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[CODEGATE] The nightmare behind the cross platform mobile apps dream
Codegate 2015
Marco Grassi
April 08, 2015
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64 slides
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The nightmare behind the cross platform mobile apps dream Marco
Grassi Mobile Security Researcher - NowSecure @marcograss [email protected] -
Agenda • Background introduction • What Cross-platform Frameworks are out
there? • Concerns • The uniform attack surface • Code formats and code retrieval • Runtime manipulation and dynamic analysis • Some examples of vulnerabilities in the frameworks • Conclusions -
➜ ~ whoami • R&D Team Member @ NowSecure (formerly
viaForensics) • I’m from Italy • I work mainly on Android/iOS -
Background The mobile market is fragmented. Developers want their app
on multiple platforms, at least iOS and Android. This caused a growth in the number of tools and frameworks available for cross platform development (code reuse between multiple platforms) with different technologies. -
Background Those frameworks usually achieve code portability by leveraging
HTML5 technology or interpreters with bindings on the native code platform, to expose the API of the underlying system in a way as platform independent as possible. The result is that lot of code, if not all, can be reused. -
How does it works? (PhoneGap example) • The HTML, CSS,
Javascript is bundled inside of a shell application obtaining a regular .apk or .ipa • The web code will run in a WebView, and a bidirectional bridge (platform dependant) will be exposed to the javascript code to invoke the native device APIs and get the results back. Native Shell App Device APIs WebView (Javascript) Javascript Bridge -
How does it works? (Titanium example) • The Javascript is
bundled inside of a shell application obtaining a regular .apk or .ipa, with a interpreter. • The js code will be parsed and interpreted, the interpreter, being native code, can access and call native methods. Image credits: @olivier_morandi -
Background So far everything seems great, we can code once
and run in every platform! But how is the quality of the code of these frameworks? Do they introduce security vulnerabilities if we use them? Are those vulnerabilities shared by all the applications using the same framework? -
What cross platform frameworks are out there? % # of
Android Apps (appbrain.com) -
Cordova/PhoneGap • Mobile development framework to write Mobile applications using
web technologies such as HTML5, Javascript and CSS3. • Cordova is the Opensource core, PhoneGap is owned by Adobe which leverages Cordova. • Cordova leverages a “bridge” between javascript and native code, to invoke native methods from javascript code. • OpenSource - https://cordova.apache.org/ -
Cordova/PhoneGap • Some history of known vulnerabilities and CVEs •
Great job by David Kaplan and Roee Hay of IBM Security Systems • CVE-2014-3500, CVE-2014-3501, CVE-2014-3502, all related to Android Intents somehow “mistrusted” leading to XAS, bypasses and leak of data. -
• Cross platform game creation system, including the major mobile
platforms. • You can develop the game with Mono, so in .NET • http://unity3d.com/ -
Adobe AIR • Very popular cross platform runtime, not only
on mobile but also on desktop. Used both in apps and games. • You can develop your project with Adobe Flash or ActionScript. -
Adobe AIR • Lot of CVE, maybe mainly because they
are shared with Adobe Flash Player for Desktop browsers • In this context (cross platform application), those vulns are less relevant because you don’t run remote/untrusted code like in the browser, you just execute code shipped within your application. (if you don’t do strange things) -
Titanium Appcelerator • Open source - http://www.appcelerator.com/ • You can
develop your native mobile application in javascript • The javascript runs on a interpreter and uses native UI and functionalities • The IDE is Eclipse based -
• SDK to develop 2d games and apps • You
write Lua code using bindings to C++ and OpenGL -
Kony Framework • Platform to develop cross platform applications. •
Native Mobile Applications can be written in Lua or Javascript. -
