The DNA of Hidden Cobra – A Look at a Nation State’s Cyber Offensive Programs

In 2018 McAfee ATR began to re-focus on identifying and tracking the operations attributed to Hidden Cobra / Lazarus group to better understand and reveal activity never seen before. In this talk we will present research conducted by McAfee Advanced Threat Research into the threat actor known as Hidden Cobra and the various operations targeting different sectors over the years.

The actor known as Hidden Cobra is thought to have been linked to the North Korean intelligence services and has been involved in numerous operations dating back to 2007. Over the course of 2018, McAfee ATR discovered several major campaigns linked to Hidden Cobra using complex and hidden implants aimed at gathering intelligence on targeted victims, disrupting their operations and generating hard currency through large crypto-currency and banking heists.

This talk will be a deep dive into the techniques, tactics and procedures of Hidden Cobra as well as the developments in this actor’s complex toolkit including several new implant frameworks. This talk goes into detail about McAfee ATR’s various investigations into Hidden Cobra and what we have learned as a result. We will also discuss the various partnerships with International law enforcement in our efforts to uncover and expose back-end operations used by Hidden Cobra. We will discuss the behind the scenes of the Operation Sharpshooter, a case that took us from an isolated incident to the exposure of a long running back-end operation.

Transcript

1. A Look At a Nation States' Cyber Offensive Programs Inside Hidden Cobra Ryan Sherstobitoff and Thomas Roccia McAfee Advanced Threat Research
2. Agenda ▪ About the presenters ▪ The Goal of a Nation State & Geopolitical context ▪ Background on nation state cyber offensive programs ▪ Who is / what is Hidden Cobra ▪ Known TTPs ▪ Arsenal Involved ▪ Code DNA ▪ Conclusion
3. About the Presenters Ryan Sherstobitoff Sr. Analyst Major Campaigns – Advanced Threat Research Thomas Roccia Security Researcher - Advanced Threat Research https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/author/thomas-roccia/ https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/author/ryan-sherstobitoff/ @fr0gger_ @R_Sherstobitoff
4. Section 1 | Section 2 | Section 3 | Section 4 The Goal of a Nation State & Geo-Political Context What are the goals of a nation state in the cyber domain? • Political • Foreign Policy • Military • Financial • Influence Campaigns How does the geo-political situation influence cyber offensive programs related to Hidden Cobra? • Adversary often reacts to sanctions • Targeting opposition and state enemies • Seeking foreign military technologies • Targeting humanitarian aid groups reporting on Human Rights issues in North Korea
5. Background on Nation State Cyber Offensive Programs • Most nations have some form of cyber offensive program • These programs are often designed to accomplish state goals • Attribution of these cyber attacks are challenging
6. Who is/What is Hidden Cobra? • Hidden Cobra refers to the U.S Government’s umbrella classification of North Korean cyber offensive programs • The activity set maps across multiple groups the private sector has different names for https://www.us-cert.gov/northkorea
7. Group Naming Conventions • The private sector has identified the Hidden Cobra activity set by various names • The target objectives of these groups are different when compared to each other Hidden Cobra Lazarus Bluenoroff Kimsuky APT37 APT38
8. A brief Statistical Review File Types Used in Q4 2019 PE DLL DOC DMG XLS MachO ELF HWP © GeoNames, HERE, MSFT, Microsoft, NavInfo, Thinkware Extract, Wikipedia Powered by Bing 12 2 1 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS 1 12 Count
9. A brief Statistical Review MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
10. Hidden Cobra Threat Profile • Hidden Cobra is using cyber operations as a means of accomplishing state military goals in place of conventional warfare. Hidden Cobra has had some form of cyber-offensive dating back to 2007. • Objectives of cyber offensive programs • More cost effective than conducting conventional war (for a nation state that has heavy imposed by economic sanctions) • Creates a level of deniability for whom is responsible (often placing blame on false groups) • Can be used to disrupt or deceive enemies anywhere in the world
11. Timeline of Events
12. Modus Operandi of Known Attacks • Circumventing sanctions by engaging in crypto currency and bank heists. • Targeting North Korean defectors and opposition groups. • Seeking access to foreign technologies in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/examining-code-reuse-reveals-undiscovered-links-among-north-koreas-malware-families/
13. Operation Sharpshooter • Sharpshooter was a global campaign that appeared in 2018 • New activity appeared in 2019 with additional targets in the Middle East • A new implant known as Rising Sun was used against targets • ATR discovered linkage to other Hidden Cobra attributed campaigns • With this insight we could effectively map back activity to 2017
