Microservices Manchester 2016: Security, Microservices & Vault

Slides for talk done at Microservices Manchester conference http://www.microservicesmanchester.com/speakers/nick-watt/

Transcript

1. Security, Microservices & Vault Nicki Watt @techiewatt 1 http://www.microservicesmanchester.com
2. About Me • Hands on Lead consultant at OpenCredo
 • Co-author Neo4j In Action
 • Twitter: @techiewatt 2
3. Agenda • Introduction • Framework for assessing challenges • Vault • Conclusion 3
4. 4 Introduction
5. 5 You’ve already heard the stories of how …
6. 6 from the monolith … image credit: http://lovealwaysbear.blogspot.co.uk/2011_01_01_archive.html Applications
7. 7 to microservices image credit: http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/most-tennis- balls-held-in-the-mouth-dog Applications
8. 8 to microservices image credit: http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/most-tennis- balls-held-in-the-mouth-dog Not every problem needs m icroservices! Applications
9. 9 from Silo’d teams with manual release processes image credit: http://kittypluscoco.blogspot.co.uk/ 2011/04/day-at-dog-park.html Teams
10. 10 image credit: http://www.notey.com/@coolshitibuy/external/10054533/ ruffwear-approach-dog-backpack.html to agile teams with fast, automated software delivery DevOps! Teams
11. 11 But …
12. 12 What do you mean “It’s going live today” ? image credit: https://www.facebook.com/EarltheGrump/photos Security ?
13. 13 image credit: https://www.facebook.com/EarltheGrump/photos SECURITY BOLTED ON AT THE END! # FAIL! Security ? What do you mean “It’s going live today” ?
14. 15 image credit: http://www.beauswish.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/arianna.jpg DevSecOps! agile teams (with security as a 1st class citizen) practicing fast, secure, automated software delivery
15. Delivery Pipeline 17 http://www.devsecops.org/blog/2016/5/20/-security <— Shifting Security to the Left Shannon Lietz DEV TEST OPS SECURITY
16. Delivery Pipeline 17 http://www.devsecops.org/blog/2016/5/20/-security <— Shifting Security to the Left Shannon Lietz DEV TEST OPS SECURITY
17. “secure reasoning” should be in the forefront of every engineers minds 18
18. Microservice example: Big retail store selling goods which includes a typical “web store” 19
19. 20 user service product service Example: web store
20. 21 user service product service Example: web store external system XXX
21. 22 user service product service Example: web store external system XXX sensitive data passwords, keys
22. 23 Example: web store external system XXX store api store front user service product service sensitive data passwords, keys
23. 24 sensitive data store api store front user service product service external system XXX passwords, keys Example: web store
24. Where do we start ? 25
25. Know thy playground! • What infrastructure? • What tech stacks? • What databases? • What type of delivery channels? 26
26. 27 sensitive data store api store front user service product service external system XXX passwords, keys Example: web store
27. 28 sensitive data store api store front user service product service external system XXX passwords, keys Example: web store
28. 29 sensitive data store api store front user service product service external system XXX passwords, keys Example: web store
29. 30 A framework for thinking about security …
30. 31 NIST Cyber Security Framework
31. 32 NIST Cyber Security Framework
32. 33 IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER What stuff needs protecting? What can I do to protect it? How will I know if bad stuff happens? What should I do when bad stuff happens? How can I get my system back up and running after bad stuff has happened?
33. 34 IDENTIFY What stuff needs protecting?
