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Shiny, Let's Be Bad Guys: Exploiting and Mitigating the Top 10 Web App Vulnerabilities -- CodeMash 2017 edition
Slides from the CodeMash 2017 presentation of my tutorial that walks through the OWASP Top 10 web application vulnerabilities and discusses strategies to mitigate them.
Mike Pirnat
January 11, 2017
Transcript
137 slides
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Shiny Let’s Be Bad Guys! Exploiting and Mitigating the Top
1 0 Web App Vulnerabilities Mike Pirnat - @mpirnat CodeMash 2017 Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Announcements • This session will run 1:00 PM – 5:00
PM • We’ll break midway through • Snacks & beverages available • Feedback via EventsXD mobile app • Slides linked from github repo Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Shiny Let’s Be Bad Guys! Exploiting and Mitigating the Top
1 0 Web App Vulnerabilities Mike Pirnat - @mpirnat CodeMash 2017 Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Why it Matters • Your users • Your data •
Your business Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
OWASP • http://www.owasp.org • Open Web Application Security Project •
Non-profit focused on improving software security • Documentation and tools to help learn about security and protect your apps Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
OWASP Top Ten • Based on risk data from 8
security firms • Over 500,000 vulnerabilities, hundreds of orgs, thousands of apps • Selected & prioritized by prevalence data combined with estimates of exploitability, detectability, and impact • Updated in 2013 (refresh coming in 2017) Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Today • Background on a type of vulnerability • Exploit
it! • Discuss prevention • Django & Flask specific advice where possible • Light examples where we have time Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Setup: 1 Make & activate a virtualenv: Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys #
Python 3... $ pyvenv badguys # Python 2... $ virtualenv badguys $ cd badguys $ source bin/activate # Python 3... > pyvenv.py badguys # Python 2... > virtualenv badguys > cd badguys > Scripts/activate.bat -
Setup: 2 Clone the repository: $ git clone https://github.com/ mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys
src Or pull the latest changes: $ cd src $ git pull Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Setup: 3 Install dependencies: $ cd src $ pip install
-r requirements.txt > cd src > pip.exe install -r requirements.txt Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Setup: 4 Start up the app: $ python manage.py runserver
Setup: https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys -
Injection Attacks • When an application sends untrusted data to
an interpreter • Can result in data loss/corruption, lack of accountability, denial of access • Can lead to complete host takeover -
Trust No One • External users • Internal users •
Administrators -
Attack Vectors • GET parameters • POST parameters • PATH_INFO
• Some HTTP headers: Cookie, Host • Uploaded Files -
Possible Consequences • Creation of malicious SQL (or other queries)
• Accessing private files on disk • Arbitrary code execution -
Real-World Examples • Sony Playstation Network • Ruby on Rails
• HBGary • MySQL • Many, many others… -
SQL Injection • Unescaped user input causes the premature end
of a SQL query and allows a malicious query to be executed... """ select * from users where username='%s'; """ • Use 2 dashes to start a SQL comment: -- • http://localhost:8000/injection/sql -
Accessing Private Files • File system access + unvalidated user
input allows attackers to navigate the file system • http://localhost:8000/injection/file- access -
Arbitrary Code Execution • Unsafe input is dynamically evaluated or
executed • http://localhost:8000/injection/code- execution -
Prevention • Validate ALL user input • Sign cookies, don’t
accept if signature is bogus/missing • Use ORMs or bind variables when talking to the database • Don’t use eval or exec, beware of pickle, user-supplied YAML, etc. -
Django Advice • Make sure data types for your model
are tight • Use Forms instead of ModelForms • Make new validators as needed for your application • Make sure your URL regexes for dynamic URLs are tight -
Django Advice • Use the ORM when you can •
When you can’t, use extreme caution! • Use bind variables/parameters • No string concatenation/formatting of anything that came from the client -
Without the ORM # If it's a basic select: MyModel.objects.raw("SELECT
... WHERE foo = %s", params={'foo': ...}) # If it's more complicated: from django.db import connection cursor = connection.cursor() cursor.execute("UPDATE bar set bar = 1 WHERE foo < %s", [foo]) row = cursor.fetchall() -
Flask Advice • Use Flask-WTF to validate form input •
Use SQLAlchemy • Bind variables if you don’t -