14. Operation Sharpshooter • Actor used compromised servers to host command and control code • Chinese webshells were used to maintain persistence to the asset • Actor connected via Express VPN service to manage the hacked assets
15. Operation Sharpshooter • Some malicious TLS certificates were identified and associated with C2 infrastructure • Based on the TLS certificates we identified more C2s using the same certificate • In these operations we often find shared TLS certificates use for C2 protocol, this enables hunting for more infrastructure Shared TLS Certificates Tracking Shared TLS Certificates
16. Operation Sharpshooter Connections to other operations
17. Operation Sharpshooter • Backend was based on Python code, other iterations were found written in ASP language • Backend used a multi-layered approach to relay commands to a master server • Backend was custom coding written by the adversary • We can date the usage of this server to 2017 • ATR discovered additional C2s with more implants from previous campaigns that used the Sharpshooter backend framework C2 backend component analysis
18. Operation Sharpshooter • Free: write infected end-point’s IP to a log file called jquery2017.js • Query: Write the data gathered from Rising Sun implant • Suggestion: read the data from the name file and present it to intermediate C2 • Result: send the results of command execution to actual C2 • Set: obtain a new C2 IP address of the actual C2 (master) Obfuscation of Commands (random names with no meaning) Data Format <var1_enum>=<random_number>&page=suggestion&wr_id=<enc oded_time_stamp>&name=jquery2017<encoded_time_stamp>09. css Command handler and data acceptor (mainmenu.php)
19. Operation Sharpshooter • Additional functionality custom coded Connection opened to the actual command and control server by the intermediate command and control server. Delete Log Files Function Check IP against hashed IPs
20. Operation Sharpshooter • Designed to target Middle East aerospace companies • First stage implant used by the actor to collect basic data and install further implants • Retrieved by Framework.php hosted on the command and control server • Capabilities • Gets HTTP user agent • Collects and sends file path with running processes • As a response to HTTP POST, Vendor.php sends apple.png (Rising Sunv2) to Mypng.png • Once the contents of apple.png file are downloaded from CNC, decrypts Rising Sun v2 into memory Implant injecting into memory alive=verify_session&page=<base64_encoded _path_of_self>&session_data=<base64_enco ded_process_filepaths> Data format
21. • Tracking additional C2s was possible by knowing the HTTP request format associated with command interpreter • Command interpreter accepts a specific format, C2 backend provided insight • We discovered additional C2s hosting ASP code instead of PHP • This indicates the backend was adapted into two code formats to be able to be run on any kind of platform • In the request header ‘Accept- Language’ we identified North Korean language set Operation Sharpshooter HTTP Request from Rising Sun implant 2018 HTTP Request from Op Sharpshooter Very Similar ASP based command handler This names are random, the difference is not significant The HTTP request format is identical Accept-Language Setting in request header (ko-kp)
22. • Vendor PHP file is used to • Log remote IP and identifier to a log called jquery2018.js with timestamp • Whitelist checking of client IP against specific MD5s • Checks HTTP User Agent • Checks to see if the POST request contains the parameter alive=verify_session • Script will serve the file apple.png to the infected client Operation Sharpshooter Vendor.php serving apple.png to downloader
23. • Variations of Rising Sun can be traced back to as early as 2015 • Another indication that the backend framework has been used for years to support operations • ATR can trace a linage of samples originating in the public domain going back to 2017 Operation Sharpshooter
24. • Additional activity was observed in 2019 targeting an Israeli defense contractor • Within the Accept-Language parameter in the email header, Korean language was present • Attached file exploited CVE-2018- 20250 involving a WinRar vulnerability • Masquerading as SysAid product documentation that actually contains a Rising Sun downloader 2019 Activity – additional targeting in the Middle East Operation Sharpshooter Targeted Email sent to Victim Email Header Contents of WinRar file Rising Sun Downloader
25. Tools and Implants US CERT Classified Implants • BANKSHOT • BADCALL • HOPLIGHT • TYPEFRAME • KEYMARBLE • SLICKSHOES • BUFFETLINE • ELECTRICPHISH • ARTFULPIE • CROWDEDFLOUNDER • BISTROMATH • HOTCROISSANT Industry Classified Implants • GOLDRAGON • RISING-SUN • HAOBAO • HONEYBEE • BACKDOOR ESCAD • BACKDOOR AKDOOR • BACKDOOR NUKESPED • BACKDOOR DESTOVER • TROJAN AKDOOR • TROJAN HWDOOR • BRAMBUL • JOANAP
26. Implant Development – the past, the present and the future 6/10/2014 12/27/2014 7/15/2015 1/31/2016 8/18/2016 3/6/2017 9/22/2017 4/10/2018 10/27/2018 5/15/2019 12/1/2019 TROJAN SCARCRUFT TIMELINE CompileDate 8/14/2013 12/27/2014 5/10/2016 9/22/2017 2/4/2019 6/18/2020 TROJAN HWDOOR CompileDate 11/22/2013 6/10/2014 12/27/2014 7/15/2015 1/31/2016 8/18/2016 3/6/2017 9/22/2017 4/10/2018 10/27/2018 5/15/2019 12/1/2019 BACKDOOR ESCAD • Several implants have long development timelines lasting years • Some implant families have appeared recently with new variants • Dataset is based on samples observed by McAfee Labs 1/12/2020 8/14/2013 12/27/2014 5/10/2016 9/22/2017 2/4/2019 6/18/2020 BACKDOOR AKDOOR CompileDate