34. 35 IDENTIFY What stuff needs protecting? Threat Modelling
35. 36 IDENTIFY What stuff needs protecting? Attack Trees https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack_trees.html
36. 38 IDENTIFY sensitive data external system XXX store api store front passwords, keys user service product service steal sensitive user data
37. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 39 IDENTIFY gain access to internal network steal sensitive user data attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic
38. external system XXX sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service 40 IDENTIFY store api store front attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data steal sensitive user data modify data in DB
39. external system XXX 41 IDENTIFY store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service gain access to internal network steal sensitive user data social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic
40. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 42 IDENTIFY gain access to internal network steal sensitive user data attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic
41. Security, and actually being able to do things, always requires a trade off! 43
42. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 44 PROTECT attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall
43. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 45 PROTECT attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall
44. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 46 PROTECT attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall cfssl
45. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 47 PROTECT attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall
46. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 48 DETECT Log suspicious queries Log HTTP requests Log HTTP requests attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall IDS
47. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 49 gain access to internal network infect employee computer install malware via email sniff non encrypted traffic compromise user data attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS HTTPS Firewall antivirus Use prepared statements IDS Log suspicious queries Log HTTP requests Log HTTP requests build web app vuln verification into CI/CD DETECT Distributed logging capability Container level logging Alerting capability Infrastructure level logging Serverless logging ???
48. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 50 gain access to internal network infect employee computer install malware via email sniff non encrypted traffic compromise user data attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS HTTPS Firewall antivirus Use prepared statements IDS Log suspicious queries Log HTTP requests Log HTTP requests build web app vuln verification into CI/CD DETECT Distributed logging capability Container level logging Alerting capability Infrastructure level logging Serverless logging ???
49. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 52 RESPOND Redirect to HTTPS Block consistent offenders Adjust firewall rules Block attackers Log suspicious queries Log HTTP requests Log HTTP requests attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall IDS Change DB Password Reset users passwords Inform users Redirect to HTTPS
50. store api store front sensitive data passwords, keys user service product service external system XXX 53 Log suspicious queries Block consistent offenders RECOVER Redirect to HTTPS Block consistent offenders Adjust firewall rules Block attackers Log suspicious queries Log HTTP requests Log HTTP requests attack store front / API sniff non encrypted traffic SQL Injection Alter query to get data modify data in DB HTTPS Use prepared statements build web app vuln verification into CI/CD gain access to internal network social engineering sniff non encrypted traffic steal sensitive user data HTTPS Firewall IDS Change DB Password Reset users passwords Inform users Redirect to HTTPS Restore from backup Fix Code, Blue/Green deploys: redeploy microservice(s) redeploy infrastructure
51. 54 RECOVER Trash & burn! is your friend
52. • Due diligence: know thy playground • Think holistically: identify, protect, detect, respond, recover Summary 55 Make security a 1st class citizen in your thinking process!
53. • Multiple, diverse, interconnected services • More varied attack surfaces • Harder to track what’s going on 
 (distributed, multi facetted logging capabilities)
 • Transient components • Dynamic transport level encryption (HTTPS) • Authentication & Authorisation (see David’s talk :) • Trash & burn recovery strategies Microservice security challenges 56
54. Onto the practical bit … 58
55. 59 A tool for managing secrets and other sensitive content
56. 60 Deployment Tools Application Component / Microservices service 1 service 2 Human Users
