Shifting Application Security Left

(Central Ohio InfoSec Summit version)
Many people agree the best way to avoid security problems in an application is to design security into the architecture from the beginning instead of doing blackbox testing after development is finished. But what does that actually look like in a real-world application development lifecycle? Checklists like the OWASP Top 10 do not tell architects how to best work with infosec professionals or singlehandedly build an application on a secure foundation. Where should a developer even begin? How do you design security into applications based on next week's JavaScript framework, for which no "best practices" exist? The Information Security Practice Principles, developed by Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, provide both a foundation for application security independent of specific technology decisions as well as a means for establishing a common language between designers and defenders. We will work through an example of how to apply the principles build a threat model and an application design, and what this looks like in an "agile" software development lifecycle. Security teams can be an enabler for good design, not just a gateway to block mistakes!

Transcript

1. S H I F T I N G A P P L I C A T I O N S E C U R I T Y L E F T Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving
2. S H I F T I N G A P P L I C A T I O N S E C U R I T Y L E F T Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
3. 2 0 1 2
4. 2 0 1 7
5. 2 0 1 7
6. 2 0 1 8
7. P R E V I E W • What does application security mean? • Developer checklists don’t work • Threat modeling & security f rom f irst principles • Security as a f irst class part of the software design & development lifecycle
8. – H i p p o c r a t i c O a t h ( 1 9 6 4 L o u i s L a s a g n a v e r s i o n ) “I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person’s family and economic stability.”
10. 1. ummm… blockchain? 2. ??? 3. prof it!
11. http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-safety-2017-best-year-safest-airline-passengers-worldwide-to70-civil-aviation-review- a8130796.html
12. W H A T W O U L D S O F T W A R E D E V E L O P M E N T L O O K L I K E I F H U M A N S A F E T Y W A S A LW A Y S T H E F I R S T C O N S I D E R A T I O N ? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25900776992/
13. – A C M C o d e o f E t h i c s a n d P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t ( p r o p o s e d ) “A computing professional should contribute to society and to human well-being, acknowledging that all people are stakeholders in computing.”
14. – A l l i s o n M i l l e r “I don't think humans are the problem, the problem is that humans are the target.” https://www.scmagazineuk.com/news-feature-google-security-interview-human-solutions--the-way-to-go/article/701976/
15. W H A T I S S E C U R I T Y , R E A L LY ? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airport_Frankfurt_-_Fraport_-_Flughafen_Frankfurt_-_barbed_wire_and_fence_-_Stacheldraht_und_Zaun_-_05.jpg https://www.flickr.com/photos/captkodak/37054929956/
16. D O M A I N S P E C I F I C Q A
17. Behavior
18. Behavior Specification
19. Behavior Specification
20. Behavior Specification
21. Behavior Specification
22. Behavior Specification
23. Q A : D O E S T H E S O F T W A R E D O W H A T I T S H O U L D ?
24. S E C U R I T Y : D O E S I T A L S O D O A N Y T H I N G E L S E ?
25. D o We E v e n K n o w W h a t t h e S o f t w a r e I s S u p p o s e d t o D o ?
26. “In order to write secure applications, developers must • Take OWASP Top 10 training • Use Veracode • Have application pentested • Use two factor authentication on source control and hosts • Use off-the-shelf crypto libraries • Monitor production • Use memory-safe languages • Do code review • HTTPS everywhere!
27. B U I L D A R E C I P E , N O T A G R O C E R Y S T O R E
28. L E A R N Y O U R D O M A I N https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Domain,_Atrium_(Hong_Kong).jpg
29. – M a t t Ta i t “The underlying problem is folks think in terms of ‘secure’ versus ‘insecure.’ But in reality, it's ‘in/secure vs. X threat in Y threat model.’” https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/922009773352120320
30. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/amazon-recalls-potentially-hazardous-solar-eclipse-glasses
31. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592
32. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592
33. iT u n e s M o n e y L a u n d e r i n g https://www.thedailybeast.com/want-to-launder-bitcoins-how-crooks-are-hacking-itunes-and-getting-paid-by-apple
34. “ I ’ m j u s t a t o a s t e r . N o b o d y w i l l e v e r t r y t o h a c k m e ! ”
35. – S e n . R i c h a r d B u r r “You commented yesterday that your company’s goal is bringing people together. In this case, people were brought together to foment conflict, and Facebook enabled that event to happen.” https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/
36. QA! Security!
37. F O U N D A T I O N S Secure Design Secure Lifecycle Empowered Developers Threat Model Security Fundamentals Human Safety Priority Domain Knowledge Safer Applications and Infrastructure
38. Define Design Develop QA Security Deploy
39. N I S T 8 0 0 - 6 4 Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle (2008) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf
40. C I S C O S E C U R E D E V E L O P M E N T L I F E C Y C L E https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/trust-center/docs/building-trustworthy-systems-with-CSDL.pdf
41. M I C R O S O F T S D L C http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL
42. O W A S P S D L C DRAFT https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Software_Development_Lifecycle_Project
44. https://twitter.com/petecheslock/status/595617204273618944?lang=en
45. G R E A T I D E A S … O N T H E R I G H T
46. G R E A T I D E A S … O N T H E R I G H T Bug Bounties Canaries Full Packet Capture Fuzzing Asset Identification Attack Simulation
47. S L A C K S L C https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBwluaTaenI
48. S L A C K S L C https://github.com/slackhq/goSDL
49. S E C U R I T Y I N A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster
50. S E C U R I T Y I N A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster Fundamental Principles Threat Model Automated Analysis Manual Review
51. T H R E A T M O D E L I N G
52. S I X D E G R E E S Who is affected by the software you create? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388897014/
53. U s e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/
54. C u s t o m e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/ https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926791491/
55. Yo u r Te a m https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25167741264/
56. S t a k e h o l d e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388889234/
