking Space Small Few tools Mostly hacking WoW Lots

    of PowerShell Lots of decompilers and not many attackers!
  35. Conclusion Arbitrary .NET applications can be injected and changed New

    .NET attack possibilities New tools that support automation Get Gray Frost and Storm github.com/graykernel
  36. Questions? Contact Me @TTimzen https://www.tophertimzen.com Get Gray Frost and Storm

    github.com/graykernel White Papers Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow Acquiring .NET Objects from the Managed Heap