57. 61 • Unified API to access multiple backends • ACL policies - who can access what • Audit Logs
58. 62 Unseal Init service 1 service 2 Allow token to be used by tools to access secrets Acquire policy constrained token Create microservice mount or area, add secrets System X
59. 63 $ vault init -key-shares=3 -key-threshold=2 Key 1: 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Key 2: 3fd762583cc9755222fa20f2a78770aca5ecba3b16d8c Key 3: a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Initial Root Token: 57dfce17-08c4-d042-91a3-68082965367b Vault initialized with 3 keys and a key threshold of 2. Please securely distribute the above keys. When the Vault is re-sealed, restarted, or stopped, you must provide at least 2 of these keys to unseal it again. Vault does not store the master key. Without at least 2 keys, your Vault will remain permanently sealed. $ vault unseal 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 1 Vault init & unseal $ vault unseal a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 0
60. 64 $ vault init -key-shares=3 -key-threshold=2 Key 1: 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Key 2: 3fd762583cc9755222fa20f2a78770aca5ecba3b16d8c Key 3: a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Initial Root Token: 57dfce17-08c4-d042-91a3-68082965367b Vault initialized with 3 keys and a key threshold of 2. Please securely distribute the above keys. When the Vault is re-sealed, restarted, or stopped, you must provide at least 2 of these keys to unseal it again. Vault does not store the master key. Without at least 2 keys, your Vault will remain permanently sealed. $ vault unseal 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 1 Vault init & unseal $ vault unseal a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 0
61. 65 $ vault init -key-shares=3 -key-threshold=2 Key 1: 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Key 2: 3fd762583cc9755222fa20f2a78770aca5ecba3b16d8c Key 3: a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Initial Root Token: 57dfce17-08c4-d042-91a3-68082965367b Vault initialized with 3 keys and a key threshold of 2. Please securely distribute the above keys. When the Vault is re-sealed, restarted, or stopped, you must provide at least 2 of these keys to unseal it again. Vault does not store the master key. Without at least 2 keys, your Vault will remain permanently sealed. $ vault unseal 8573410dd211cc9b5ea6b426b19d6d668e0184c39d4ba Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 1 Vault init & unseal $ vault unseal a0428a6b6681eb15ffcea5be5c787beabcb7599a6fa91 Sealed: true Key Shares: 3 Key Threshold: 2 Unseal Progress: 0
62. 66 Success! Ready for use
63. 67 Unseal Create segregated area, policies, add secrets Init Acquire policy constrained token Allow token to be used by tools to access secrets service 1 service 2 System X
64. 68 $ vault mount -path=usersvc generic Successfully mounted 'generic' at ‘usersvc'! $ vault mounts Path Type Default TTL Max TTL Description cubbyhole/ cubbyhole n/a n/a per-token private secr ... secret/ generic system system generic secret storage sys/ system n/a n/a system endpoints used f... usersvc/ generic system system Vault create new mount
65. 69 $ vault write usersvc/db-password value=ASDKJ234SF*2 Success! Data written to: usersvc/db-password $ vault read usersvc/db-password Key Value lease_duration 2592000 value ASDKJ234SF*2 Vault write, then read back secret
66. 70 $ cat usersvc.policy path "usersvc/*" { policy = "read" } $ vault policy-write usersvc usersvc.policy Policy 'usersvc' written. Vault create custom policy
67. 71 Unseal Allow token to be used by tools to access secrets Init Acquire policy constrained token service 1 service 2 Create segregated area, add secrets System X
68. 72 Basics of Vault complete!
69. Getting sensitive data into microservices … 73
70. 74 # Embedded Config spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://localhost/test spring.datasource.username=dbuser spring.datasource.password=dbpass spring.datasource.driver-class-name= com.mysql.jdbc.Driver Java Code @Component public class MyBean { private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; @Autowired public MyBean(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) { this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate; } // ... } Starting point … user service db1
71. 75 # Embedded Config spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://localhost/test spring.datasource.username=dbuser spring.datasource.password=dbpass spring.datasource.driver-class-name= com.mysql.jdbc.Driver Java Code @Component public class MyBean { private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; @Autowired public MyBean(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) { this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate; } // ... } Starting point … user service db1 Separate Code and Config - Especially Secrets!!
