Shifting Application Security Left

Many people agree the best way to avoid security problems in an application is to design security into the architecture from the beginning instead of doing blackbox testing after development is finished. But what does that actually look like in a real-world application development lifecycle? Checklists like the OWASP Top 10 do not tell architects how to best work with infosec professionals or singlehandedly build an application on a secure foundation. Where should a developer even begin? How do you design security into applications based on next week’s JavaScript framework, for which no “best practices” exist? The Information Security Practice Principles, developed by Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, provide both a foundation for application security independent of specific technology decisions as well as a means for establishing a common language between designers and defenders. We will work through an example of how to apply the principles build a threat model and an application design, and what this looks like in an “agile” software development lifecycle. Security teams can be an enabler for good design, not just a gateway to block mistakes!

Transcript

1. S H I F T I N G A P P L I C A T I O N S E C U R I T Y L E F T Craig Stuntz ∈ Improving https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz
2. 2 0 1 2
3. 2 0 1 7
4. 2 0 1 7
5. 2 0 1 8
6. P R E V I E W • What does application security mean? • Developer checklists don’t work • Threat modeling & security f rom f irst principles • Security as a f irst class part of the software design & development lifecycle
7. – H i p p o c r a t i c O a t h ( 1 9 6 4 L o u i s L a s a g n a v e r s i o n ) “I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person’s family and economic stability.”
9. 1. ummm… ChatGPT? 2. ??? 3. prof it!
10. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/132725271/paknsaves-ai-meal-planner-suggests-recipe-for-deadly-chlorine-gas
11. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/amnesty-report-finds-facebook-amplified-hate-ahead-of-rohingya-massacre-in-myanmar
12. https://globalnews.ca/news/9470293/battery-fire-airplane-lithium-ion-united-flight/
13. W H A T W O U L D S O F T W A R E D E V E L O P M E N T L O O K L I K E I F H U M A N S A F E T Y W A S A LW A Y S T H E F I R S T C O N S I D E R A T I O N ? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25900776992/
14. – A C M C o d e o f E t h i c s a n d P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t “A computing professional should contribute to society and to human well-being, acknowledging that all people are stakeholders in computing.”
15. – A l l i s o n M i l l e r “I don't think humans are the problem, the problem is that humans are the target.” https://www.scmagazineuk.com/news-feature-google-security-interview-human-solutions--the-way-to-go/article/701976/
16. W H A T I S S E C U R I T Y , R E A L LY ? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airport_Frankfurt_-_Fraport_-_Flughafen_Frankfurt_-_barbed_wire_and_fence_-_Stacheldraht_und_Zaun_-_05.jpg https://www.flickr.com/photos/captkodak/37054929956/
17. D O M A I N S P E C I F I C Q A
18. Behavior Speci fi cation
19. Q A : D O E S T H E S O F T W A R E D O W H A T I T S H O U L D ?
20. S E C U R I T Y : D O E S I T A L S O D O A N Y T H I N G E L S E ?
21. D o We E v e n K n o w W h a t t h e S o f t w a r e I s S u p p o s e d t o D o ?
22. “In order to write secure applications, developers must • Take OWASP Top 10 training • Use Snyk/SonarQube/Prisma/… • Have application pentested • Use two factor authentication on source control and hosts • Use off-the-shelf crypto libraries • Monitor production • Use memory-safe languages • Do code review • HTTPS everywhere!
23. B U I L D A R E C I P E , N O T A G R O C E R Y S T O R E
24. L E A R N Y O U R D O M A I N https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Domain,_Atrium_(Hong_Kong).jpg
25. – M a t t Ta i t “The underlying problem is folks think in terms of ‘secure’ versus ‘insecure.’ But in reality, it's ‘in/secure vs. X threat in Y threat model.’” https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/922009773352120320
26. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/amazon-recalls-potentially-hazardous-solar-eclipse-glasses
27. https://twitter.com/slatestarcodex/status/944739157988974592
28. iT u n e s M o n e y L a u n d e r i n g https://www.thedailybeast.com/want-to-launder-bitcoins-how-crooks-are-hacking-itunes-and-getting-paid-by-apple
29. “ I ’ m j u s t a t o a s t e r . N o b o d y w i l l e v e r t r y t o h a c k m e ! ”
30. – S e n . R i c h a r d B u r r “You commented yesterday that your company’s goal is bringing people together. In this case, people were brought together to foment conflict, and Facebook enabled that event to happen.” https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/
31. QA! Security!
32. De fi ne Design Develop QA Security Deploy
33. F O U N D A T I O N S Secure Design Secure Lifecycle Empowered Developers Threat Model Security Fundamentals Human Safety Priority Domain Knowledge Safer Applications and Infrastructure
34. N I S T 8 0 0 - 6 4 Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle (2008) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf
35. C I S C O S E C U R E D E V E L O P M E N T L I F E C Y C L E https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/trust-center/docs/building-trustworthy-systems-with-CSDL.pdf
36. M I C R O S O F T S D L C http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/SDL
37. O W A S P S A M M https://www.opensamm.org/
39. https://twitter.com/petecheslock/status/595617204273618944?lang=en
40. G R E A T I D E A S … O N T H E R I G H T Bug Bounties Canaries Full Packet Capture Fuzzing Asset Identi fi cation Attack Simulation
41. S L A C K G O S D L https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBwluaTaenI https://github.com/slackhq/goSDL
42. S L A C K G O S D L https://github.com/slackhq/goSDL
43. https://sre.google/books/building-secure-reliable-systems/
44. S E C U R I T Y I N A N A G I L E P R O C E S S https://www.scrum.org/resources/scrum-framework-poster Fundamental Principles Threat Model Automated Analysis Manual Review
45. T H R E A T M O D E L I N G
46. S I X D E G R E E S Who is affected by the software you create? https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388897014/
47. U s e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/
48. C u s t o m e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25703122741/ https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926791491/
49. Yo u r Te a m https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25167741264/
50. S t a k e h o l d e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388889234/
51. P a r t n e r s https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25388854424/
52. Yo u r C o m m u n i t y
53. W H A T D O Y O U H A V E ?
54. I n f r a s t r u c t u r e • Servers • Software • Clients • Gateways • Third Parties
55. D a t a • Databases • Metadata • Logs • Credentials • Files on client machines
56. T r u s t B o u n d a r i e s • Implicit • Explicit
57. W H A T C O U L D G O W R O N G ?
58. D O M A I N - S P E C I F I C R I S K S
59. T a k e C a r e o f P e o p l e F i r s t https://www.flickr.com/photos/wocintechchat/25926827581/
60. L e a r n f r o m H i s t o r y https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maginot_line_1.jpg
61. E x i s t e n t i a l T h r e a t s http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/technology/knight-expensive-computer-bug/index.html
62. R e g u l a t o r y
63. T H R E A T M O D E L I N G • Who is affected by your software? • What do you have? • What could go wrong?
64. B A C K T O B A S I C S
65. C O M P R E H E N S I V I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I covering all of my bases? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Agoncillo_- _W%C3%BCrth_Rioja%2C_Museo_30_-_Christo.JPG
66. O P P O R T U N I T Y Security f rom First Principles Am I taking advantage of my environment? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amazing_Bhutan_Monastery.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
67. R I G O R Security f rom First Principles What is correct behavior, and how am I ensuring it? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turnstile_state_machine_colored.svg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
68. M I N I M I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Can this be a smaller target? Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
69. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z A T I O N Security f rom First Principles Is this made of distinct parts with limited interactions? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulkhead_(partition)#/media/ File:Compartments_and_watertight_subdivision_of_a_ship%27s_hull_(Seaman%27s_Pocket- Book,_1943).jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
70. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E Security f rom First Principles What happens if this fails? https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:A_U.S._Soldier,_right,_looks_on_as_a_U.S._Army_Garrison_Ansbach_Junior_ROTC_cadet_negotia tes_a_high_rope_obstacle_6.jpg Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
71. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y Security f rom First Principles Is this worth it? https://twitter.com/jwgoerlich/status/939268098699550720?s=09 Craig Jackson, Scott Russell, and Susan Sons
72. T H E B A S I C P R I N C I P L E S I N A C T I O N
73. B U S I N E S S P R O B L E M • A hotel chain needs to capture credit card numbers for potential incidental charges when the cardholder will not be present at check in • Example: A parent wants to authorize incidental charges for a traveling school sports team member • Current process is a paper form. Company would like to automate
74. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N “Type a quote here.”
75. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
76. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
77. N A Ï V E S O L U T I O N , R E - R E - R E V I S I T E D Comprehensivity “Type a quote here.”
78. D E S I G N E D I N T O P R O C E S S Comprehensivity https://jeremylong.github.io/DependencyCheck/
79. T R A I N I N G Comprehensivity https://twitter.com/chrisrohlf/status/925846092184477698
80. O P P O R T U N I T Y
81. C E N T R A L I Z E S E C R E T S Opportunity https://safenet.gemalto.com/data-encryption/enterprise-key-management/key-secure/
82. P A T C H A L L O F T H E T H I N G S Opportunity “Type a quote here.”
83. R I G O R
84. S T A T I C A N A LY S I S Rigor “The most important thing I have done as a programmer in recent years is to aggressively pursue static code analysis. Even more valuable than the hundreds of serious bugs I have prevented with it is the change in mindset about the way I view software reliability and code quality.” - J o h n C a r m a c k https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/128836/InDepth_Static_Code_Analysis.php
86. M I N I M I Z E A T T A C K S U R F A C E ( a n d e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Attack_Surface_Analysis_Cheat_Sheet
87. S T O R E L E S S Minimization “Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored data at least quarterly.” P C I - D S S § 3 . 1 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCIDSS_QRGv3_1.pdf
88. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T !
89. D O U B L E E D G E D S W O R D Compartmentalization “Your perimeter is not the boundary of your network it’s the boundary of your telemetry.” http://grugq.github.io/presentations/comae-blackhat-year-of-the-worm.pdf - T h e G r u g q
90. L E A S T P R I V I L E G E Compartmentalization EncryptionServiceIAMRole: Type: "AWS::IAM::Role" Properties: Path: "/" ManagedPolicyArns: - "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole" AssumeRolePolicyDocument: Version: "2012-10-17" Statement: - Sid: "AllowLambdaServiceToAssumeRole" Effect: "Allow" Action: - "sts:AssumeRole" Principal: Service: - "lambda.amazonaws.com"
91. C O M P A R T M E N T A L I Z E I T ! • Networks • Public ingress (CloudFront), WAF rules • Private ingress (Jump server) • Roles for public, hotel staff, site admin, developer, ops • Restrict data by property • Archive old data to encrypted cold storage • Use key management (KMS, HSM, etc.) for secrets
92. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E https://github.com/Xyl2k/TSA-Travel-Sentry-master-keys
93. F A U LT T O L E R A N C E • User safety • Stop the exf iltration • Assess the scope • Proactively prevent further damage to users • Listen • Technical • Engage DF/IR professionals to assess how it happened and how to prevent • Design system for secure storage and rotation of secrets
94. P R O P O R T I O N A L I T Y
95. L A T H E R , R I N S E , R E P E A T • Plan on enumerating the f irst principles at least twice in initial app design • Enumerate again in sprint planning for each sprint • Following f irst principles does not mean “big design upf ront”
96. C O N T I N U O U S S E C U R I T Y Initially •Human safety review •Review principles at least twice •Begin threat modeling •Security controls in CI Periodically •Pentest •Regulatory review •Incident response plan Continuously •Use principles in backlog grooming •Update threat model •Usability testing •Static/dynamic analysis •Training •Patch All of the Things
97. W H A T ’ S O M I T T E D ? • Testing — does it work? • Incompetence / fat f ingering vs. malicious insiders • Decrease reaction times • Automation and zero touch • Have human supervision over automated processes • Breakglass escapes for emergencies
98. F U R T H E R R E A D I N G
99. C R E D I T S • Some stock photography f rom wocintechchat.com, CC- BY 2.0 • Creative Commons photography credited on each slide
100. N E X T U P 13 December “non-technical obstacles of launching a side project” - Jordan Wagner
101. C O N T A C T craig.stuntz@improving.com @CraigStuntz@types.pl http://paperswelove.org/chapter/columbus/ https://speakerdeck.com/craigstuntz