Concerns • Code reuse implies uniform attack surface between apps
using the same framework. • Vulnerabilities and attacks can be reused among different apps. • The code is stored in high level languages or byte code. This makes reverse engineering process easier or non-existent as we will see soon. -
Cordova/PhoneGap • Almost all the code is written in javascript,
the UI is developed in HTML5 and CSS3. • The code by default it’s just bundled in plain text inside of the mobile app, so retrieving it and reversing is trivial -
Cordova/PhoneGap • On iOS the Cordova code is bundled as
a resources, or in a www/ subfolder of the app bundle • On Android it’s usually bundled in the assets/ folder of the apk -
Cordova/PhoneGap ➜ assets tree . ├── OpenSans-Light.ttf ├── OpenSans-Regular.ttf ├──
defappratepack.json ├── deflanpack.json ├── defpermissions.json └── www ├── akbank.lib.js ├── cashflow_dummy.js ├── cordova.android.js ├── cordova.js ├── index.html ├── index_cashflow.html -
• .NET code, trivial to reverse if not obfuscated, lot
of good quality decompilers out there, like ILSPY. • You can find the code in the assets/ folder in Android for example. -
Adobe AIR • You can find the .swf file in
the assets/ folder on Android • Trivial to reverse if not obfuscated, some decompilers available -
Kony Framework •If Lua is used, the code is stored
inside a “konyappluabytecode.o.mp3” (wut) ➜ assets file konyappluabytecode.o.mp3 konyappluabytecode.o.mp3: Lua bytecode, version 5.1 •Can be decompiled with OSS decompilers -
Titanium Framework • Real code is written in JavaScript. •
Load asset data at runtime through the AssetCryptImpl class. • Assets range are defined in a HashMap within the initAssets class. • Assets bytes are contained in a CharBuffer defined in the initAssetsBytes. -
Titanium Framework •One python script to rule them all:
•Parse the code looking for the ‘initAssets’ method: •.method private static initAssets()Ljava/util/Map; •Apply some regular expression to spot the HashMap containing all the assets: •'invoke-‐direct \{(v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+)\}, Lcom/******/ *****/AssetCryptImpl\$Range;-‐><init>\(II\)V’ •Repeat the same process for the Ljava/util/Map call: •'invoke-‐interface \{(v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+)\}, Ljava/util/ Map;.*’ •Once all the ranges have been retrieved, its time to extract the assets bytes: •start_init_assets = ".method private static initAssetsBytes()Ljava/ nio/CharBuffer;" •const_string = 'const-‐string v1, "' -
Titanium Framework • But the assets are encrypted… NO PROBLEM,
DO YOU EVEN REVERSE ENGINEERING, BRO?!? • The crypto is described in the JNI function ‘Java_org_appcelerator_titanium_TiVerify_filterD ataInRange’ in ‘libtiverify.so’ byte[] filterDataInRange(byte[] bytes, int offset, int count) { SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(bytes, bytes.length -‐ 0x10, 0x10, "AES"); Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES"); cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key); return cipher.doFinal(bytes, offset, count); } -
Titanium Framework • Yeah, OK, enough theory, show me some
real stuff. [+] Extracting "xxx/ui/checkDeposit/DepositLandingPage.js" [+] Extracting "xxx/ui/transfers/TransferApprovedPage.js" [+] Extracting “shared/xxx/gbapi/checkDepositHistoryResponse.js" … ./xxx/modules: total 40 -rw-r--r-- 1 sebas staff 1560 Mar 9 03:09 BalanceHelper.js -rw-r--r-- 1 sebas staff 1618 Mar 9 03:09 StepUpServiceWrapper.js -rw-r--r-- 1 sebas staff 5675 Mar 9 03:09 UserContext.js -rw-r--r-- 1 sebas staff 1703 Mar 9 03:09 events.mod.js -
Runtime attacks, leveraging the shared codebase • Like we said
before, apps using those frameworks share most of the code. • This fact comes handy also for runtime attacks. We can deploy a runtime attack and use it against all applications that leverage the same framework with little or without any change! -
Can I have it for free Adobe? In App items
for free! 1.Reverse engineer the Adobe AIR code 2.Spot implementation of in app purchases on Android 3.Verify it’s shared between multiple apps 4.Develop a runtime attack to make the purchases appear legitimate when they are not 5.??? 6.PROFIT! -
Reversing and spotting the shared code •Very well known trivial