72. 76 # Embedded Config spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://localhost/test spring.datasource.username=dbuser spring.datasource.password=dbpass spring.datasource.driver-class-name= com.mysql.jdbc.Driver Java Code @Component public class MyBean { private final JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate; @Autowired public MyBean(JdbcTemplate jdbcTemplate) { this.jdbcTemplate = jdbcTemplate; } // ... } Starting point … user service db1 Separate Code and Config - Especially Secrets!! DETECT https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets
73. 77 Options • Push secrets in
 • Pull secrets out
 • Variations of the above …
74. 78 Push secrets in … user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables read secret/db-password
75. 79 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read secret/db-password orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ vault auth e2d0a065-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz Successfully authenticated! You are… token_policies: [default, usersvc] $ vault read usersvc/db-password Key Value --- ----- refresh_interval 2592000 value MyClearTextPassword 1 2
76. 80 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read secret/db1 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ # Start docker container,pass in vars docker run --name usersvc -e DB_USER="MyDBName" -e DB_PASSWORD="MyClearTextPassword" -d usersvc:v1 3
77. 81 Steal Sensitive User Data IDENTIFY steal sensitive user data steal sensitive user data gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config steal plaintext password social engineering
78. the-machine$ docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE ... CREATED STATUS NAMES 9950ea8e3c59 product-service:v1 ... 4 days ago Up 4 days prodsvc 29b9ebca6dab user-service:v2 ... 5 days ago Up 5 days usersvc 82 gain access to running user microservice(s)
79. 83 gain access to internal network find a disgruntled employee dump startup config the-machine$ docker inspect 29b9ebca6dab [ { "Id": “29b9ebca6dab147991201a5c61b72d3d546885ca8fd…”, "Created": "2016-06-27T21:26:16.126414991Z", "Args": [ "-jar", "UserService" ], "Config": { "Hostname": "29b9ebca6dab", "Env": [ “DB_USER=MyUserName", “DB_PASSWORD=MyClearTextPassword", “VAR1=something-else“ ], "Cmd": [ "java", "-jar", "UserService" ], ... } ]
80. 84 gain access to internal network find a disgruntled employee the-machine$ docker inspect 29b9ebca6dab [ { "Id": “29b9ebca6dab147991201a5c61b72d3d546885ca8fd…”, "Created": "2016-06-27T21:26:16.126414991Z", "Args": [ "-jar", "UserService" ], "Config": { "Hostname": "29b9ebca6dab", "Env": [ “DB_USER=MyUserName", “DB_PASSWORD=MyClearTextPassword", “VAR1=something-else“ ], "Cmd": [ "java", "-jar", "UserService" ], ... } ] steal plaintext password
81. 85 gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config social engineering PROTECT don’t expose as plain text steal sensitive user data steal plaintext password limit user access
82. Vault Response Wrapping 86 Push secrets in … (take 2)
83. 87 Push secrets in … user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables read secret/db-password
84. 87 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read wrapped secret orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide wrapped value as environment variables 4 unwrap Push wrapped secrets in …
85. 88 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read wrapped secret orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide wrapped value as environment variables 4 unwrap $ vault read -wrap-ttl=60s usersvc/db-password Key Value --- ----- wrapping_token: 57ccef32-471d-869 wrapping_token_ttl: 60 wrapping_token_creation_time: 2016-06-28 22:.. 2
86. 89 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read wrapped secret orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide wrapped value as environment variables 4 unwrap $ # Start docker container,pass in vars docker run --name usersvc -e DB_USER="MyDBName" -e DB_PASSWORD="57ccef32-471d-869" -d usersvc:v1 3
87. 90 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read wrapped secret orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide wrapped value as environment variables 4 unwrap $ vault unwrap 57ccef32-471d-869 Key Value --- ----- refresh_interval 2592000 value MyClearTextPassword 4
88. 91 dump startup config the-machine$ docker inspect 29b9ebca6dab [ { "Id": “29b9ebca6dab147991201a5c61b72d3d546885ca8fd…”, "Created": "2016-06-27T21:26:16.126414991Z", "Args": [ "-jar", "UserService" ], "Config": { "Hostname": "29b9ebca6dab", "Env": [ “DB_USER=MyUserName", “DB_PASSWORD=57ccef32-471d-869", “VAR1=something-else“ ], "Cmd": [ "java", "-jar", "UserService" ], ... } ]
89. 92 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data steal plaintext password don’t expose as plain text gain access to user DB limit user access
90. 93 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data steal plaintext password don’t expose as plain text gain access to user DB limit user access
91. 94 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data don’t expose as plain text gain access to user DB steal wrapped password get real password limit user access
92. 95 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read wrapped secret orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide wrapped value as environment variables 4 unwrap $ vault unwrap 57ccef32-471d-869 error reading cubbyhole/response: Error making API request. URL: GET https://vault:8200/v1/cubbyhole/response Code: 400. Errors: * permission denied 4
