Upgrade to Pro
— share decks privately, control downloads, hide ads and more …
Speaker Deck
Features
Speaker Deck
PRO
Sign in
Sign up for free
Search
Search
SDN Final Report
Search
adr
June 21, 2019
Technology
0
460
SDN Final Report
adr
June 21, 2019
Tweet
Share
More Decks by adr
See All by adr
Skrull Like A King: 從重兵看守的天眼防線殺出重圍
aaaddress1
3
1.5k
Rebuild The Heaven's Gate: from 32 bit Hell back to Heaven Wonderland
aaaddress1
0
1.2k
重建天堂之門:從 32bit 地獄一路打回天堂聖地
aaaddress1
0
440
Reversing In Wonderland: Neural Network Based Malware Detection Techniques
aaaddress1
2
730
CYBERSEC: 唉唷,你的簽章根本沒在驗啦。
aaaddress1
1
4.1k
SITCON: Playing Win32 Like a K!NG ;)
aaaddress1
2
1.2k
NTUST [2019]: Windows Reversing
aaaddress1
0
1.1k
Duplicate Paths Attack: Get Elevated Privilege from Forged Identities
aaaddress1
0
1.6k
Computer Security 資安實務: Windows Reversing [Dark Art]
aaaddress1
8
1.8k
Other Decks in Technology
See All in Technology
AWS Well-Architected から考えるオブザーバビリティの勘所 / Considering the Essentials of Observability from AWS Well-Architected
sms_tech
1
100
“日本一のM&A企業”を支える、少人数SREの効率化戦略 / SRE NEXT 2025
genda
1
270
AI エージェントと考え直すデータ基盤
na0
20
7.9k
アクセスピークを制するオートスケール再設計: 障害を乗り越えKEDAで実現したリソース管理の最適化
myamashii
1
670
衛星運用をソフトウェアエンジニアに依頼したときにできあがるもの
sankichi92
1
1k
[SRE NEXT 2025] すみずみまで暖かく照らすあなたの太陽でありたい
carnappopper
2
470
Rethinking Incident Response: Context-Aware AI in Practice
rrreeeyyy
2
940
研究開発部メンバーの働き⽅ / Sansan R&D Profile
sansan33
PRO
3
18k
Copilot coding agentにベットしたいCTOが開発組織で取り組んだこと / GitHub Copilot coding agent in Team
tnir
0
200
大量配信システムにおけるSLOの実践:「見えない」信頼性をSLOで可視化
plaidtech
PRO
0
390
マルチプロダクト環境におけるSREの役割 / SRE NEXT 2025 lunch session
sugamasao
1
730
CDK Toolkit Libraryにおけるテストの考え方
smt7174
1
550
Featured
See All Featured
The Success of Rails: Ensuring Growth for the Next 100 Years
eileencodes
45
7.5k
StorybookのUI Testing Handbookを読んだ
zakiyama
30
5.9k
Designing Experiences People Love
moore
142
24k
Making the Leap to Tech Lead
cromwellryan
134
9.4k
Designing Dashboards & Data Visualisations in Web Apps
destraynor
231
53k
Bootstrapping a Software Product
garrettdimon
PRO
307
110k
Understanding Cognitive Biases in Performance Measurement
bluesmoon
29
1.8k
Rails Girls Zürich Keynote
gr2m
95
14k
How To Stay Up To Date on Web Technology
chriscoyier
790
250k
Become a Pro
speakerdeck
PRO
29
5.4k
The World Runs on Bad Software
bkeepers
PRO
70
11k
[RailsConf 2023] Rails as a piece of cake
palkan
55
5.7k
Transcript
SDN-Based Intrusion Prevention System Software-Defined Networking and Function Virtualization
>_SDN? Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table
>_SDN Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv
>_SDN? Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table External Network Controller Service Ctrl Srv
>_Issue Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv Hacking Behavior Packets Packets DDoS, Telnet/SSH Brutforce, Ransomware, etc.
>_Issue Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv Hacking Behavior Packets Packets DDoS, Telnet/SSH Brutforce, Ransomware, etc.
>_Issue Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv Hacking Behavior Packets Packets DDoS, Telnet/SSH Brutforce, Ransomware, etc.
>_Issue Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Manager
Host C Emploee Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv Hacking Behavior Packets Packets DDoS, Telnet/SSH Brutforce, Ransomware, etc. $>/bin/sh Bingo! Get Shell.
>_IDS Host A Switch Service Flow Table Host B Host
C IDS Srv Packets Packets Packets Intrusion Detection System
>_ Host A Switch Service Flow Table Host B Host
C IDS Srv Packets Packets Packets IDS Intrusion Detection System Tcpdump
>_IDS Host A Switch Service Flow Table Host B Host
C IDS Srv Intrusion Detection System Hacked Bruteforce credentials (Telnet/SSH/RDP/AD) SMTP (Email) Godmode
>_IDS Host A Switch Service Flow Table Host B Host
C IDS Srv Intrusion Detection System Hacked Bruteforce credentials (Telnet/SSH/RDP/AD) SMTP (Email) Godmode Marked As Pwned Devices
>_SDN Host A Switch A Service Flow Table Host B
Hacked Controller Service Ctrl Srv IDS Srv Scouting Updating Flow
>_SDN Host A Switch A Service Flow Table Host B
Hacked Controller Service Ctrl Srv IDS Srv Isolating Hacked Host
>_SDN Host A Switch A Service Flow Table Host B
Hacked Controller Service Ctrl Srv IDS Srv Isolating Hacked Host
>_SDN? Host A ... Switch A Service Flow Table Host
B Host C Host N Switch B Service Flow Table Controller Service Ctrl Srv IDS Srv IDS Srv
Demo
SDN-Based Intrusion Prevention System Thanks.