Broken Auth & Session Management • Attacker uses leaks or
flaws in authentication or session management to impersonate users • Roll-your-own solutions contribute to the difficulty of finding these flaws -
Possible Consequences • Compromised user accounts • Compromised administrative accounts
• Unauthorized use of privileged functionality -
Prevention • Hash or encrypt passwords • Don’t let credentials
be easily overwritten • Don’t put session IDs in URLs • Allow session IDs to timeout/log out • Rotate session IDs after successful login • TLS connections for passwords, session IDs -
Django Advice • Use django.contrib.auth • Consider http://django-session- security.readthedocs.io/ middleware
for timing out sessions • We’ll talk about transport layer security later on... -
Flask Advice • Use flask-security • Read https://pythonhosted.org/Flask- Security/ •
Avoid overuse of cookies for storing session state -
XSS Attacks • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) • The most prevalent
web app security flaw • App includes user-supplied data in content sent to the browser without properly validating or sanitizing it -
XSS Attacks • Stored: injected code permanently stored in database,
message forum, comment, etc. • Reflected: injected code in live request to server, reflected back in error message or search result • DOM: injected code in browser DOM environment that causes scripts to run in unexpected ways (eg, reading from URL) -
Possible Consequences • Execute scripts in a victim’s browser •
Hijack sessions • Deface sites • Insert hostile content • Redirect users • Hijack browser (install malware) -
Most Often Seen... • Places where user-created text is displayed
to other users (comments, messages) • Form inputs where value is populated with user-supplied data • Script tags where user-supplied data is populated into script variables -
Real-World Example • ESPN had a page that exposed unsanitized
content from the URL • Able to replace the content of the page • Used bit.ly to make an official-looking short URL! • http://es.pn/Z0jnoi -
XSS in Dynamic URLs • Part of the URL path
is variable, isn’t validated, and gets included into the page: http://example.com/stuff/{$CATEGORY} • http://localhost:8000/cross-site- scripting/path-matching/your-path- here -
XSS in Query String Parameters • Unvalidated user input from
a query string parameter is included in the page: http://example.com/?search={$TEXT} • http://localhost:8000/cross-site- scripting/query-params?qs=awesome -
XSS in Form Fields • The value part of an
input is prematurely terminated, allowing Javascript to be injected into or adjacent to the element: <input … value="{$TEXT}"> • http://localhost:8000/cross-site- scripting/form-field -
Prevention • Escape all untrusted data based on the HTML
context the data will be placed into • Whitelist input validation • Consider auto-sanitization libraries for rich content (eg, OWASP’s AntiSamy) • Update your parents’/in-laws’ browsers! -
Prevention • Use X-XSS-Prevention header to configure browser XSS sanitization
behavior • Use X-Frame-Options header to control whether and how a page can be loaded within a frame • Use Content-Security-Policy header to specify where a page can load resources from (requires careful tuning) -
Django Advice • Be careful with the safe filter, django.utils.safestring,
etc. • Use form.as_p, form.as_table, form.as_ul when displaying a form in a template • Be careful with your own template tags; django.utils.html.escape is your friend! -
django.utils.html cleaned = escape(unsafe_value) cleaned = escapejs(unsafe_value) cleaned = strip_tags(unsafe_value)
cleaned = remove_tags(unsafe_value, ['script', ...]) -
Flask Advice • Don’t disable autoescaping • Be very careful
with anything you bless via Markup objects, the safe filter, or blocks where autoescape is disabled -
Insecure Direct Object Reference • Expose a reference to an
internal implementation object without verifying authorization • Attacker changes URL, GET/POST parameters, cookies -
Possible Consequences • Compromise of all data that can be
referenced by the vulnerable parameter • Unless the namespace is sparse, an attacker can easily access all available data of that type -
Exercises • Manipulate parameters in the URL to access data
that doesn’t belong to you • http://localhost:8000/direct-object- references -
Prevention • Implement access controls on any direct references to
restricted resources • Implement per-user or per-session indirect object references • This can be as much about URL design as about access control! -
Django + Flask • Lock down views: • Use Django’s
permissions architecture • Use Flask-Security or Flask-Login • Customize Django queryset for looking up objects that involve user ownership -
Custom Queryset # In models.py... class ThingyManager(models.Manager): def for_user(self, user):
return self.get_query_set().filter(user=user) class Thingy(models.Model): objects = ThingyManager() # In views.py... class ThingyUpdateView(UpdateView): def get_queryset(self): return Thingy.objects.for_user( self.request.user) -
Possible Consequences • Unauthorized access to some system data or
functionality • Potential complete system compromise -
Text This Really Happens! • Patreon compromised via exposed Werkzeug
Debugger • https://labs.detectify.com/2015/10/02/ how-patreon-got-hacked-publicly- exposed-werkzeug-debugger/ -
Prevention • Have a repeatable hardening process • Have a
process for keeping on top of updates and patches • Architecture that provides secure separation between components • Periodic scans and audits -
Django Advice • Don’t run in debug mode in production
• Keep your SECRET_KEY secret! • Keep Python code out of webserver’s root • Don’t run admin publicly • Don’t use the built-in admin for normal user admin tasks -
Flask Advice • Read http://flask.pocoo.org/docs/ security • Set app.debug =
False to turn off debugging -
Sensitive Data Exposure • Failure to properly protect credit cards,
tax IDs, authentication credentials, etc. • Sensitive data deserves extra protection such as encryption at rest or in transit, special precautions when exchanged with the browser -
Insecure Cryptographic Storage • Not encrypting worthy data • Unsafe
key generation & storage, failure to rotate keys • Weak algorithms • Weak or unsalted hashes -
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection • May not authenticate, encrypt, and
protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive network traffic • May use weak algorithms • May use expired or invalid certificates • May use certificates incorrectly -
Possible Consequences • Compromise of all data that should have
been encrypted • This can be highly sensitive information: credentials, credit cards, personal data, health records, etc. -
Possible Consequences • Expose individual users’ data • Account theft
• Compromise an admin account?! • Poor SSL setup can facilitate phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks -
Attack Vectors • Attacker monitors network traffic of your users
• Maybe in public places (Starbucks, conference wi-fi, etc.) • Maybe back end connections • Maybe inside your network (!!!) -
Prevention • Encrypt sensitive data at rest • Encrypt offsite
backups; manage keys separately • Use strong standard algorithms, strong keys • Hash passwords with strong standard algorithm & use appropriate salt • Protect passwords & keys from unauthorized access -
Prevention • Require SSL for all sensitive pages; redirect non-SSL
requests to SSL • Set the “secure” flag on sensitive cookies • Use only strong SSL algorithms • Ensure your cert is valid, not expired, not revoked, and matches your domain • SSL/encryption on the back end too -
Prevention •Use HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header to protect
against downgrade attacks and cookie hijacking •Consider setting Public Key Pinning (HPKP) header to reduce impersonation by attackers with mis-issued or fraudulent certificates -
Django Advice • Use django.contrib.auth for proper password salting and
hashing • Use bcrypt or Argon2; see https:// docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.10/topics/auth/ passwords/ • Require SSL in Apache or Nginx • Require SSL using middleware: • Configure Django SecurityMiddleware–introduced in Django 1.8! • https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.10/ref/middleware/ • https://github.com/rdegges/django-sslify -
Flask Advice • Salt passwords using werkzeug.security: • http://flask.pocoo.org/snippets/54/ •
Require SSL: • https://github.com/kennethreitz/flask-sslify • https://github.com/jacobian/wsgi-sslify • Use Passlib to do bcrypt or Argon2: • https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/ -
Missing Function Level Access Control • Application doesn’t protect its
functions properly • Misconfiguration • Forgot proper code checks -
Attack Vectors • Authorized user changes a URL or parameter
to a privileged function • Anonymous users could access private functions that aren’t protected -
Possible Consequences • Compromised user accounts • Compromised administrative accounts
• Unauthorized use of privileged functionality -
Exercises • Manipulate the URL to access privileged functionality •
http://localhost:8000/missing-access- control -
Prevention • Consider every page; public or private? • If
authentication is required, make sure that checks are in place • If additional authorization is required, make sure that checks are in place • Deny all by default; explicitly grant access to users or roles -
Django + Flask • Lock down views: • Use Django’s
permissions architecture • Use Flask-Security or Flask-Login • Don’t use Django’s built-in admin for normal user admin tasks -
CSRF Attacks • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) • Attacker tricks