93. 96 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT don’t expose as plain text gain access to user DB steal wrapped password get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access limit user access
94. 97 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT don’t expose as plain text RESPOND gain access to user DB steal wrapped password get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access change DB password limit user access
95. 98 gain access to internal network gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT don’t expose as plain text RESPOND gain access to user DB steal wrapped password get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access change DB password Expect secrets to change. Make a habit of changing them regularly. It will naturally force you to put measures in place. limit user access
96. • Dynamic Secrets: Auto generate credentials on the fly Other handy options 99
97. 100 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 read dynamic password orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables 0 Human / Other System Users
98. 101 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ vault mount postgresql Successfully mounted 'postgresql' at 'postgresql'! $ vault write postgresql/config/connection connection_url="postgresql:// vault:somepassword@yourhost:5432/postgres" $ vault write postgresql/roles/usersvc-ro \ sql="CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ‘{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}'; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA users TO \"{{name}}\";" Success! Data written to: postgresql/roles/ read dynamic password Human / Other System Users 0 0
99. 102 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ vault mount postgresql Successfully mounted 'postgresql' at 'postgresql'! $ vault write postgresql/config/connection connection_url="postgresql:// vault:somepassword@yourhost:5432/postgres" $ vault write postgresql/roles/usersvc-ro \ sql="CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ‘{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}'; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA users TO \"{{name}}\";" Success! Data written to: postgresql/roles/ read dynamic password Human / Other System Users 0 0
100. 103 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ vault mount postgresql Successfully mounted 'postgresql' at 'postgresql'! $ vault write postgresql/config/connection connection_url="postgresql:// vault:somepassword@yourhost:5432/postgres" $ vault write postgresql/roles/usersvc-ro \ sql="CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD ‘{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}'; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA users TO \"{{name}}\";" Success! Data written to: postgresql/roles/ read dynamic password Human / Other System Users 0 0
101. 104 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ vault read postgresql/creds/usersvc-ro Key Value lease_id postgresql/creds/usersvc-ro/ c888a097-b0e2-26a8-b306-fc7c84b98f07 lease_duration 3600 password 34205e88-0de1-68b7… username vault-14301-usersvc-ro read dynamic password Human / Other System Users 0 2
102. 105 user service db1 1 authenticate 2 orchestration / deployment platform 3 provide value as environment variables $ # Start docker container,pass in vars docker run --name usersvc -e DB_USER="vault-14301-usersvc-ro" -e DB_PASSWORD="34205e88-0de1-68b7" -d usersvc:v1 read dynamic password
103. • Dynamic Secrets: Auto generate creds on the fly • Ability to combine security primitives
 dynamic secrets + resource wrapping Other handy options 106
104. 107 gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT steal wrapped password don’t expose as plain text get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access RESPOND change DB password
105. 108 gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT steal wrapped password don’t expose as plain text get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access RESPOND change DB password use time limited dynamic creds
106. 109 gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config find a disgruntled employee PROTECT steal sensitive user data DETECT steal wrapped password don’t expose as plain text get real password Raise TOFU alarm Audit access RESPOND change DB password use time limited dynamic creds compromise orchestration platform
107. Turtles all the way down!
108. 111 gain access to internal network gain access to user DB gain access to running user microservice(s) dump startup config compromise orchestration platform find a disgruntled employee steal sensitive user data steal vault token get db password 1 2 3 4 Defense in Depth
109. Put enough hurdles in the way of attackers for you to stop when you can, but if not, to be able to … - realise what’s going on - react before too much damage is done 112
110. • Centralised Secrets Management • API - helps with automation • Tries to address concerns across full security lifecycle • But still very new & maturing Vault Summary 113
111. • Encryption as a service: offload responsibility to Vault • PKI: Generates X.509 certificates dynamically based on configured roles • SSH: Dynamically generates SSH credentials for remote hosts Other Handy Features 114
112. Conclusion 115
113. 116 Make security a first class citizen! Don’t try and just bolt it on at the end!
114. 117 Think holistically about security Don’t stop at the protect stage!
115. 118 Choose the right tech for the job Microservice architectures add complexity
116. 119 Do your best! but don’t do nothing!
117. Questions? Nicki Watt @techiewatt 120