What’s wrong with WebSocket APIs? Unveiling vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs.

Slides from Hacktivity 2019 conference - https://hacktivity.com/index.php/presentations/.

Transcript

1. What’s wrong with w/ WebSocket API? Unveiling vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs Mikhail Egorov / @0ang3el #HACKTIVITY2019
2. # whoami 2 ▪ Security researcher / full-time bug hunter ▪ https://bugcrowd.com/0ang3el ▪ https://hackerone.com/0ang3el ▪ Conference speaker ▪ https://www.slideshare.net/0ang3el ▪ https://speakerdeck.com/0ang3el
3. Previous work 3 ▪ https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us- 12/Briefings/Shekyan/BH_US_12_Shekyan_Toukharian_Hacking_Websocket_Slides .pdf ▪ https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and- events/blog/2017/may/wssip-a-websocket-manipulation-proxy/ ▪ https://chybeta.github.io/2018/04/07/spring-messaging-Remote-Code-Execution- %E5%88%86%E6%9E%90-%E3%80%90CVE-2018-1270%E3%80%91/ ▪ https://www.twistlock.com/labs-blog/demystifying-kubernetes-cve-2018-1002105- dead-simple-exploit/ ▪ https://github.com/andresriancho/websocket-fuzzer ▪ https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon9/stable-35-old-tools-new- tricks-hacking-websockets-michael-fowl-nick-defoe
4. 4 WebSocket protocol essentials
5. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 5 ▪ Efficient two-way communication protocol ▪ WebSocket is stateful (HTTP is stateless) ▪ Two main parts: handshake and data transfer
6. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 6 ▪ Extensibility: subprotocols and extensions ▪ Subprotocols ▪ https://www.iana.org/assignments/websocket/websocket.xml#subpro tocol-name ▪ Wamp ▪ Stomp ▪ Soap ▪ …
7. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 7 ▪ Extensibility: subprotocols and extensions ▪ Extensions ▪ https://www.iana.org/assignments/websocket/websocket.xml#extens ion-name ▪ permessage-deflate ▪ bbf-usp-protocol
8. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 8 ▪ Origin-based security model (Browser clients) ▪ No authentication ▪ Client must do client-to-server masking
9. WebSocket protocol support 9 ▪ Major web browsers ▪ Web servers / Proxies ▪ Apache httpd, Nginx, IIS, … ▪ HAProxy, Traefik, Varnish, Envoy, … ▪ Cloud providers ▪WebSocket API (api gateways) ▪WebSocket proxying (load balancers)
10. WebSocket handshake 10 Upgrade request Base64(Random nonce) Protocol version Required HTTP version
11. WebSocket handshake 11 Required status code BASE64(SHA1(Sec-WebSocket-Key || CONST ))
12. WebSocket data transfer 12 \x00 – continuation frame \x01 – text frame \x02 – binary frame \x08 – close frame \x09 – ping \x0A – pong other values are reserved
13. WebSocket data transfer - masking 13 ▪ Masking key is 32-bit long passed inside frame ▪ Client must send masked data ▪ MASKED = MASK ^ DATA (^ - XOR) ▪ Mechanism protects against cache poisoning and smuggling attacks
14. 14 Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking
15. WebSocket security for Web Browser 15 ▪ SOP doesn’t work for WebSocket in web browser ▪ Read from WebSocket cross-origin ▪ Write to WebSocket cross-origin ▪ Header Origin should be checked on handshake step (origin-based security model)
16. CSWSH 16 ▪ Cookies are used to authenticate upgrade request ▪ Header Origin isn’t checked or checked poorly
17. CSWSH 17 ▪ CORS tricks from @albinowax are applicable to WebSocket ▪ https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations- for-bitcoins-and-bounties ▪ Null origin ▪ Pre-domain wildcard ▪ Post-domain wildcard ▪ …
18. CSWSH – Null origin 18 ▪ nullorigin.html <iframe src="data:text/html, <script>const socket = new WebSocket('wss://example.com'); </script>"></iframe>
19. CSWSH 19 ▪ Playground ▪ https://portswigger.net/web-security/websockets/cross-site- websocket-hijacking
20. CSWSH – template for attack 5
21. Demo 5
22. 22 Authentication / IDOR issues
23. Authentication 23 ▪ WebSocket protocol doesn’t offer authentication ▪ Developers have to roll out their own AuthN ▪ It’s secure to check AuthN only during handshake ▪ Common secure implementations ▪ Session cookies ▪ Tokens
24. Broken authentication – Case 1 24 ▪ Some ID / GUID is required in Upgrade request ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
25. Broken authentication – Case 2 25 ▪ No authentication during handshake step ▪ Some ID / GUID required in API messages ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
26. Broken authentication – Case 2 26 ▪ Exposing GraphQL subscriptions w/o AuthN ▪ https://github.com/righettod/poc-graphql#subscriptions- websocket-endpoint-default-enabling ▪ Path /subscriptions