57. P a r t n e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388854424/
58. Yo u r C o m m u n i t y
59. W H A T D O Y O U H A V E ?
60. I n f r a s t r u c t u r e • Servers • Software • Clients • Gateways • Third Parties
61. D a t a • Databases • Metadata • Logs • Credentials • Files on client machines
62. T r u s t B o u n d a r i e s • Implicit • Explicit
63. W H A T C O U L D G O W R O N G ?
64. D O M A I N - S P E C I F I C R I S K S
65. T a k e C a r e o f P e o p l e F i r s t https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926827581/
66. L e a r n f r o m H i s t o r y https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maginot_line_1.jpg
67. E x i s t e n t i a l T h r e a t s http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/technology/knight-expensive-computer-bug/index.html
68. R e g u l a t o r y
69. B A C K T O B A S I C S
70. C O M P R E H E N S I V I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I covering all of my bases? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Agoncillo_- _W%C3%BCrth_Rioja%2C_Museo_30_-_Christo.JPG
71. O P P O R T U N I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I taking advantage of my environment? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazing_Bhutan_Monastery.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
72. R I G O R Security f rom First Principles What is correct behavior, and how am I ensuring it? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turnstile_state_machine_colored.svg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
73. M I N I M I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Can this be a smaller target? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
74. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Is this made of distinct parts with limited interactions? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulkhead_(partition)#/media/ File:Compartments_and_watertight_subdivision_of_a_ship%27s_hull_(Seaman%27s_Pocket- Book,_1943).jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
75. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E Security f rom First Principles What happens if this fails? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:A_U.S._Soldier,_right,_looks_on_as_a_U.S._Army_Garrison_Ansbach_Junior_ROTC_cadet_negotia tes_a_high_rope_obstacle_6.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
76. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y Security f rom First Principles Is this worth it? https://twitter.com/jwgoerlich/status/939268098699550720?s=09 Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
77. T H E B A S I C P R I N C I P L E S I N A C T I O N
78. B U S I N E S S P R O B L E M • A hotel chain needs to capture credit card numbers for potential incidental charges when the cardholder will not be present at check in • Example: A parent wants to authorize incidental charges for a traveling school sports team member • Current process is a paper form. Company would like to automate
79. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N “Type a quote here.”
80. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
81. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
82. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
83. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
84. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
85. D E S I G N E D I N T O P R O C E S S Comprehensivity https://jeremylong.github.io/DependencyCheck/
86. T R A I N I N G Comprehensivity https://twitter.com/chrisrohlf/status/925846092184477698
87. O P P O R T U N I T Y
88. O P P O R T U N I T Y
89. O P P O R T U N I T Y
90. O P P O R T U N I T Y
91. O P P O R T U N I T Y
92. P A T C H A L L O F T H E T H I N G S Opportunity “Type a quote here.”
93. R I G O R
94. S T A T I C A N A LY S I S Rigor “The most important thing I have done as a programmer in recent years is to aggressively pursue static code analysis. Even more valuable than the hundreds of serious bugs I have prevented with it is the change in mindset about the way I view software reliability and code quality.” - J o h n C a r m a c k https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/128836/InDepth_Static_Code_Analysis.php
96. M I N I M I Z E A T T A C K S U R F A C E ( a n d e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet
97. S T O R E L E S S Minimization “Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.” P C I - D S S § 3 . 1 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSS_QRGv3_1.pdf
98. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T !
99. D O U B L E E D G E D S W O R D Compartmentalization “Your perimeter is not the boundary of your network it’s the boundary of your telemetry.” http://grugq.github.io/presentations/comae-blackhat-year-of-the-worm.pdf - T h e G r u g q
100. L E A S T P R I V I L E G E Compartmentalization EncryptionServiceIAMRole: Type: "AWS::IAM::Role" Properties: Path: "/" ManagedPolicyArns: - "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole" AssumeRolePolicyDocument: Version: "2012-10-17" Statement: - Sid: "AllowLambdaServiceToAssumeRole" Effect: "Allow" Action: - "sts:AssumeRole" Principal: Service: - "lambda.amazonaws.com"
101. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T ! • Networks • Public ingress (CloudFront), WAF rules • Private ingress (Jump server) • Roles for public, hotel staff, site admin, developer, ops • Restrict data by property • Archive old data to encrypted cold storage • Use key management (KMS, HSM, etc.) for secrets
102. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
103. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E • User safety • Stop the exf iltration • Assess the scope • Proactively prevent further damage to users • Listen • Technical • Engage DF/IR professionals to assess how it happened and how to prevent • Design system for secure storage and rotation of secrets
104. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y
105. L A T H E R , R I N S E , R E P E A T • Plan on enumerating the f irst principles at least twice in initial app design • Enumerate again in sprint planning for each sprint • Following f irst principles does not mean “big design upf ront”
106. C O N T I N U O U S S E C U R I T Y Initially •Human safety review •Review principles at least twice •Begin threat modeling •Security controls in CI Periodically •Pentest •Regulatory review •Incident response plan Continuously •Use principles in backlog grooming •Update threat model •Usability testing •Static/dynamic analysis •Training •Patch All of the Things
107. F U R T H E R R E A D I N G • The Information Security Practice Principles, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University • Threat Modeling, Designing for Security, by Adam Shostack
108. C R E D I T S • Some stock photography f rom wocintechchat.com, CC- BY 2.0 • Creative Commons photography credited on each slide
109. C O N T A C T craig.stuntz@improving.com @craigstuntz http://paperswelove.org/chapter/columbus/ https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz