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February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Securing iOS apps Max Bazaliy -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe About me 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Bluebox Security CocoaHeads Ukraine mbazaliy -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Agenda 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o iOS security mechanisms o Security from attacker’s perspective o Reverse engineering tools detection o Security coding practices o Advanced practices -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe o Secured boot process
o Privilege separation o Code signing o Memory protection o Sandbox o Encryption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 iOS security mechanisms -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Secured boot process Bootrom LLB iBoot Kernel Application Signature check -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Privilege separation 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o Users (root, mobile, …) o Groups o File permissions o Safari, Mail run as mobile o Most important system processes as root -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Code signing 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o Implemented in kernel o Every executable should be signed o Stored in LC_CODE_SIGNATURE o Superblob, entitlements, signature o SHA1 check of memory pages o Superblob is signed -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Memory protection 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o R ^ W policy o Non executable stack and heap o Implemented in kernel o Vulnerable to ROP o (K)ASLR o No dynamic code generation -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Sandbox (Seatbelt) 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o Based upon TrustedBSD MAC framework o Implemented in kernel o Profiles (nointernet, container…) o Operations (read, write, search…) o System & user partition -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Encryption 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o Hardware AES and SHA modules o 7 derivative keys from UID and GID o Everything is encrypted (iBoot, filesystem, …) o Data protection API o Passcode \ TouchID key o Remote device wiping -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe o Code injection o
Function hooking o ObjC logger o Jailbreak detection o Security checks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Security from attacker’s perspective -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe Code injection 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 o .dylib injection o DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES o LLDB o Cycript o LD_LOAD_DYLIB o Mobile Substrate -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=dumper.dylib Scan.app/Scan Dynamic loader -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 LLDB Max-iPhone-5S:~ root# ./debugserver *:1234 -a ”Scan” $ lldb (lldb) platform select remote-ios (lldb) process connect connect://192.168.1.2:1234 (lldb) expr (void*)dlopen(“/Desktop/dumper.dylib”, 0x2) -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Cycript $ cycript -p Scan cy# dlopen(”/Desktop/dumper.dylib", RTLD_NOW) -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 New load command cmd LC_LOAD_DYLIB cmdsize 52 name @rpath/dumper.dylib time stamp 2 Thu Jan 1 03:00:02 1970 cur.ver. 1.0.0 compat.ver 1.0.0 otool -l –v binary | grep -A 5 LC_LOAD_DYLIB -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 New load command LC_LOAD_DYLIB or LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB o Wrap LC_LOAD, update sizeof commands o optool o insert_dylib o yololib -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Mobile Substrate o Most popular code patching framework o Hook C, C++, Objective C, Java code o Trampoline for C hooks o Swizzling for Objective C o Dynamic code injection o Filter support -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Mobile Substrate hook API + Logos MSImageRef MSGetImageByName(const char *file) void *MSFindSymbol(MSImageRef image, const char *name) void MSHookFunction(void *symbol, void *hook, void **old) void MSHookMessageEx(Class _class, SEL message, IMP hook, IMP *old) void MSHookClassPair(Class _class, Class hook, Class old) -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Mobile Substrate Loader Filter = { Executables = ("mediaserverd"); Bundles = ( "com.apple.MobileSMS", "net.whatsapp.WhatsApp" ); CoreFoundationVersion = (550.32, 675.00); Classes = ("MMTrackingMgr"); Mode = "Any"; }; Load everything from /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Function hooking main qsort No hooking -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Function hooking main qsort Hooking scenario hook -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Function hooking main qsort Hooking scenario 2 hook -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Hooking [NSObject description] NSString *(*oldDescription)(id self, SEL _cmd);! ! NSString *newDescription(id self, SEL _cmd) {! NSString *description = (*oldDescription)(self, _cmd);! description = [description stringByAppendingString:@"!"];! return description;! }! ! MSHookMessageEx(! " [NSObject class], @selector(description),! " (IMP)&newDescription, (IMP*)&oldDescription! ); -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 objc_msgSend[_[st|fp]ret] logging - [Pin password] +[PBKDF2 getKeyForPassphrase:], args:<NSCFString: secretPassword> - [Pin initWithCoder:], args: <0x1f5a4320> - [Pin setPinValue:], args: <NSCFString: 4711> - [Pin setNote:], args: <NSCFString: Sample PIN Note> - [Pin initWithCoder:], args: <0x1f5a4320> - [Pin setPinValue:], args: <NSCFString: 1337> - [Pin setNote:], args: <NULL> Aspective-C, Subjective-C, Inspective-C -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Bypassing shell check + (BOOL)shellCheck {! if (system(0))! return YES;! return NO;! } static int (*old_system)(char *) = NULL;! int hooked_system(char * cmd) {! if (!cmd) {! return 0;! }! return old_system(cmd);! }! MSHookFunction(system, hooked_system, &old_system);! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Bypassing files check + (BOOL)cydiaCheck {! if ([[NSFileManager defaultManager] ! "fileExistsAtPath: @"/Applications/Cydia.app"])! return YES;! return NO;! } void* (*old_fileExistsAtPath)(void* self, SEL _cmd, NSString* path) = NULL;! void* hooked_fileExistsAtPath(void* self, SEL _cmd, NSString* path){! if ([path isEqualToString:@"/Applications/Cydia.app"]) {! return 0;! }! return old_fileExistsAtPath(self, _cmd, path);! }! MSHookMessageEx([NSFileManager class], @selector(fileExistsAtPath:),! (IMP)hooked_fileExistsAtPath, (IMP *)&old_fileExistsAtPath);! ! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Bypassing fork check + (BOOL)forkCheck {! pid_t result = fork();! if (!result)! exit(0);! if (result >= 0)! return YES;! return NO; } static pid_t (*old_fork)(void) = NULL;! pid_t hooked_fork() {! if (calledDirectlyFromApp()) {! return -1;! }! return old_fork();! }! MSHookFunction(fork, hooked_fork, &old_fork);! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 const char* hook_dyld_get_image_name(uint32_t image_index) {! if (image_index >= dyld_skipimage)! return orig_get_image_name(image_index + 1);! else! return orig_get_image_name(image_index);! }! ! MSHookFunction(_dyld_image_count,hooked_image_count,&orig_image_count)! MSHookFunction(_dyld_get_image_name,hooked_get_image_name,&orig_get_image_name) uint32_t dyld_skipimage = 0;! ! uint32_t hooked_dyld_image_count(void) {! return orig_image_count() - 1;! }! “Calling functions like _dyld_image_count() and _dyld_get_image_name() to see which dylibs are currently loaded. Very difficult to patch, as patches are themselves part of dylibs.” – theiphonewiki.com -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Bypassing ptrace tricks static int (*orig_ptrace)(int request, pid_t pid, caddr_t addr, int data);! ! int hooked_ptrace(int request, pid_t pid, caddr_t addr, int data) {! int retVal;! if (request == PT_DENY_ATTACH || request == PT_TRACEME) {! return 0;! }! else {! retVal = orig_ptrace(request, pid, addr, data);! }! return retVal;! }! MSHookFunction(MSFindSymbol(0, "ptrace"),hooked_ptrace,(void **)&orig_ptrace);! ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0); -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Bypassing SSL pinning - SSLKillSwitch OSStatus hooked_SSLHandshake(SSLContextRef context) {! OSStatus result = orig_SSLHandshake(context);! ! if (result == errSSLServerAuthCompleted) {! return orig_SSLHandshake(context);! }! else return result; }! … MSHookFunction(SSLHandshake,hooked_SSLHandshake, &orig_SSLHandshake) ! MSHookFunction(SSLCreateContext,hooked_SSLCreateContext,&orig_SSLCreateContext)! MSHookFunction(SSLSetSessionOption,hooked_SSLSetSessionOption,! " " " " " "&orig_SSLSetSessionOption)! SSLHandshake, SSLSetSessionOption, SSLCreateContext! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Auto bypassing jailbreak checks o tsProtector X o xCon o Officer -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Tracing tweaks Introspy, Snoop-It, iSpy -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe o Debugger detection o
Hooks detection o Code injection detection 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Reverse engineering tools detection -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Debugger detection – process flags static int is_debugger_present(void) {! ! struct kinfo_proc info;! size_t info_size = sizeof(info);! ! name[0] = CTL_KERN;! " …! name[3] = getpid(); " " " " // Getting proccess pid! ! if (sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0) == -1) {! return 0;! }! return ((info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0); "// Checking P_TRACED flag! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Debugger detection – parent process static int is_debugserver_present(void) {! ! struct kinfo_proc info;! size_t info_size = sizeof(info);! ! name[0] = CTL_KERN;! " …! name[3] = getppid(); " " "// Getting parent proccess pid! ! if (sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0) == -1) {! return 0;! }! return (strncmp(info.kp_proc.p_comm, "launchd", sizeof("launchd")-1) != 0);! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Breakpoint detection bool is_breakpoint_set(void* memory, size_t check_size) {! unsigned char *tmp_mem = (unsigned char*)memory;! for (size_t i = 0; i < check_size; i++)! {! if ((tmp_mem[i] == 0xFE) && (tmp_mem[i+1] == 0xDE))! return true;! }! return false;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Hook detection - pointer bool is_method_swizzled(Class clazz, SEL sel) {! ! Dl_info info;! if (dladdr(class_getMethodImplementation(clazz, sel), &info)) {! if (strstr(info.dli_fname, "/System/Library") || ! " " " "strstr(info.dli_fname, "/usr/lib”) {! return false;! }! }! return true;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Hook detection - trampoline bool is_function_hooked(void* function) {! ! uintptr_t* code = (uintptr_t*)(uintptr_t) function;! ! if (code[0] == 0xE5XXXXXX) {! return true;! }! return false;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES detection extern char **environ;! ! bool is_dyld_insert_libraries_present(void) {! int i=0;! char *envp = *environ;! char *dyld_var = "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES”;! while(envp) {! i++;! char *env_var = NULL, *env_val = NULL;! … ! if (strncmp(env_var, dyld_var , sizeof(dyld_var)-1) == 0) {! return true;! }! "envp = *(environ+i);! }! return false;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Mobile Substrate detection #import <mach-o/dyld.h>! ! bool is_mobile_substrate_present(void) {! ! uint32_t count = _dyld_image_count();! char* substrate = "Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib";! ! for (uint32_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {! "if (strcmp(_dyld_get_image_name(i),substrate)==0) {! return true;! }! }! return false;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 ‘Bad’ symbols detection bool is_cycript_present(void) {! ! Class genericClass = objc_getClass("CYJSArray");! SEL genericSelector = sel_registerName("initWithJSObject:inContext:");! ! if (genericClass) {! Method method = class_getInstanceMethod(genericClass, genericSelector);! if (method) {! return true;! }! }! return false;! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe o Anti-hooking o Anti-patching
o Obfuscation 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Security coding practices -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Anti-hooking __attribute__((always_inline))! static inline void my_secret_function(void)! o Inline critical functions o Symbol visibility __attribute__((visibility("hidden")))! static bool is_dyld_insert_libraries_present(void) o Hook detection Dl_info info; if (dladdr(func_pointer, &info)) // Pointer! ! if (code[0] == 0xE5XXXXXX) " " // Trampoline -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Anti-patching – code checksum for (uint32_t i = 0; cmd != NULL && i < header->ncmds; i++) {! if (cmd->cmd == LC_SEGMENT_ARCH_DEPENDENT) {! segment_command_t* segment = (segment_command_t*)cmd;! if (!strcmp(segment->segname, SEG_TEXT)) {! section_t * section = (section_t *)(segment + 1);! for (uint32_t j = 0; section != NULL && j < segment->nsects; j++){! if (!strcmp(section->sectname, SECT_TEXT))! break;! section = (section_t *)(section + 1);! }! … if (!CC_SHA1(text_section, (CC_LONG)text_section_size, code_hash_buf))! if (memcmp(signature_buf, code_hash_buf, sizeof(code_hash_buf)) == 0)! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Obfuscation – hide function calls uint32_t count = _dyld_image_count();! const char *image= NULL;! ! for(uint32_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {! dyld = _dyld_get_image_name(i);! }! static uint32_t (*orig_dyld_image_count)(void);! orig_dyld_image_count = dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, "_dyld_image_count");//To obfuscate! ! uint32_t count = orig_dyld_image_count();! const char *dyld = NULL;! ! for(uint32_t i = 0; i < count; i++) {! dyld = _dyld_get_image_name(i);! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Obfuscation – hide method calls ! NSString *string = @"Hi im string";! string = [string uppercaseString];! ! ! // Obfuscate all strings! id string = @"Hi im string";! SEL genericSelector = sel_registerName("uppercaseString");! string = ((id(*)(id, SEL))objc_msgSend)(string,genericSelector);! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Obfuscation – strings obfuscation + (NSString*)xorString: (NSString*)first withString: (NSString*)second! {! …! for(int index = 0; index < [firstString length]; index++)! firstBytes[index] ^= secondBytes[index];! ! NSString *result = firstString;! return result;! }! o Simple XOR o Encoding \ Decoding table o Crypto -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Obfuscation – numbers obfuscation __attribute__((noinline))! static volatile uint32_t get_obfuscated_num(uint32_t *seed){! *seed = ((*seed) * 214013 + 2531011) & 0x7fffffff;! return *seed >> 16;! }! ! int seed = 1802271524;! int number = get_obfuscated_num(&seed); //Return 2! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 3rd party obfuscators o Arxan o LLVM Obfuscator o iOS Class Guard -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe o Functions replacement o