victim into submitting forged HTTP requests • Attack succeeds if user is authorized/ authenticated -
Attack Vectors • Image tags • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) •
Fake buttons • Phishing forms • Other techniques -
Possible Consequences • Cause victim to change any data the
victim is allowed to change • Cause victim to perform any function the victim is authorized to use • Impact varies based on victim’s role • Think of some possibilities... -
CSRF via Image • Craft an “image” link that triggers
some site functionality • http://localhost:8000/csrf/image -
CSRF via Form Post • Create an innocuous-looking form that
POSTs to a vulnerable location • http://localhost:8000/csrf/third-party- site -
Prevention • Don’t “do” things on a GET • Include
a unique token in a hidden field (often used in concert with a cookie) • Validate token to make sure the request is from on-site • Avoid putting the token into a query string -
Django Advice • Don’t change the built-in settings! • Do
use the CSRF middleware and template tag in forms • Be VERY CAREFUL about deactivating it (csrf_exempt decorator) • Be careful about APIs (Tastypie, oauth); http://codrspace.com/vote539/csrf- protection-in-django-tastypie/ -
Flask Advice Various CSRF solutions... • DIY/naïve: http://flask.pocoo.org/snippets/3/ • Flask-WTF:
http://flask-wtf.readthedocs.org/ en/latest/csrf.html • Flask-SeaSurf: https://flask- seasurf.readthedocs.org/en/latest/ • Flask-csrf: http://sjl.bitbucket.org/flask-csrf/ -
Components with Known Vulnerabilities • Libraries, frameworks, and other
modules almost always run with full privilege • Hard to stay up to date on everything • Do you even know all the components in use, let alone their versions? • Components with known problems can be identified & exploited with automated tools -
Attack Vectors • Attacker identifies a weak component through scanning
or manual analysis • Customize exploit as needed • More difficult the deeper the component is in the application -
Possible Consequences • Full range of weaknesses are possible •
Impact could be minimal, or... • Complete host takeover! • Data compromise! -
Prevention • Don’t use components you don’t write (unrealistic) •
Keep components up to date • Identify all components and versions • Monitor security of these components -
Python Advice • Use pip to find old packages: pip
list --outdated • Use requires.io to monitor dependencies -
Django + Flask • Keep an eye on the mailing
lists: • https://groups.google.com/group/django- announce • http://flask.pocoo.org/mailinglist • Follow @djangoproject on Twitter -
Redirection Abuse • Attacker tricks user into visiting a URL
that redirects or forwards the request without validating the redirect location • Users prone to click because the link is to a legitimate site -
External Redirection • Use a redirection URL to redirect to
an external location • http://localhost:8000/redirects-and- forwards/redirects -
Forwards • Manipulate a forward parameter to gain access to
privileged functionality • http://localhost:8000/redirects-and- forwards/forwards -
Prevention • Don’t use redirects or forwards • Don’t involve
user-supplied data to build the redirect location • Ensure the supplied value is valid and authorized for the user -
Django Advice • Use django.utils.http.is_safe_url to check redirect URLs •
Used by django.contrib.auth internally • Consider wrapping is_safe_url if you have to allow other off-domain URLs -
Checking Redirects from django.shortcuts import redirect from django.utils.http import is_safe_url
def my_view(request): ... url = 'http://www.example.com/foo/bar' if is_safe_url(url, host='www.example.com'): return redirect(url) else: ... -
Allowing Multiple Safe Hosts from django.utils.http import is_safe_url def is_whitelisted_url(url,
hosts): for host in hosts: if is_safe_url(url, host=host): return True return False >>> url = 'http://us.pycon.org' >>> whitelist = ['us.pycon.org', 'pycon.org', ...] >>> is_whitelisted_url(url, whitelist) True -
Flask Advice • Redirect back: http://flask.pocoo.org/ snippets/62/ • Redirect back,
more selectively with whitelist, using cookies for previous URL: http://flask.pocoo.org/snippets/120/ • Can modify these approaches to suit, as with the Django example -
Further Exploration • http://www.owasp.org • https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Top_Ten_Project • https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Headers_Project • https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2016/09/content-security-
policy-your-future-best-friend/ • https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/topics/security/ • http://flask.pocoo.org/docs/security • OSCON 2016 & PyCon 2016: Security on a Shoestring • https://www.fullstackpython.com/web-application-security.html • https://github.com/mpirnat/lets-be-bad-guys