27. Implant Development – the past, the present and the future 6/10/2014 12/27/2014 7/15/2015 1/31/2016 8/18/2016 3/6/2017 9/22/2017 4/10/2018 10/27/2018 5/15/2019 12/1/2019 TROJAN NUKESPED 11/22/2013 6/10/2014 12/27/2014 7/15/2015 1/31/2016 8/18/2016 3/6/2017 9/22/2017 4/10/2018 10/27/2018 5/15/2019 12/1/2019 BACKDOOR DESTOVER 4/1/2012 8/14/2013 12/27/2014 5/10/2016 9/22/2017 2/4/2019 6/18/2020 TROJAN.WIN32.NUKESPED
28. Implant Development – Trojan Hwdoor • HWDoor is a broad anti- malware detection name for a family of Hidden Cobra backdoors • HWDoor has been in existence since Operation Troy • New versions of this backdoor have appeared in 2020 HTTP Header Code Server Logs files
29. Implant Development – Backdoor Escad • Escad is an implant that has been associated with Hidden Cobra for years • Escad is a listening implant installed on victim machines • Variants of Escad have been tied to numerous high profile intrusions such as the Sony Pictures incident • Last active development of Escad was April 2019
30. Using Graph Correlation to identify malware DNA • Using visualization for: • It can be scalable and can be used on thousand of samples. • It spots similarities between them. • It helps to draw hypothesis. Trends Evidences Similarities
31. Graph Theory ▪ A graph is a structure amounting to a set of objects in which some pairs of the objects are in some sense "related". ▪ The objects correspond to mathematical abstractions called vertices (also called nodes or points). ▪ Each of the related pairs of vertices is called an edge (also called link or line). G = (V, E)
32. ▪ String metrics or string similarity measure how similar two strings are. ▪ The unit that measures string similarity is the distance between strings. ▪ Malware from the same family or compiled from the same environment can share a significant amount of strings indicating similarities between them. ▪ For this exercise, we extracted strings for all the samples and compared them with a Jaccard distance to evaluate the similarities. Strings Similarity
33. Code DNA – Hidden Cobra • Extracting a full set of strings from a smaller sample set of Lazarus / Hidden Cobra samples • Using data science models we determine relationships between samples • Individual clusters appear that indicate overlaps between families of Hidden Cobra malware
34. Code DNA – Breaking out into Clusters • Extracting a full set of strings from a sample set of Lazarus / Hidden Cobra samples Full Strings Full Strings Full Strings MACHOKE HASH MACHOKE HASH
35. Clustering by PE Rich Header • PE Rich header is a useful signature for tracking similar samples, but be aware of false flags • 324 Samples from 2018/2019 with Rich Header information generated • Intersections between some malware families indicate shared development environments
36. Clustering by PE Rich Header • Breaking out the clusters reveals interesting links • Several malware families were found to link to each other based on common development environments • The same developers were responsible for multiple clusters of implants.
37. ▪ Code similarities is used to identifies similar functions or part of code of a sample. ▪ To scale this part we used the Machoc Hash. ▪ Machoc is a fuzzy hash of the Control Flow Graph (CFG) which is a representation of the function call in binary. ▪ The Machoc Hash can be used to calculate the similarities between two samples, and it is reliable enough for malware research. Code Similarities
38. Code DNA – BankShot v.s BadCall Code Sharing • Clustering with data science models shows that BADCALL and BANKSHOT share a significant amount of strings • Further code analysis indicates 65% similar functions • Code overlap exists in the functionality to enable host to act as a hop point and through implementation of Fake TLS method https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-B_WHITE.PDF 2cffc3dcf8ef45f1020c2bc65fb89444e5223325234a3cac8dabeb63f10f171c 2/6/2016 DLL File D1f3b9372a6be9c02430b6e4526202974179a674ce94fe22028d7212ae6be 9e7 2/7/2016 DLL File Strings comparison Machoke hash comparison SSL Proxy Code SSL Proxy Code
39. Code DNA – BankShot BadCall Code Sharing • Both uses functionality and load the external library SSLEAY32.dll and WS2_32.dll in the same way SSLEAY32.DLL (OpenSSL) WS2_32.DLL (WinSock)
40. Code Factory – Shared Functions • Multiple implant families shared code amongst each other – this is also indictive based on sharing of development environments • Hidden Cobra uses a code factory type approach in building implants
41. Take away • Hidden Cobra is a well organized and aggressive attacker. • They conduct cyberespionage, sabotage and cybercrime campaign. • They keep updating their tools and arsenal since more than a decade. • Following their campaigns along with graph correlation allowing us to proactively detect new threat and draw the story behind. • Analyzing and study reveal that multiple team inside the group are working with same malware DNA but for different goals.
42. Thank you.