level • Third level — Fourth level » Fifth level Click to edit Master title style The nightmare behind the cross platform mobile apps dream Marco Grassi @marcograss [email protected] Sebastián Guerrero @0xroot [email protected]
•Concerns •The uniform attack surface •Code formats and code retrieval •Runtime manipulation and dynamic analysis •Some examples of vulnerabilities in the frameworks •Conclusions
on multiple platforms, at least iOS and Android. This caused a growth in the number of tools and frameworks available for cross platform development (code reuse between multiple platforms) with different technologies.
HTML5 technology or interpreters with bindings on the native code platform, to expose the API of the underlying system in a way as platform independent as possible. The result is that lot of code, if not all, can be reused.
and run in every platform! But how is the quality of the code of these frameworks? Do they introduce security vulnerabilities if we use them? Are those vulnerabilities shared by all the applications using the same framework?
applications using web technologies such as HTML5, Javascript and CSS3. •Cordova is the Opensource core, PhoneGap is owned by Adobe which leverages Cordova. •Cordova leverages a “bridge” between javascript and native code, to invoke native methods from javascript code. •OpenSource -‐ https://cordova.apache.org/
•Great job by David Kaplan and Roee Hay of IBM Security Systems •CVE-‐2014-‐3500, CVE-‐2014-‐3501, CVE-‐2014-‐3502, all related to Android Intents somehow “mistrusted” leading to XAS, bypasses and leak of data.
shared with Adobe Flash Player for Desktop browsers •In this context (cross platform application), those vulns are less relevant because you don’t run remote/untrusted code like in the browser, you just execute code shipped within your application. (if you don’t do strange things)
using the same framework. •Vulnerabilities and attacks can be reused among different apps. •The code is stored in high level languages or byte code. This makes reverse engineering process easier or non-‐existent as we will see soon.
javascript, the UI is developed in HTML5 and CSS3. •The code by default it’s just bundled in plain text inside of the mobile app, so retrieving it and reversing is trivial
asset data at runtime through the AssetCryptImpl class. •Assets range are defined in a HashMap within the initAssets class. •Assets bytes are contained in a CharBuffer defined in the initAssetsBytes.
• Parse the code looking for the ‘initAssets’ method: • .method private static initAssets()Ljava/util/Map; • Apply some regular expression to spot the HashMap containing all the assets: • 'invoke-‐direct \{(v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+)\}, Lcom/******/*****/ AssetCryptImpl\$Range;-‐><init>\(II\)V’ • Repeat the same process for the Ljava/util/Map call: • 'invoke-‐interface \{(v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+), (v[0-‐9]+)\}, Ljava/util/Map;.*’ • Once all the ranges have been retrieved, its time to extract the assets bytes: • start_init_assets = ".method private static initAssetsBytes()Ljava/nio/ CharBuffer;" • const_string = 'const-‐string v1, "'
DO YOU EVEN REVERSE ENGINEERING, BRO?!? • The crypto is described in the JNI function ‘Java_org_appcelerator_titanium_TiVerify_filterDataInRange’ in ‘libtiverify.so’ byte[] filterDataInRange(byte[] bytes, int offset, int count) { SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(bytes, bytes.length -‐ 0x10, 0x10, "AES"); Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES"); cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key); return cipher.doFinal(bytes, offset, count); }
level • Third level — Fourth level » Fifth level Click to edit Master title style Enough with static analysis attacks.. What about dynamic? Runtime Manipulation
before, apps using those frameworks share most of the code. •This fact comes handy also for runtime attacks. We can deploy a runtime attack and use it against all applications that leverage the same framework with little or without any change!
items for free! 1. Reverse engineer the Adobe AIR code 2. Spot implementation of in app purchases on Android 3. Verify it’s shared between multiple apps 4. Develop a runtime attack to make the purchases appear legitimate when they are not 5. ??? 6. PROFIT!
verifyPurchase to return always true and other small mods (with Xposed framework for example) • if the app doesn’t check signatures server side for the purchase (which almost none do) we are done • For more informations on runtime attacks on iOS or Android: ZeroNights ’14 -‐ Steroids For Your App Security Assessment -‐ https:// speakerdeck.com/marcograss/steroids-‐for-‐your-‐ app-‐security-‐assessment
via Android Intent URLs. • CVE-‐2014-‐3501 Whitelist Bypass for Non-‐HTTP URLs. • CVE-‐2014-‐3502 Apps can leak data to other apps via URL Loading.
website requested, via the ‘CordovaWebView’ activity, through the ‘loadUrl()’ function. • If the url provided is ‘ about:blank' or ‘javascript’ it will be loaded via ‘loadUrlNow(url)’ method. Otherwise the register v0 will triggered after a call to ‘getProperty(“url”, null)’. • In such case, the ‘url’ parameter is taken from ‘getIntent().getExtra()’, which can be provided externally.
parameter can be passed via Intent extras in ‘CordovaActivity’. • The ‘errorurl’ will be rendered by the WebView when a network request fails. • The parameter’s content must either be in the whitelist or be part of URI scheme file. Otherwise it will not be triggered.
to ensure that the WebView only allows requests to URLs in the configured whitelist. • The mechanism is only configured for HTTP/S or the file URI, being possible to bypass it through other protocols like WS/S
not handled by the function will be launched in the default viewer. • If an attacker calls the WebView to load a new URL (location.href), ‘shouldOverrideUrlLoading()’ will be called. Independently of the whitelist validation. • It’s possible to force Cordova to launch a URL using the default viewer.
an encrypted local storage mechanism that you can be use as a small cache for an application's private data. ELS data cannot be shared between applications. The intent of ELS is to allow an application to store easily recreated items such as login credentials and other private information.” -‐ Adobe documentation
the EncryptedLocalStorage class are not encrypted. Adobe basically rely on the fact that application private folder are not accessible by an attacker thanks to Android uid/gid separation between apps. As we will see this assumption is not valid. So basically a developer expects to store data encrypted but….
• If you have physical access to the phone and you can activate usb debugging, you can backup to your computer the content of the private application folder that have the flag “allowBackup” set to true in their AndroidManifest.xml • If the flag is omitted, the default value is true.
have the flag allowBackup unset, so the default value of true kicks in. This allows an attacker without root to backup the content of the private folder of the Adobe application with adb backup and retrieve those unencrypted supposedly private informations.
pinning for his certificate, the framework simply leverage dummy classes called “NonValidatingSSLSocketFactory / NonValidatingTrustManager” and so on. So the result is that if you rely on the defaults (which pretty much everyone does), the SSL validation is completely skipped, allowing an attacker to MiTM traffic even without a trusted certificate!
• Mechanisms used to protect the application’s assets are not good enough. (so your IP is at risk!) • Few hours and some minion bottles of vodka were necessary to find these issues. What could possibly go wrong if we dedicate more time?
and develop instrumentation to trace also interpreted execution. • Merge all the code extractors in one unique utility. • Find more vulnerabilities in the framework cores. • Suggestions?
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