27. Insecure Direct Object Reference issues 27 ▪ Strong authentication during handshake step ▪ Some ID / GUID required in API messages ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
28. 28 Smuggling through WebSocket
29. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 29 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Backend /socket.io/ Public WebSocket API
30. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 30 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request Backend /socket.io/
31. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 31 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101 Backend /socket.io/
32. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 32 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket connection direct WebSocket connection Client - Backend Backend /socket.io/
33. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 33 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) Private REST API Public WebSocket API Backend /internal /socket.io/
34. 34 Backend Client Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Version correctness isn’t checked! Smuggling through WebSocket connection
35. 35 Backend Client Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 HTTP/1.1 426 HTTP/1.1 426 Response correctness isn’t checked! Smuggling through WebSocket connection
36. 36 Backend Client Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 HTTP/1.1 426 HTTP/1.1 426 TLS connection direct TLS connection Client – Backend not WebSocket!!! Client can access /internal Smuggling through WebSocket connection
37. Challenge – challenge.0ang3el.tk 37 ▪ URL ▪ https://challenge.0ang3el.tk/websocket.html ▪ You need to access flag on localhost:5000 ▪ Seems no one solved
38. Challenge – challenge.0ang3el.tk 38 ▪ Frontend ▪ Not disclosed WebSocket reverse proxy ▪ socket.io.js ▪ Proxies only WebSocket API - /socket.io/ path ▪ Backend ▪ Flask, Flask-SoketIO, Flask-Restful ▪ Listens on localhost:5000 only
39. challenge1.py
40. challenge1.py - DEMO
41. Vulnerable reverse proxies 41 ▪ Vulnerable ▪ Varnish, Envoy proxy <= 1.8.0, other non-disclosed ▪ Not vulnerable ▪ Nginx, HAProxy, Traefik, others
42. Varnish response 42 ▪ WebSocket proxying configuration ▪ https://varnish-cache.org/docs/6.3/users-guide/vcl-example- websockets.html
43. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 43 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Private REST API Public WebSocket API & REST API Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health
44. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 44 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health example.com GET HTTP/1.1 200
45. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 45 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health Only Upgrade: websocket header is checked! POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u=
46. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 46 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health attacker.com GET HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101 Only status code is checked for response! POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u=
47. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 47 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101 TLS connection direct TLS connection Client – Backend not WebSocket!!! Client can access /internal POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u= Client-to-Server masking isn’t checked by proxy!!!
48. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 48 ▪ URL ▪ https://challenge2.0ang3el.tk/websocket.html ▪ You need to access flag on localhost:5000 ▪ Seems no one solved
49. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 49 ▪ Frontend ▪ Nginx as WebSocket reverse proxy ▪ socket.io.js ▪ Proxies only /api/public path (socket.io and healthcheck) ▪ Backend ▪ Flask, Flask-SoketIO, Flask-Restful ▪ Listens on localhost:5000 only
50. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 50 ▪ Nginx config
51. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 51 ▪ REST API - healthcheck
52. Challenge2.py 5
53. Challenge2.py - Demo 5
54. Vulnerable reverse proxies 54 ▪ Almost all proxies are affected ▪ But exploitation is limited ▪ External SSRF is required that returns status code ▪ …
55. 55 Discovering WebSocket APIs
56. Discovering WebSocket API 56 ▪ Monitor Upgrade requests ▪ Analyze JavaScript files ▪ Try to establish WebSocket connection to each URL ▪ …
57. 57 Conclusion
58. Ideas for further research 58 ▪ Security of WebSocket subprotocols ▪ More smuggling techniques ▪ HTTP/2 and WebSocket ▪ …
59. Thank you! @0ang3el