System calls o Device anomalies o Assembler code obfuscation 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Advanced practices -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Re-implement libc __attribute__((always_inline))! static inline int mb_memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n) {! if (n != 0) {! const unsigned char *p1 = s1, *p2 = s2;! ! do {! if (*p1++ != *p2++)! return (*--p1 - *--p2);! } while (--n != 0);! }! return (0);! }! memcmp, memcpy, strcmp, strncmp, strstr -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Re-implement dyld const void * dlladdr(mach_header *image, const char *symbol) {! " " " "… nlist_t *symbase = (nlist_t*)(image + (symtab->symoff + file_slide));! char *strings = (char*)(image + (symtab->stroff + file_slide));! nlist_t *sym;! ! for (i = 0, sym = symbase; i < symtab->nsyms; i += 1, sym += 1)! {! if (sym->n_un.n_strx != 0 && !strcmp(symbol, strings + sym->n_un.n_strx))! {! unsigned long address = vm_slide + sym->n_value;! if (sym->n_desc & N_ARM_THUMB_DEF)! return (const void*)(address | 1);! else! return (const void*)(address);! }! dlsym, dladdr, _dyld_get_image_xxx -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Device anomalies if (sysctl(myname, 4, &myinfo, &myinfo_size, NULL, 0) == -1) {! return;! }! ! // check for debugger trace flag set! if ((myinfo.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0) ! "NSLog(@”Tracing detected");! } ! // check for aslr disabled flag! if ((myinfo.kp_proc.p_flag & P_DISABLE_ASLR) != 0) {! NSLog(@"PIE disabled");! } ! // check for debugger enabled flag! if ((myinfo.kp_proc.p_debugger) != 0) {! NSLog(@"Debugger enabled ?");! }! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Device anomalies // check kproc for mobile's uid! if ( myinfo.kp_eproc.e_pcred.p_ruid != 501 ||! myinfo.kp_eproc.e_pcred.p_svuid != 501 ||! myinfo.kp_eproc.e_ucred.cr_uid != 501 )! {! NSLog(@"Mobile uid anomaly");! }! ! // check kproc for mobile's gid! if ( myinfo.kp_eproc.e_pcred.p_rgid != 501 ||! myinfo.kp_eproc.e_pcred.p_svgid != 501 )! {! NSLog(@"Mobile gid anomaly");! }! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 System calls o Syscall function as wrapper o Implemented as svc 0x80 o Syscall number in r12 or x16 o Arguments in registers o Listed in syscall.h -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Syscall ; ssize_t read(int, void *, size_t)! EXPORT _read! _read! MOV R12, #3 // SYS_read! SVC 0x80! BCC locret_2F756914! …! BX R12! #define "SYS_syscall 0! #define "SYS_exit 1! #define "SYS_fork 2! #define "SYS_read 3! #define "SYS_write 4! usr/include/sys/syscall.h -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Access to private stuff #include <codesign.h> // opensource.apple.com! ! int csops(pid_t pid, unsigned int ops, void *addr, size_t size);! ! #define "SYS_csops 169! #include <ptrace.h> // opensource.apple.com! ! int ptrace(int _request, pid_t _pid, caddr_t _addr, int _data);! ! #define "SYS_ptrace 26! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 CSOPS – getting code directory hash #include <codesign.h> ! ! syscall(SYS_csops,! CS_OPS_CDHASH,! " (void*)BUFFER,! " CC_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH);! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 49 50 51 52
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Rewrite code using syscalls pid_t pid = getpid(); " " pid_t pid = syscall(SYS_getpid);! ! ! ! int st = sysctl(mib,…); " int st = syscall(SYS_sysctl,…);! ! ! ! pid_t pid = fork(); " " pid_t pid = syscall(SYS_fork);! ! ! ! int st = stat("/bin",…); " int st = syscall(SYS_stat,…);! ! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Implement your own syscall int zyzcall(int num, uint32_t arg0, uint32_t arg1, uint32_t arg2) {! ! int result = 0;! asm volatile (! ".thumb;"! "mov r0, %[a0];"! " ""mov r1, %[a1];"! " ""mov r2, %[a2];“! " ""mov r12, %[num];"! " ""svc 0x80;"! "mov %[ret], r0;“! " " …! " ");! return result;! -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 How to obfuscate syscall ? o ARM – 4 bytes o Thumb - 2 bytes o Thumb2 - 2/4 bytes o ARM64 - 4 bytes -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Instructions overlapping "add r11, r12, r4;"! "mov r4, %[a3];"! "mov r12, 0;“! "mov pc, r11;“! //overlaps with SVC instruction! ".byte 0x50, 0xf8;"! "svc 0x80;"! "mov %[ret], r0;" -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Instructions overlapping No SVC instruction J -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Summary o Do not rely on iOS security and ObjC\Swift o ‘Everything is hooked’ environment o Detect hooks and code injection o Detect debuggers and device anomalies o Re implement standard functions o Love and use syscalls o Obfuscate your code -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Cracking time == protection time -
February 6, 2015 Mobile Central Europe 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 @mbazaliy