code copy pasted from Google’s examples that can be found in almost all the apps using In app purchases on Google Play -
Develop a runtime attack • Leverage a framework to patch
verifyPurchase to return always true and other small mods (with Xposed framework for example) • if the app doesn’t check signatures server side for the purchase (which almost none do) we are done • For more informations on runtime attacks on iOS or Android: ZeroNights ’14 - Steroids For Your App Security Assessment - https://speakerdeck.com/marcograss/steroids- for-your-app-security-assessment • Credits to Ryan Welton ( @fuzion24 ) for providing insights and internals of Google Play IAP! -
A tale about chained vulns in Cordova • CVE-2014-3500 XAS
via Android Intent URLs. • CVE-2014-3501 Whitelist Bypass for Non-HTTP URLs. • CVE-2014-3502 Apps can leak data to other apps via URL Loading. • Great paper by IBM Security Systems - http:// www.slideshare.net/ibmsecurity/remote- exploitation-of-the-cordova-framework -
Adobe AIR’s EncryptedLocalStorage API “The EncryptedLocalStore class (ELS) provides an
encrypted local storage mechanism that you can be use as a small cache for an application's private data. ELS data cannot be shared between applications. The intent of ELS is to allow an application to store easily recreated items such as login credentials and other private information.” -‐ Adobe documentation -
Adobe AIR WTF On Android, the data stored by the
EncryptedLocalStorage class are not encrypted. Adobe basically rely on the fact that application private folder are not accessible by an attacker thanks to Android uid/gid separation between apps. As we will see this assumption is not valid. So basically a developer expects to store data encrypted but…. -
Adobe AIR WTF Instead the implementation of the “EncryptedStorage”
is just a Base64 Encoding! Probably lot of others platform specific quirks around the code base… -
Small parenthesis… adb backups • Functionality introduced in Android 4.0.
• If you have physical access to the phone and you can activate usb debugging, you can backup to your computer the content of the private application folder that have the flag “allowBackup” set to true in their AndroidManifest.xml • If the flag is omitted, the default value is true. -
Adobe AIR WTF The Adobe AIR applications by default have
the flag allowBackup unset, so the default value of true kicks in. This allows an attacker without root to backup the content of the private folder of the Adobe application with adb backup and retrieve those unencrypted supposedly private informations. -
What about development tools? By default, outdated JDK is installed
on Windows (who cares right?) -
Titanium Broken Default HTTPS Who’s fault? App Developer, or worst,
framework developers? -
Titanium Broken Default HTTPS So the applications developed by this
framework are often vulnerable by MiTM. Why? By default the framework doesn’t validate the certificate on Android! -
Titanium Broken Default HTTPS If the developer doesn’t specify a
pinning for his certificate, the framework simply leverage dummy classes called “NonValidatingSSLSocketFactory / NonValidatingTrustManager” and so on. So the result is that if you rely on the defaults (which pretty much everyone does), the SSL validation is completely skipped, allowing an attacker to MiTM traffic even without a trusted certificate! -
Titanium Broken Default HTTPS You can use their APIs to
pin your own certificate to workaround this issue, but it will require to pin every single cert you use. -
Conclusions • Security is not taken too much seriously. •
Mechanisms used to protect the application’s assets are not good enough. (so your IP is at risk!) • Few hours were necessary to find these issues. What could possibly go wrong if more time is dedicated to it? -
To the infinity and beyond • Automatic framework recognition and
develop instrumentation to trace also interpreted execution. • Merge all the code extractors in one unique utility. • Find more vulnerabilities in the framework cores. • Suggestions? -
WE ARE HIRING! https://www.nowsecure.com/careers/ OR… SAY HI AND WE CAN
GRAB A DRINK AND TALK! -
Greetz/thanks to @abelenko @insitusec @giantpune @trufae @pof @fuzion24 @tom_anderson2 …
and obviously @0xroot